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In the Histories, objects tell their own stories. Herodotos gives them a 
variety of additional meanings that add to his narrative’s complexity. This 
dissertation examines the creation and shaping of these meanings through 
Herodotos’ manipulation of objects and their connotations. He employs two 
methods to shape an object’s meaning: context and presentation. For the first, he 
emphasizes a particular connotation through a specific context. For the second, 
he alters the object physically, replacing it or depicting it diachronically. This 
work discusses Herodotos’ methodology and its application to foreshadowing, 
comparisons, the creation of an epic setting, and the rise of Athenian power. 
Herodotos uses the manipulation of objects to foreshadow Persian 
victories and defeat. As the Persian Empire confronts a series of kingdoms, the 
historian presents the respective royal monuments diachronically. Succumbing 
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to or enduring the passage of time, these monuments symbolize the fate of the 
monarchs and kingdoms. 
Herodotos also manipulates objects to create comparative character 
portraits. The historian associates characters with distinct connotations through 
the repetition and substitution of an object. Placing similar characters in parallel 
contexts, the historian then replaces or alters an object over time. The change in 
the object and its attendant connotation highlights the characters’ differences. 
In addition to manipulating an object, Herodotos carefully controls 
meaning through an object’s context. This dissertation examines a prominent 
example: the Masistios logos (ix.20-31). In this section, Herodotos uses corpses to 
create an epic setting and unite the passage structurally and thematically. 
Equating Masistios’ corpse to the bodies of Patroklos and Hektor, the historian 
transforms the battle at Cithaeron into an epic duel, in which the Athenians play 
the role of a collective epic hero. 
Athenian power is illustrated through the historian’s fundamental 
alteration of the connotation of teichea. Throughout the Histories, Herodotos 
consistently places teichea in the context of failure, thus undermining the 
traditional association of teichos with security. He uses this new connotation to 
contrast the Spartan and Athenian strategies for the war against Persia and to 
trace the decline of Persian power and the concomitant rise of Athens. Thus, in 
these various ways, Herodotos controls objects to enhance his narrative. 
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Herodotos walked in a world full of objects that spoke. Tombs 
commemorated the lives of kings, queens, heroes, and ordinary men.1 
Monuments told the greatness of these people.2 Dedications recounted the tales 
of their great deeds and the events of their lives.3 Simple objects, such as clothing 
and tools – the implements of everyday life – told the historian about their 
peoples and what they valued.4 He lived in a culture in which objects or images 
of objects were used as symbols to enhance memory5 or as focal points for oral 
tales.6 The Greeks frequently bolstered and verified their traditions and accounts 
through references to objects.7 Essentially, objects, particularly monuments, 
became vehicles for the preservation of memory or kleos.8 Walking through this 
world, Herodotos touched these objects and heard the stories and the meanings 
that clung to each of them.  
The current work examines Herodotos’ use and manipulation of these 
objects and their meanings in his narrative. The majority of the previous studies 
on objects in the Histories have examined their use from a purely historical 
perspective. Scholars have debated whether Herodotos explicitly set out to 
                                                
1 E.g. the public burial and tomb of Tellus the Athenian (i.31). 
2 E.g. the statues of the pharaoh Sesostris and his family before the temple of Hephaestus (ii.110). 
3 E.g. the Greek victory-dedications after the victory at Plataea (ix.81). 
4 E.g. the Athenian adoption of Ionic dress (v.87-88). 
5 Vansina. 1985, pp. 44-45. Rubin. 1995, pp. 46-48, 62. Shrimpton. 1997, p. 54.  
6 Bartlett. 1964, pp. 93-94. Vansina. 1985, pp. 44-46. 
7 Evans. 1991, p. 130. Poudrier. 2002, pp. 16-17. Higbie. 2003, pp. 208, 280. E.g.: the chains in the 
temple of Athene Alea in Tegea reminded the Tegeans of their great victory over the Spartans 
(Hdt. i.66). 
8 Jackson. 1991, pp. 243-244. Steiner. 2001, p. 254. Higbie 2003, pp. 249-250. E. g.: the statues of 
Kleobis and Biton preserved the memory of their great display of strength and fidelity to their 
mother (Hdt. i.31).  
 
2 
preserve a record of objects or at least great monuments. His use of the term erga 
in his proem has been interpreted to mean “deeds” or “monuments” or a 
combination of the two.9 In the body of the historian’s text, objects have been 
examined as sources. Scholars have used his accounts of great monuments and 
cities to aid archaeological investigations.10 In recent years, scholars have given 
greater attention to how Herodotos used (or even invented) objects, particularly 
monuments and inscriptions, as sources for his investigation.11 
But objects can do more than verify historical fact or preserve memories. 
Through their connotations, they may convey a variety of meanings, symbolizing 
relationships, wealth, social status, and more. Objects have a multiplicity of 
connotations depending upon whether they are regarded on the physical or the 
social level. For example, an automobile can be viewed as a pile of metal, a 
means of transportation, a status symbol (e.g. a luxury car), or all three 
simultaneously.12 Hence imagery, generated in part by objects, may express 
meaning more effectively than verbal information.13 In general, objects convey 
cultural content or connotations that are brought out in different ways.14 
                                                
9 For arguments that “erga” includes monuments see: Stein. 1883, p. 1f; Diels. 1887, p. 440. Jacoby. 
1913, cols. 333-334. For arguments that “erga” means only “deeds” see: Schwartz. 1929, p. 20 n. 1; 
Focke. 1927, p. 1f; Legrand. 1954, loc. sit; Erbse. 1956, p. 218; Cobet. 1971, p. 30; Grant. 1983, pp. 
294-296. For arguments that “erga” refers generally to “achievements” both tangible 
(monuments) and intangible (deeds) see: Immerwahr. 1960, pp. 263-264. Regenbogen. 1968. 
Bloomer. 1993, pp. 32-33. Bakker. 2002, pp. 8-12. 
10 For example: von Guschmid. 1893, pp. 148-157. Ravn. 1942, pp. 31-38. Lloyd. 1993, passim.  
11 Groten. 1963, p. 87. Hunter. 1982, pp. 93-97. West. 1985, pp. 287-289. Flory. 1987, pp. 40-41. 
Smith. 1987, passim. Fehling. 1989, passim. Evans. 1991, pp. 123-127. Flower. 1991, pp. 67-69. 
Hendrick. 193, p. 26. Pritchett. 1993, passim. Christ. 1994, pp. 167-202. Hornblower. 2002, pp. 373-
386. Poudrier. 2002, pp. 8-10. Higbie. 2003, p. 262. 
12 Eco. 1976, p. 27. 
13 Rubin. 1995, p. 48. 
14 Eco. 1976, pp. 55-57, 60-61. Barthes. 1977, pp. 118-119. 
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But connotations are more than simply employed, they are arranged, 
manipulated, or even created. Renaissance artists used depictions of scientific 
instruments and navigation tools to convey the superiority of European culture. 
They also inserted images of skulls or bones into their works to symbolize 
mortality and death.15 Modern media, particularly advertisements, frequently 
manipulate objects, linking them to specific positive or negative connotations. 
Such manipulation is neither new nor surprising. The early Christians 
transformed the image of a fish, which previously had been associated with the 
sea, into a symbol of their religion.16 All objects possess a multiplicity of 
connotations that may be evoked by an artist or read by an audience depending 
upon the object’s context.17 
Herodotos reveals an awareness of an object’s ability to express multiple 
additional meanings in his account of Periander’s consultation of Thrasybulus. 
Through a messenger, the Corinthian tyrant asked Thrasybulus the best method 
to maintain his newfound power. The Milesian tyrant led the messenger out into 
a field and cut the heads off the highest stalks of grain (v.92z2). Herodotos uses 
the reactions of the messenger and Periander to express the grain’s multiple 
meanings. Through the messenger’s surprise at Thrasybulus’ destruction of his 
own crops, the historian uses the grain to illustrate tyrannical waste. Through 
                                                
15 Berger. 1972, pp. 91, 94-95 
16 Elsner. 1995, p. 1. 
17 Eco. 1976, p. 57. 
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Periander’s eyes, however, the historian uses the grain to communicate to the 
Corinthian tyrant the most secure way to rule (5.92.z3).18 
Herodotos develops such multiple layers of meaning both explicitly and 
implicitly. In the case of the former, the historian includes a discussion of the 
significance of an object, or set of objects. For example, when the Scythians sent a 
bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows to Darius, the Persians openly debated the 
import of these gifts (iv.131-132). Darius optimistically interpreted them as an 
indication that the Scythians were surrendering. Gobryas, however, interpreted 
the objects differently saying:  
h]n mh; o[rniqe" genovmenoi ajnapth'sqe ej" to;n oujranovn, w\ Pevrsai, 
h] muve" genovmenoi kata; th'" gh'" kataduvhte, h] bavtracoi 
genovmenoi ej" ta;" livmna" ejsphdhvshte, oujk ajponosthvsete ojpivsw 
uJpo; tw'nde tw'n toxeumavtwn ballovmenoi. 
 
Unless becoming birds you fly up into the air, O Persians, or 
becoming mice you burrow into the earth or becoming frogs you 
jump into the lakes, then being shot by these arrows you will never 
return home. (iv.132.3) 
 
Regardless of the correct interpretation of the gifts, the historian plainly 
examines their significance.  
 In recent years, scholars have studied this explicit use of objects to 
communicate or signify meaning. Donald Lateiner first recognized that 
Herodotos uses objects in various forms of non-verbal communication. In a 
broader study of the historian’s use of gestures (ritualized, informal, involuntary, 
and subconscious), Lateiner includes objects or tokens as another means by 
                                                
18 As will be shown, Chapter 1, pp. 13-17, the historian combines the interpretations of both 
Periander and the messenger to comment on the nature of tyranny. 
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which the historian creates lines of communication between characters and 
between himself and his audience.19 In her 1993 article “Reading the World,” 
Carolyn Dewald focuses on Herodotos’ use of objects to indicate meaning 
explicitly. While she warns that the historian often avoids giving an object a 
single, clear meaning, she determines that the historian uses objects as a method 
of conveying additional meaning between characters and to his audience.20 More 
recently, Alexander Hollmann has examined the semiotics of Herodotean objects. 
In his study, he argues that Herodotos encodes meaning into objects, 
transforming them into “sign vehicles,” for communication between characters.21 
In each of these studies, however, focus has never been placed on objects 
that possess an implicit meaning or connotation. The current work addresses this 
omission. Instead of studying the historian’s use of objects for non-verbal 
communication or as an explicit symbol or sign, I examine objects that Herodotos 
charges with latent meaning or objects from which he evokes a particular 
connotation. The historian employs these objects to create a sub-text reified in the 
artifacts of his narrative, which, similar to the objects in Herodotos’ world, await 
an audience to unlock their implicit meanings. 
Such an approach to objects is not unique to Herodotos. Greek artists, 
particularly vase painters, used representations of objects to signify certain 
connotations or associations.22 They could evoke funerary or symposiastic 
connotations (or both) with the simple inclusion of images of objects common to 
                                                
19 Lateiner. 1987, pp. 87, 96-97. 
20 Dewald. 1993, pp. 65-66. 
21 Hollmann. 1998, pp. 172-186. 
22 Bérard. 1989, pp. 25-26. 
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one or both settings.23 Early Greek authors used objects in a similar way. On the 
remarkable surface of the Shield of Achilles, Homer inscribes an entire narrative 
for his audience to interpret.24 Gregory Nagy has studied this poet’s use of 
objects as symbols.25 Nagy and other scholars have also examined the use of 
everyday objects, such as clothing, to define status.26 In the works of Pindar, 
goads and whips are symbols of love27 and leaves signify both victory and 
death.28 In the works of the tragic poets, Oliver Taplin first recognized the 
manner in which they gave some objects “special associations [that] betoken 
much more than themselves.”29 Since then, scholars have studied notable objects 
in tragedy such as the carpet in Agamemnon,30 the chains in Prometheus Bound,31 
the sword of Ajax, the robe of Deianeira, the bow of Philoctetes, and the urn of 
Electra.32 Similar studies on commonplace objects have been conducted for other 
tragedians33 as well as the comedian Aristophanes.34  
Yet in these studies, scholars have never examined the process by which 
an author charges an object with an additional meaning. In the case of the 
tragedies and comedies, the playwrights no doubt relied in part upon the 
physical props and their performers to evoke the desired connotation. But 
                                                
23 Boardman. 1990, pp. 127-130. 
24 Becker. 1990, pp. 140-141. 
25 Nagy. 1990, pp. 203-217. 
26 Block. 1985, pp. 4-10. Nagy. 1990, pp. 203-205. 
27 Faraone. 1993, pp. 5-14. 
28 Griffith. 1999, pp. 55-58. 
29 Taplin. 1978, p. 77. 
30 Crane. 1993, p. 135. 
31 Mossman. 1996, p. 60. 
32 Segal. 1980, pp. 127-135. 
33 Mastronade. 1975, pp. 164-166. Segal. 1990, p. 304. Georges. 1994, pp. 152-153. Mueller. 2002, 
pp. 21-23. Lee. 2004, pp. 258-262.  
34 Compton-Engle. 2005, pp. 164-175. 
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Herodotos possesses no stage, no actors, and no props besides the ones that he 
creates within his text. Accordingly, the methods that he uses to manipulate an 
object’s connotation are more easily discerned. Hence, this work examines not 
only the additional meanings that Herodotos assigns to his objects, but also the 
manner in which he embeds these meanings. 
I divide the study of this subject into five parts. In the first chapter, I begin 
with an examination of Herodotos’ methodology. For the most part, the historian 
does not create an additional meaning; rather he evokes one of an object’s 
existing connotations. He emphasizes the desired connotation through one of 
two methods: the object’s context in the text or by the alteration of its 
presentation. Through a series of examples, this chapter illustrates how the 
historian places an object in a carefully constructed context to elicit a particular 
connotation. Next, the chapter examines two methods by which Herodotos alters 
an object’s appearance or description and hence changes its meaning. First, he 
uses repetition with substitution to replace an object with one of a similar 
category (e.g. clothes: himation for chiton) in the same or similar scene. Second, he 
presents an object diachronically. Through the use of analepsis or prolepsis, the 
historian describes an object in multiple time frames. In both cases, Herodotos 
generates multiple images of the same object, which creates a text of 
connotations for his audience to interpret.  
In the next two chapters, I examine Herodotos’ manipulation of objects 
and their contexts in greater depth. The second chapter illustrates the historian’s 
use of the diachronic presentation to foreshadow major events in his narrative. 
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As Herodotos traces the expansion of Persian power in the first half of his 
narrative, he examines in turn several of the major empires or polities as they 
encountered Persia. Immediately before he describes the encroachment of 
Persian power, Herodotos selects royal monuments and reveals how each one 
succumbed to or endured the passage of time. The historian links the fate of the 
ruler to the fate of the monument, a symbol of the monarch’s greatness. The 
historian uses a monument’s decay at a later point in time to presage a similar 
decline in the monarch’s fate. In this way, he illustrates the imminent defeat of 
Lydia, Babylon, Egypt, and Samos. But in the case of Scythia, Herodotos reverses 
this paradigm, foreshadowing the failure of Darius’ campaign through the 
diachronic presentation of one of his monuments. 
The third chapter examines Herodotos’ other method for the 
manipulation of objects and their connotations: the repetition and substitution of 
an object. This chapter focuses specifically on the historian’s use of comparisons 
to highlight character traits. Herodotos places characters of a similar class (e.g. 
kings, tyrants, etc.) in analogous circumstances. Within this pattern of repeated 
contexts, the historian alters an object that is central to the character or the action 
in the narrative. By changing an object (diachronically) or replacing it (through 
repetition and substitution), the historian associates the characters with different 
connotations to emphasize the disparities between the characters and their 
natures. 
In the next two chapters, I return to the historian’s use of an object’s 
context to emphasize or even transform its connotation. The fourth chapter 
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examines how the historian uses the context of a battle to place a class of objects 
(corpses) in an epic light. Herodotos then uses these corpses to unite and shape a 
particular section of the narrative, the Masistios logos (ix.20-31). Equating the 
corpse of the Persian cavalry commander Masistios at one point to the body of 
Patroklos and later to the body of Hektor, Herodotos presents the Athenian army 
in the role of an epic hero. The historian uses the corpse to create several 
allusions to the Iliad and to equate the battle on the foothills of Cithaeron to a 
transitional moment in the epic poem. He then perpetuates the praise of the 
Athenians in the following two sections: the debate between the Tegeans and the 
Athenians and the catalog of the Greek forces. In both sections he maintains the 
epic tone of the passage and continues to use corpses to praise the Athenian 
contribution to the Plataean campaign. 
The fifth chapter demonstrates that Herodotos may also fundamentally 
alter the connotation of an object through its presentation. By consistently 
placing teichea in a context of failure, the historian undermines the association of 
teichos with security and replaces it with the connotation of vulnerability. In the 
Histories, fortifications fail 86.0% of the time and nearly 100% of the time when 
attacked by the Persians (prior to the battle of Salamis). In the opening books of 
his work, Herodotos demonstrates the futility of defending a fortified position 
against the Persians and emphasizes the nascent empire’s siege-craft. The 
historian uses this altered connotation for two purposes. First, he compares the 
strategies proposed by the Spartans and Athenians to defend Greece against the 
invasion of Xerxes. The Spartans continually espoused the construction or 
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defense of a fortified position, which, when presented in light of teichea’s 
established context of failure, appears foolish and foredoomed to failure. In 
contrast, the Athenians eschewed traditional teichea in favor of an offensive 
strategy centered on their fleet. Second, Herodotos uses teichea to trace the rise 
and fall of imperial powers. He links the rise of Persia to its ability to defeat 
strongly fortified positions. When the Persians shifted to the defensive in Scythia 
and Greece, however, they began to rely on fortifications and were soon 
defeated. In the second campaign, Herodotos traces the concomitant rise of 
Athens as the fortunes of Persia declined after the Battle of Salamis. The 
Athenians became the key to the defeat of various Persian defenses at Plataea, 
Mycale, and later at Sestos. The historian uses this newfound proficiency with 
siege-craft to illustrate the growing power of Athens and to indicate its 





Shaping Objects, Shaping Connotations: 
Objects with Additional Meaning 
 
Objects are full of potential meanings or connotations. An article of 
clothing, for example, may reveal or conceal the wearer’s identity, which may 
range from regal to common. An object’s connotation is a social construct, 
derived from the preconceptions of the viewer.1 In the physical world, an object’s 
appearance limits the range of potential connotations, but in the pages of the 
Histories Herodotos controls this appearance and hence may exert direct control 
over an object’s connotation. He creates every detail that he wishes his audience 
to notice; the manner of this creation provides a way of discerning the historian’s 
methods of manipulating an object’s various connotations. 
Herodotos limits and directs the audience’s gaze to the connotations that 
he wishes to convey in two ways: an object’s context and its description. Through 
these two methods, the historian emphasizes particular connotations and 
minimizes others. Context largely dictates meaning. The clothing worn by the 
Cean concubine discovered in the Persian camp at Plataea illustrates her status 
and identity (ix.77). Conversely, the women’s clothing used to disguise the 
Macedonian youths intent on murdering some Persian ambassadors signifies 
concealment and deception (v.20). Despite the differing contexts, however, the 
objects, female garb, are essentially the same. 
                                                
1 Eco. 1976, pp. 24-26. 
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In addition to guiding an object’s connotation through its context, 
Herodotos further manipulates an object’s meaning by altering the presentation 
of the object itself. Herodotos alters an object in two ways. First, he replaces the 
object for another of the same type. Second, he retains the specific object, but 
alters it physically. In the first approach, the historian uses repetition and 
substitution to replace one type of the object with another (e.g. a chiton for a 
himation, a sword for a spear). In the second approach, the historian emphasizes 
how a specific object changes over time. Through such alterations, Herodotos 
generates multiple images, and hence multiple meanings, of the same or similar 
object, transforming the object into a text of connotations. Like an old fashioned 
flipbook, Herodotos creates a cinematic effect, a series of shifting images that 
enables him to tell a story. 
This chapter examines both the historian’s use of context and his 
manipulation of objects to derive meaning through the analysis of select 
examples that employ one or both methods. Beginning with the manipulation of 
an object’s context, I examine how the historian emphasizes or minimizes a 
particular connotation. Next, I review the historian’s use of repetition with 
substitution and his diachronic presentation of objects to create multiple images, 
and hence multiple meanings, of the same (or similar) object. 
 
Evoking Meaning Through Context 
 Context is a pervasive term that includes characters, setting, action, 
dialogue, and even other props in the narrative. For example, a bottle of wine 
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contains the connotations of “value,” “revelry,” and “desperation” when 
presented in the respective contexts of “a collector’s wine cellar,” “a dinner 
party,” and “a homeless man drinking straight from the bottle.” Through these 
contexts, an author does not alter the wine bottle’s basic meaning – a drink – but 
emphasizes its various latent additional meanings. Hence, in the context of the 
wine cellar, the author directs the audience to interpret the wine bottle as a 
symbol of value. At the dinner party, however, if the author describes the 
breaking of the bottle and its use as a weapon, he undermines the wine bottle’s 
connotation, creating two contrasting meanings of revelry and violence. The 
author may also arrange a series of connotations into a narrative pattern. 
Through the presentation of the same or a series of wine bottles, first in the wine 
cellar, next at a several dinner parties, and finally in the grasp of a homeless man, 
the author may illustrate the decline of successful wine collector into alcoholism 
and ruin.  
In this same way Herodotos shapes the connotations and hence the latent 
meanings of the objects in his narrative. Controlling an object’s context, he 
promotes, minimizes, and arranges these connotations into coherent messages 
for his narrative and so transforms objects into a sub-textual tool with which he 
communicates to the audience.  
 
Wasteful Tyranny – Corn to Loaves (v.92z-h) 
  When Socles sought to persuade the Lacedaemonians to abandon their 
restoration of the Athenian tyrant Hippias to power, he cited his own polis’ 
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painful memories of the tyrant Periander. Scholars have long studied this 
passage to discern Greek and Herodotean views on tyranny. In this logos, 
tyrannical violence reaches all levels of society2 and there is a discernible link 
between the tyrant and waste.3 Yet, the totality of the tyrant’s destructive 
behavior has not been fully recognized. Periander assaulted not merely the 
bodies of the Corinthian polis, but on a symbolic level the Corinthian oikos as 
well. The Greek oikos ideally operated within a cycle of self-sufficiency. The oikos 
would both produce and consume its staple needs, often represented by the 
processing of wool and grain, which the Greeks would then wear as clothing or 
consume as food.4  
Tyrannical waste is a familiar theme in the Histories. Even when tyrants 
worked towards a desirable, even productive, goal, they often utilized wasteful 
methods. Thrasybulus heaped the few grain stores left in Miletos in the town 
center and ordered his subjects to drink and revel (i.21). Although he did this to 
fool Alyattes, the potential exposure of grain to the elements and vermin as well 
as the unnecessary consumption of food and wine for the revelry was profligate. 
Polycrates, even though he failed to achieve his goal, sought to destroy his own 
signet ring (iii.41-42). He also engaged in pointless piratical raids, often returning 
the plunder that he had stolen (iii.40). Finally, when a force of Samian exiles 
threatened his hold on power, he placed the wives and children of potential 
traitors in his boat-sheds and threatened to burn them and the sheds, which were 
                                                
2 Van der Veen. 1996, p. 82. 
3 Gray. 1996, p. 379. 
4 Jenkins. 1985, p. 111. 
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an integral part of the tyrant’s naval power (iii.45.4). Even Peisistratus, who 
amassed resources to seize power in Athens a third time and husbanded them to 
maintain his position, engaged in wasteful behavior. In his first attempt, he 
wounded himself and his mule in an attempt to elicit sympathy (i.59). When he 
was in power a second time, he engaged in unproductive sex with Megacles’ 
daughter to prevent conception (i.61).  
 In Socles’ speech, Herodotos represents the destructive nature of tyranny 
through Periander’s and Thrasybulus’ assaults on the two staples of the Greek 
oikos: clothes and food. After Periander assumed power he killed and exiled 
many citizens (polihvta"). He destroyed the public representatives of the various 
Corinthian oikoi, but did not immediately assault the oikos. This changed, though, 
when he lost a friend’s deposit. He consulted his dead wife, Melissa, about its 
whereabouts, but she refused to answer because she lacked clothes in the 
afterlife. Rather than simply sacrifice some of her old clothes or even new 
clothes, the tyrant summoned the women of Corinth to the temple of Hera and 
sacrificed their finest clothes to his Melissa: 
ai} me;n dh; wJ" ej" oJrth;n h[isan kovsmw/ tw'/ kallivstw/ crewvmenai, o} 
dæ uJposthvsa" tou;" dorufovrou" ajpevduse sfeva" pavsa" oJmoivw", 
tav" te ejleuqevra" kai; ta;" ajmfipovlou", sumforhvsa" de; ej" 
o[rugma Melivssh/ ejpeucovmeno" katevkaie.  
 
The women came as though to a festival wearing their finest 
clothes, and he having concealed some guards for this purpose 
stripped everyone of the women both free and servants, and 





In addition to this direct violation of the sanctity of the temple and the women, 
representatives of the Corinthian oikoi, Periander wantonly destroyed one of the 
two symbols of an oikos’ self-sufficiency – clothing, or more specifically the 
women’s finest clothing (kovsmw/ tw'/ kallivstw/). 
 Herodotos also links tyrants, both Periander and his mentor Thrasybulus, 
to the waste of food. When the ghost of Melissa complained to the Corinthian 
tyrant that she was naked in the afterlife, she made a cryptic reference to the fact 
that Periander had slept with his wife after her death to prove that she spoke the 
truth:  
martuvrion dev oiJ ei\nai wJ" ajlhqeva tau'ta levgei, o{ti ejpi; yucro;n 
to;n ijpno;n Perivandro" tou;" a[rtou" ejpevbale. 
 
Then as evidence that she spoke the truth to him, she said that 
Periander placed loaves of bread in a cold oven. (v.92h2) 
 
As Vivienne Gray points out, this is another sign of tyrannical waste, for 
Periander literally wasted his own seed in the corpse of his wife.5 However, the 
significance of the metaphor has not been fully appreciated. Symbolically 
Periander wasted the other mark of oikos self-sufficiency: bread.  
Moreover, Herodotos attributes similar behavior to the Milesian tyrant 
Thrasybulus. After succeeding his father as tyrant, Periander sent a messenger to 
ask Thrasybulus how he might “most securely” (ajsfalevstaton) and “best” 
(kavlliston) rule Corinth. Instead of a verbal response, Thrasybulus led the 
messenger out to a field where he lopped the heads off of the best (kavllista) 
                                                
5 Gray. 1996, p. 379. 
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wheat stalks (v.92z2). Scholars have studied the manner in which Thrasybulus 
and Periander used the grain to encode and decode a message,6 but the meaning 
of the action is often overlooked. While Benardete argues that it was symbolic, 
advising Periander that beauty may need to be sacrificed for security;7 the literal 
action should not be disregarded. Thrasybulus willfully destroyed the best heads 
of grain, which in the oikos would ideally have been harvested and turned into 
flour and then bread. Hence, both literally and metaphorically the tyrant wasted 
the staple produce and product of the Greek oikos: food. 
Herodotos, then, uses Thrasybulus’ and Periander’s treatment of the two 
staples of the Greek oikos, food and clothing, to symbolize the profligacy of 
tyranny. In the case of the first, the tyrants destroyed the core of the ancient diet, 
bread, at both ends of the production cycle: harvesting and baking. Next, 
Periander first provided inadequate clothing for his deceased wife and second 
violated the women of Corinth by stripping off and burning their finest clothes.  
Thus, through the destruction of these two classes of objects, Herodotos depicts 
the tyrants not merely as destroyers of rivals (the wealthy and powerful), but 
also pillagers of the essentials of an oikos’ self-sufficiency. 
 
The Table of the Sun (iii.17-26) 
Using this necessity of life, food, Herodotos adds another layer of 
meaning to Cambyses’ campaigns against the Ethiopians and Ammonians. In 
this logos, food, or more precisely diet, occupies a central position both in 
                                                
6 Forsdyke. 1999, p. 367.  Hollmann 1998, p. 294. 
7 Benardete. 1969, p. 149. 
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Cambyses’ investigation of Ethiopia and his invasion of the country. The 
historian describes both the Ethiopian diet and the provisions that Cambyses 
supplied to his invasion force in detail. In addition to defining Ethiopian customs 
and the causes for the failure of the Persian campaign, however, Herodotos uses 
his description of food and differing diets to contrast the wisdom of the 
respective monarchs and to emphasize Cambyses’ lack of perspicacity and his 
growing madness.  
 Cambyses began his preparations for invasion by dispatching spies to 
Ethiopia. Herodotos appropriates this investigation to insert his own 
observations about the Ethiopians.8 Scholars overlook, however, the historian’s 
foregrounding of Cambyses’ lack of perception through the episode. The Persian 
king charged his spies, the Fish-Eaters, with three tasks: 
ejpi; de; tou;" Aijqivopa" katovpta" prw'ton, ojyomevnou" te th;n ejn 
touvtoisi toi'si Aijqivoyi legomevnhn ei\nai hJlivou travpezan eij 
e[sti ajlhqevw", kai; pro;" tauvth/ ta; a[lla katoyomevnou", dw'ra de; 
tw'/ lovgw/ fevronta" tw'/ basilevi aujtw'n.  
 
[Cambyses decided to send] the spies to Ethiopia first to see the 
table that the Ethiopians called the Table of the Sun really existed 
and next to inspect the other things in the country, while 
supposedly bringing gifts to the Ethiopian king. (iii.17.2) 
 
Making the Table a focal point of the mission, Herodotos describes at length the 
curious custom that surrounds it:9  
hJ de; travpeza tou' hJlivou toihvde ti" levgetai ei\nai, leimwvn ejsti 
ejn tw'/ proastivw/ ejpivpleo" krew'n eJfqw'n pavntwn tw'n 
                                                
8 Christ. 1994, pp. 180-181. Christ regards this episode as one in which Herodotos "…appropriates 
a kingly inquiry for his own purposes. These episodes without a doubt serve a 'compositional 
function,' since the historian takes advantage of them to insert his own observations."  
9 Munson. 1991, p. 181. While Munson notes Herodotos’ focus, she overlooks the significance of 
the Table’s contents and its maintenance. 
 
19 
tetrapovdwn, ej" to;n ta;" me;n nuvkta" ejpithdeuvonta" tiqevnai ta; 
kreva tou;" ejn tevlei> eJkavstou" ejovnta" tw'n ajstw'n, ta;" de; hJmevra" 
daivnusqai prosiovnta to;n boulovmenon. favnai de; tou;" ejpicwrivou" 
tau'ta th;n gh'n aujth;n ajnadidovnai eJkavstote.  
 
The story about the Table of the Sun is that there is a meadow in 
the area in front of the town full of the boiled meat of all kinds of 
four-footed animals, during the night it is the duty of the town’s 
magistrates to place the meat there, and during the day he who 
wishes may approach and eat. But the natives say that the earth 
itself produces these things each time. (iii.18) 
 
Meat was central to diet of the Ethiopians (iii.23.1), who apparently possessed no 
knowledge of agriculture. In this respect they resemble the warlike men of 
Hesiod’s fabled Bronze Age (W&D 144-150), whose lack of agriculture 
characterized their lack of civilization.10 But while the Ethiopians appear less 
civilized in terms of their diet, they were not a barbarous meat-eating/man-
eating people like Polyphemus, the epitome of rustic barbarism. The Ethiopian 
king, through his magistrates, provided for the needs of his people. Although the 
people believed that the meat appeared spontaneously from the earth (favnai de; 
tou;" ejpicwrivou" tau'ta th;n gh'n aujth;n ajnadidovnai eJkavstote), the local 
magistrates nightly restocked the supply of food (ej" to;n ta;" me;n nuvkta" 
ejpithdeuvonta" tiqevnai ta; kreva tou;" ejn tevlei> eJkavstou" ejovnta" tw'n ajstw'n) 
(iii.18).  
 In the Fish-Eaters’ subsequent interview with the Ethiopian king, 
Herodotos uses the discussion of diet to proclaim the superiority of the Ethiopian 
diet and king. When the Ethiopian monarch learned how the staple of the 
                                                
10 Athanassakis. 1983, pp. 92-93. 
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Persian diet, grain, was grown and bread produced, he called this food the 
“produce of animals” (or dung) and attributed the relatively short Persian life-
span to it (pro;" tau'ta oJ Aijqivoy e[fh oujde;n qwmavzein eij siteovmenoi kovpron 
e[tea ojlivga zwvousi: / The Ethiopian king said that he was not surprised if 
eating dung they lived only a few years - iii.22.4). Herodotos validates the king’s 
judgment through his response to the Fish-Eaters’ counter-inquiry about the 
Ethiopian life span and diet: 
ajnteiromevnwn de; to;n basileva tw'n jIcquofavgwn th'" zovh" kai; 
diaivth" pevri, e[tea me;n ej" ei[kosi kai; eJkato;n tou;" pollou;" 
aujtw'n ajpiknevesqai, uJperbavllein dev tina" kai; tau'ta, sivthsin 
de; ei\nai kreva te eJfqa; kai; povma gavla.  
 
In response the Fish-Eaters asked the king about the Ethiopian 
lifespan and diet, they were told that most of them lived to be one 
hundred twenty years old, and that some surpassed even this, and 
that their diet was boiled meat and milk. (iii.23.1) 
 
In this exchange, Herodotos uses lifespan as a gauge to compare the Ethiopian 
diet favorably to the Persian and to support the Ethiopian king’s apparent 
wisdom about food. 
 In contrast, Cambyses, despite the greater civilization implied by the 
Persian diet, displayed a disastrous lack of understanding about food. First, he 
selected spies inadequate to their task. Herodotos delays the identification of 
Cambyses’ spies, the Fish-eaters ( jIcquofavgwn), until after his description of the 
Table (iii.19.1). But thereafter, through repeated mention of their name, he draws 
attention to their diet.11 Although their familiarity with the Ethiopian language 
suited their mission, their limited diet of fish precluded a complete investigation 
                                                
11 iii.19.1, 20.1, 21.1, 22.1, 22.2, 22.4, 23.1, 25.2. 
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of a table covered with the meat of land animals. They could not, like anyone 
that desired (to;n boulovmenon), partake of the Table's bounty. Hence through the 
Table’s repast, the historian suggests that Cambyses chose his spies poorly. 
 The Persian king’s ignorance about food extended to his own people as 
well. When his spies reported what they had seen and heard in Ethiopia, the 
monarch became incensed and launched his campaign against the Ethiopians: 
qehsavmenoi de; ta; pavnta oiJ katavskopoi ajpallavssonto ojpivsw 
… aujtivka oJ Kambuvsh" ojrgh;n poihsavmeno" ejstrateuveto ejpi; 
tou;" Aijqivopa", ou[te paraskeuh;n sivtou oujdemivan paraggeivla"  
 
Seeing everything the spies returned … immediately Cambyses 
became angry and began his campaign against the Ethiopians, 
ordering no supply of provisions … (iii.25.1)  
 
Unlike the Ethiopian leaders, who took care each night to renew the supply of 
meat on the Table of the Sun (ejpithdeuvonta" . . . tou;" ejn tevlei> eJkavstou" 
ejovnta" tw'n ajstw'n), Cambyses failed to secure an adequate supply of food prior 
to marching to the ends of the earth. This oversight led to the regression of his 
men’s diet to a less civilized level. When the soldiers exhausted their supplies, 
presumably the bread central to the Persian diet (iii.22.4), they adopted an 
Ethiopian-style diet: 
pri;n de; th'" oJdou' to; pevmpton mevro" dielhluqevnai th;n 
stratihvn, aujtivka pavnta aujtou;" ta; ei\con sitivwn ejcovmena 
ejpeleloivpee, meta; de; ta; sitiva kai; ta; uJpozuvgia ejpevlipe 
katesqiovmena.  
 
Before the army had covered a fifth of distance, it already had 
exhausted every sort of provision they had, and after the grain they 




Cambyses, however, remained insensate to this degradation of diet. According to 
Herodotos, the Persian king could have been a wise man (ajnh;r sofov") if only he 
had turned the army around at this point (iii.25). By implication, though, 
Cambyses was not a wise man and presided over the reduction of his army’s 
diet:  
oiJ de; stratiw'tai e{w" mevn ti ei\con ejk th'" gh'" lambavnein, 
poihfagevonte" dievzwon, ejpei; de; ej" th;n yavmmon ajpivkonto, 
deino;n e[rgon aujtw'n tine" ejrgavsanto: ejk dekavdo" ga;r e{na 
sfevwn aujtw'n ajpoklhrwvsante" katevfagon.  
 
While the soldiers were able to take something from the land, 
living on grass they survived, but when the came to the desert, 
some resorted to a terrible measure; selecting one out of ten of their 
own men they ate him. (iii.25.6) 
 
Only the advent of cannibalism (ajllhlofagivhn), which the Greeks attributed to 
the most barbarous of men,12 compelled Cambyses to return to Egypt with a now 
greatly reduced force (iii.25.7).  
 Food figured prominently in each stage of the Persian king’s invasion. 
Driven by the report of the Fish-Eaters (jIcquofavgwn), Cambyses led an ill-
equipped army into the desert and into barbarism. Beginning with civilized men 
that ate bread (sitiva), the Persian king reduced them into eaters of meat 
(uJpozuvgia ... katesqiovmena.), grass (poihfagevonte"), and finally their fellow 
man (katevfagon ... ajllhlofagivhn). Cambyses was ignorant of both food’s 
significance as sustenance and as an indicator of civilization. He did not perceive 
that, when his army’s supplies had run out and his men had begun to subsist on 
                                                
12 Cf. Odyssey ix.287-375. Polyphemus is regarded as the epitome of barbarity. 
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a diet of meat, he had led his men not merely against the Ethiopians, but into 
Hesiod’s mythical and primitive Bronze Age. Only when his men adopted the 
diet of grazing animals and finally cannibals did the Persian king finally 
comprehend his army’s level of degradation as expressed through food. He 
responded fearfully to the change (deivsa" th;n ajllhlofagivhn) and led his men 
back to civilization. 
 The men in Cambyses’ Ammonian campaign, however, never returned to 
civilization. Although Herodotos does not attribute the campaign’s failure to a 
lack of supplies, he still places the failure in the context of food and eating. The 
army of 50,000 men set out with guides and reached as far as the town Oasis, a 
journey of seven days from Thebes (iii.26.1). Thereafter nothing further was 
heard of the army. It never reached the Ammonians, nor did it return to Egypt 
(iii.26.2). According to the Ammonians, an immense sandstorm struck and 
destroyed the Persian army while it was taking its midday meal (iii.26.3).  
Thus, while Herodotos presents food merely as sustenance in the 
individual sections of the narrative, the broader context of the entire logos reveals 
that the historian also draws upon food’s connotation as an indicator of 
civilization with which he contrasts the Persian and Ethiopian kings. Although 
the Ethiopians appear less civilized because of their diet of boiled meat, the 
Ethiopian king recognized the monarch’s role with respect to food. He provided 
his people with a steady supply of meat placed on the Table of the Sun. He 
displayed wisdom and perspicacity through his evaluation of the respective 
Persian and Ethiopian diets. In contrast, the Persians ate “dung” and were ruled 
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by Cambyses, who failed to provide food for his army and so put in motion a 
chain of events that would reduce his men to the extreme barbarity of 
cannibalism. First, he selected dietetically challenged spies, who were incapable 
of investigating the Table of the Sun. Next, he displayed a similar lack of 
prudence when he led an army into starvation and barbarism. Through the 
Persian king’s misunderstanding of food, Herodotos alludes to Cambyses’ 
mental shortcomings and growing instability. 
 
 
The Pelusian Krater: Wine, Water, Blood, and the Subjugation of Egypt (iii.11)  
Before the Battle at Pelusium, Greek and Carian mercenaries in Egyptian 
service murdered the children of their former commander, mixed the blood with 
wine and water, and drank the mixture. Viewed within the context of this 
passage, a battle, the krater and its contents have been correctly identified as a 
jarring mixture of symposiastic and non-symposiastic elements.13 Yet, when 
viewed within a broader context, the account of the Persian invasion of Egypt, 
the krater and its contents also are revealed to possess an additional, previously 
unnoted, meaning. In the battle passage, Herodotos specifies the elements within 
the krater (wine, water, and blood), which connote the former peaceful state of 
Egypt, that land’s future subjugation, and the current state of violence. 
Throughout the historian’s narrative of Cambyses’ invasion and conquest of 
                                                
13 Bowie. 2003, p. 105. See also Slater. 1990, pp. 215-216 for the jarring effect created by the 
introduction of violence or elements of warfare into the peaceful setting of the symposium.  
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Egypt (iii.1-15), Herodotos uses the repetition of wine, water, and blood14 to link 
these elements to their respective states. Hence, when he describes the krater on 
the eve of the battle, the historian creates a text of objects that depicts the 
transition of Egypt from independence to subservience. 
 Before Cambyses invades Egypt, Herodotos steeps his description of the 
country in wine, an element of revelry and joy.15 Wine is a key element in the 
symposium, which was the Greek ideal of peace and repose.16 According to the 
historian, the drink was also a particular favorite of the Egyptian pharaoh 
Amasis: 
to; me;n o[rqrion mevcri o{teu plhqwvrh" ajgorh'" proquvmw" 
e[prhsse ta; prosferovmena prhvgmata, to; de; ajpo; touvtou e[pinev 
te kai; katevskwpte tou;" sumpovta" kai; h\n mavtaiov" te kai; 
paignihvmwn.  
 
From dawn until the market-placed filled up, he worked eagerly on 
all the matters brought before him, but from that time he drank and 
joked with his fellow symposiasts and was light-hearted and 
turned his attention to games. (ii.173.1) 
 
Further emphasizing the link between Amasis and wine, Herodotos notes that 
even before his rise to power Amasis was a noted lover of wine and jest (wJ" 
filopovth" h\n kai; filoskwvmmwn), who would steal to fund his passions 
                                                
14 Wine (iii.4.3; iii.6.1; iii.11.3; iii.14.7 [symposiast]); water (iii.6.2; iii.7.1-2; iii.9.1-4; iii.10.1-3 [rain]; 
iii.11.3; iii.14.2); blood (iii.8.1; iii.11.3; iii.15.4). 
15 Herodotos generally describes wine in positive terms (revelry or as part of an individual’s or 
people’s normal practice) (i.71.3; i.126.2; i.133.3; i.193.4; i.194.2; i.202.2; ii.37.4; ii.60.3; ii.70; ii.121d 
1, 2 ter; iii.20; iii.22.3, 4; iv.66; iv.177; vi.57.2) or in the context of a sacrifice (ii.39.1, 4; iv.62; iv.70). 
Wine is only regarded in a clearly negative light when Cyrus used it to trick the Massegetae 
(i.207.6, 211.2, 213), when Prexaspes confronted Cambyses about his alcoholism (iii.34.3), and 
when Cleomenes went mad from his consumption of wine (vi.84). 
16 Slater. 1990, pp. 213-215. 
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(iii.174.1). This love of wine extended to members of the royal court.17 When 
Amasis dispatched his most trustworthy eunuch to halt the defection of Phanes 
to Persia (iii.4.2), the captured Greek mercenary leader used wine to effect his 
escape:  
o}" aiJrevei min ejn Lukivh/, eJlw;n de; oujk ajnhvgage ej" Ai[gupton: 
sofivh/ gavr min perih'lqe oJ Favnh": katamequvsa" ga;r tou;" 
fulavkou" ajpallavsseto ej" Pevrsa".  
 
He [the eunuch] captured him [Phanes] in Lycia, but seizing him he 
did not take him back to Egypt; for Phanes got around him with 
trickery; getting the guards drunk he [Phanes] escaped to Persia. 
(iii.4.2-3) 
 
In Herodotos’ account, all Egypt was besotted with wine. The Egyptians 
imported so much wine from all over Greece and Phoenicia that they were able 
to line the passage through Gaza with the emptied wine jars (ii.6.1). The sheer 
volume of wine imported “to Egypt” (ej" Ai[gupton), not simply to Memphis, 
indicates that the love of the drink extended beyond the royal court to Egypt as a 
whole. In the reign of Amasis, then, wine pervaded all strata of Egyptian society 
from commoner to the joyful tippler monarch. The historian links the object 
(wine) and its pleasurable connotation with the state of peace and independence 
that reigned immediately prior to the Persian invasion. Although he includes 
wine in his descriptions of Egypt prior to Amasis,18 he does not associate the 
drink or symposiastic behavior with previous monarchs.  
                                                
17 The exception appears to be Amasis’ friends, who attempted to reform behavior that they 
deemed unsuited to the throne (ii.174.1). Amasis, though, refuted their arguments and made a 
persuasive case for his mixture of business and pleasure (ii.174.2). 
18 ii.39.1, 39.4, 121d.1, 121d.2. 
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 Herodotos infuses the wine with new elements, water and blood, to reflect 
the imperiled state of Egypt faced with Persian aggression. The Egyptians 
refilled their empty wine jars with water for the passage through Gaza (iii.6.2). 
By their love of wine, the Egyptians appear to have provided a means for 
invaders to cross the formidable desert barrier. Only after he completes his 
description of the practice, however, does Herodotos reveal that the Persians 
mandated this behavior only after the conquest of Egypt (iii.7.1). Collected in the 
service of Persia, the water here connotes submission. Just as elsewhere in the 
Histories, water is used as a token of submission to Persia.19 Thus, by 
transforming the contents of the vessels (kevramoi) from wine to water, the 
historian indicates a change in behavior from the consumption of wine in an 
independent Egypt to the obedient collection of water for the Persian conquerors. 
Herodotos reinforces the connotation of water with servitude as he turns 
to Arabia, which Cambyses, following the advice of Phanes, contacted for help in 
passing through Gaza. Although the historian includes a small reference to blood 
in his description of Arabian oaths (iii.8.1) and implies the presence of wine 
when he indicates that the Arabians only worshipped Urania and Dionysios 
(iii.8.3), he most closely associates this land with water. He provides two 
accounts of how the Arabians supplied the invading Persians with this essential 
element. First, he claims that they filled camel skins with water and carried them 
into the desert to await the Persian troops: 
                                                
19 v.18, v.73, vi.48-49, vi.93. 
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 oJ jAravbio", ejmhcana'to toiavde: ajskou;" kamhvlwn plhvsa" u{dato" 
ejpevsaxe ejpi; ta;" zwa;" tw'n kamhvlwn pavsa", tou'to de; poihvsa" 
h[lase ej" th;n a[nudron kai; uJpevmene ejnqau'ta to;n Kambuvsew 
stratovn. 
 
The Arabian king contrived the following: filling camel skins, he 
loaded the skins on live camels, and doing this he went to the 
desert and there awaited Cambyses’ army. (iii.9.1) 
  
Second, he narrates the less credible account in which the Arabian king 
fabricated a pipe to convey water from the river Corys to cisterns in the desert: 
ajpo; touvtou dh; w\n tou' potamou' levgetai to;n basileva tw'n 
jArabivwn, rJayavmenon tw'n wjmoboevwn kai; tw'n a[llwn dermavtwn 
ojceto;n mhvkei> ejxikneuvmenon ej" th;n a[nudron, ajgagei'n dia; dh; 
touvtou to; u{dwr, ejn de; th'/ ajnuvdrw/ megavla" dexamena;" 
ojruvxasqai, i{na dekovmenai to; u{dwr sw/vzwsi.  
 
It is said that from this river the Arabian king, stitched together the 
cowhides and the skins of other animals into a pipeline stretching 
in length to the desert, and through these he led the water into the 
desert, and in the desert he dug great cisterns, so that he might 
store the water. (iii.9.3) 
 
Through these elaborate descriptions of the Arabian water supply, the constant 
repetition of water (u{dwr) and its movement to the waterless (a[nudron) waste, the 
historian emphasizes the association of water with service to Persia. 
 As he develops his account of the invasion, Herodotos moves water from 
the periphery to the heart of Egypt. As long as Amasis lived, the Egyptians made 
no move to counter the Persian plans, but after the pharaoh’s death, his son 
Psammenitus began preparing Egypt’s defenses (iii.10). According to the 
historian, a great portent (favsma Aijguptivoisi mevgiston – iii.10.3) accompanied 
Psammenitus’ ascension – it rained in Upper Egypt:  
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u{sqhsan ga;r Qh'bai aiJ Aijguvptiai, ou[te provteron oujdama; 
uJsqei'sai ou[te u{steron to; mevcri ejmeu', wJ" levgousi aujtoi; 
Qhbai'oi: ouj ga;r dh; u{etai ta; a[nw th'" Aijguvptou to; paravpan: 
ajlla; kai; tovte u{sqhsan aiJ Qh'bai yakavdi.  
 
It rained on Thebes, never before had it rained nor has it rained 
since up to my day, so the Thebans say; for no rain at all falls in 
Upper Egypt; but then it rained on Thebes in a light shower. 
(iii.10.3) 
 
Although the water fell from the sky and was not drawn in service of Persia, the 
historian uses the unprecedented appearance of water in the heart of the once 
wine-loving Egypt to link the reign of the new pharaoh with water, a symbol of 
servitude to Persia.  
 When Herodotos begins his account of the actual invasion, he blends these 
two elements with the blood of Phanes’ children. Angered by the defection of 
their former commander, the Greek and Carian mercenaries in Egyptian employ 
set a krater and the children, whom Phanes had abandoned in Egypt, before their 
battle line. Filling the vessel with wine and water, the mercenaries killed the 
children, mixed their blood in with the wine and water, and drank the grisly 
mixture (iii.11.3).20 Elsewhere in the Histories, drinking the blood of others 
appears only in extremis, e.g. among the alien Scythians, who routinely drank 
their enemies’ blood (iv.64.1), or Cyrus’ metaphorical blood drinking after his 
                                                
20 Although the mercenaries' actions appear to have some features of oath taking, the historian 
makes no mention of an oath (o{rko") or pledge (pivsti") as in the case of the Arabian oath (iii.7). 
See Blakesley. 1854, p. 316. Moreover, the Arabian oath involved drawing one’s own blood 
(iii.8.1.). Elsewhere in the Histories, the ingestion of blood plays a limited role in some oaths and 
sacrifices, but again one tastes or drinks one’s own, not another’s, blood. The Medes and Lydians 
licked blood from shallow cuts in their arms as part of their oaths (i.74.6) and the Scythians mixed 
a little of their own blood with wine to swear an oath (iv.70).  
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defeat by Tomyris.21 The anger of the mercenaries, the murder of the children, 
and the drinking of the bloody mixture evoke blood’s connotations of violence, 
vengeance, and barbarity. 
 The addition of the blood perverts the normal association of the admixture 
of water and wine in a krater with the Greek symposium.22 The krater and its 
contents symbolize the transitional state of Egypt, blending its peaceful past 
(wine) and its subjugated future (water) with the violence of the present war 
(blood). Violence and its symptoms flow through the subsequent sections from 
the closely fought battle (iii.11.3), to the corpse strewn field (iii.12), and the siege 
of Memphis, where the Egyptians poured out (ejkcuqevnte") of their citadel to 
violate propriety by tearing Cambyses' heralds limb from limb in a quasi-
Dionysiac act (tou;" a[ndra" kreourghdo;n diaspavsante" – iii.13.2). 
 After Cambyses defeated the Egyptians and the tide of violence subsided, 
the Persian king fulfilled the vow he had made to his mother to turn Egypt 
upside down (iii.3.3). Herodotos depicts this change in part by completing the 
inversion of the liquid objects in Egypt. In place of the wine-loving Amasis 
(filopovth"), who spent each day drinking and joking with his friends (e[pinev te 
kai; katevskwpte tou;" sumpovta" / he drank and joked with his symposiasts – 
ii.173.1), Herodotos describes Psammenitus, who wept at the sight of one of his 
fellow symposiasts (tw'n sumpotevwn oiJ a[ndra) reduced to the life of a beggar 
                                                
21 After the death of her son, the Massagetae queen Tomyris swore a terrible oath that she would 
give the Persian king Cyrus his fill of blood. Later, when she defeated the Persians, she placed 
Cyrus' severed head in a skin full of blood (ajsko;n de; plhvsasa ai{mato" – i.214.4). 
22 Contra Bowie. 2003, p. 105. He regards the krater solely in the context of the negative 
atmosphere he perceives in banquets in the Histories. As shown, I argue that the krater should be 
viewed more broadly as the literal blending of the connotations of wine, water, and blood. 
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(iii.14.7).23 The historian replaces wine with water to reflect this change. He 
describes how Cambyses turned Psammenitus’ daughter into a water bearer: 
steivla" aujtou' th;n qugatevra ejsqh'ti doulhivh/ ejxevpempe ejpæ 
u{dwr e[cousan uJdrhvion, sunevpempe de; kai; a[lla" parqevnou" 
ajpolevxa" ajndrw'n tw'n prwvtwn  
 
Dressing the pharaoh’s daughter in slave’s clothing he sent her 
with a water jar to fetch water, and he sent with her other maidens 
selected from among the noble families. (iii.14.2) 
 
While the Egyptian nobles wept at the sight of their daughters reduced to 
slavery, the pharaoh seemingly remained impassive. Although Psammenitus’ 
silence frustrated Cambyses, who arranged another test, the historian notes a 
significant response that apparently escaped the Persian king’s notice. The 
pharaoh “bowed down to the earth” (oJ de; Yammhvnito" … e[kuye ej" th;n gh'n - 
iii.14.3). The historian uses the scene of pharaoh and daughter to insert the 
traditional tokens of submission to Persia – earth and water. 
 Additionally, in this scene Herodotos emphasizes the transformation of 
Egypt from freedom to subjugation through the daughter’s clothes. Before the 
war Amasis attempted to trick Cambyses, who had requested the hand of the 
pharaoh's daughter in marriage. Fearing that Cambyses would treat his daughter 
as a concubine and not a wife, Amasis instead sent Nitetis, the daughter and last 
surviving child of the deposed pharaoh Apries. Adorning her with fine clothes 
and gold (kosmhvsa" ejsqh'tiv te kai; crusw'/), Amasis attempted to pass off 
Nitetis as his own daughter, transforming a woman who was essentially his 
                                                
23 Bowie. 2003, p. 105, n. 31. Bowie notes the return of the symposiastic element, but does not tie it 
to the symposiasts at Amasis' table. 
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slave into a princess. Although a noted trickster, capable manipulator and 
interpreter of signs elsewhere,24 Amasis failed to deceive Cambyses and 
precipitated a war that would reduce Egypt to slavery; for while he crafted an 
image of a woman adorned as a princess, this fake princess refused to play along. 
Urging Cambyses to look beyond her clothes, she unveiled her true identity and 
fanned the Persian king's desire for war (iii.1.3-4). After the Persian conquest, 
Cambyses effected the reverse transformation by dressing Psammenitus' 
daughter, Amasis’ granddaughter, in the clothing of a slave (ejsqh'ti doulhivh/ - 
iii.14.2). But whereas the transformation of Nitetis did not extend below the 
surface, Cambyses truly altered the status of the pharaoh's daughter, changing 
her from a princess into a slave.  
 Herodotos concludes his description of Egypt’s conquest by again 
returning to an object from the krater, blood. After a failed rebellion, 
Psammenitus committed suicide by drinking the blood of a bull (iii.15.4). Despite 
the difference, the blood retains its association with violence, heralding the death 
of Psammenitus. In a similar vein, the blood symbolizes the end of the future. At 
Pelusium, the Greek and Carian mercenaries drew the blood of Phanes' children 
(iii.11.2), destroying their former comrade’s future. After the conquest, 
Psammenitus suffered a similar loss when Cambyses executed the pharaoh's son 
(iii.14.4). The pharaoh still possessed a future, though, and could have recovered 
Egypt since the Persians were accustomed to honor the sons of kings and even 
restore these sons to their former thrones (iii.15.2). But Psammenitus destroyed 
                                                
24 Dewald. 1993, pp. 59-60. Hollmann. 1998, p. 159. 
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this future when he conspired against the Persians (iii.15.4) and completed this 
destruction when he uses bull's blood (a symbol of violence) to end his life.  
The Pelusian krater, then, is a mixture of distinct elements and 
connotations. Appearing on the eve of a decisive battle, the krater contained 
elements of Egypt’s past, present, and future: peaceful wine, violent blood, and 
subservient water. Herodotos does not create these connotations, but uses the 
context of the logos to emphasize each particular meaning. He associates pre-war, 
independent Egypt with wine, blood with the slaughter of children on a 
battlefield, and water with service to Persia. Using these objects and their 
connotations throughout the logos, the historian creates an object-based text of 
Egypt’s status from freedom to slavery.  
 
Hence, Herodotos evokes and arranges an object’s meaning through its 
context. Composing the stage, characters, and action, the historian filters an 
object’s connotation(s) and informs the audience which one(s) apply. In the 
account of Periander’s tyranny, Herodotos illustrates the inherently wasteful 
nature of tyranny through Thrasybulus’ and Periander’s interaction with food 
and clothing. While the tyrants wasted or destroyed both objects separately, 
together they represent the two main staples of an oikos’ self-sufficiency. In his 
account of Cambyses’ invasion of Ethiopia, Herodotos again uses food, but as a 
measure of royal behavior and wisdom. He presents the Ethiopian and Persian 
diets individually, but within the broader context of the entire passage the diets 
and the actions of the kings with respect to food create a striking contrast. 
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 In each example the historian simply employs the object’s (or class of 
object’s) connotation to create an additional meaning in his text. Hence, 
Thrasybulus’ wheat stalks operate on a metaphorical level, advising the murder 
of the leading Corinthians, and a literal level, displaying the tyrant’s contempt 
for property, even his own. Herodotos increases the complexity of this message 
by increasing the number of objects and connotations. He uses wine, water, and 
blood to symbolize the three states of Egypt (free, enslaved, and at war) before, 
during, and after the Persian invasion. The historian does not subvert any 
particular connotation, but selects and arranges them to create an extended 
message concerning the plight of Egypt. In all three variations of this method, 
Herodotos places an object (or set of objects) in a varied and even changing 
landscape to emphasize or deemphasize an object’s connotation.  
 
Object Manipulation 
In his second method for shaping an object’s additional meaning, 
Herodotos adopts the reverse approach. He places a changing (or different) 
object(s) in an unchanging landscape and uses the manner in which the object 
changes to shape its meaning. He uses two narrative tools to create this change: 
repetition with substitution and the passage of time. Herodotos commonly 
employs repetition for emphasis and clarity in his writing.25 Repetition against a 
new background also allows the audience to develop hitherto unforeseen 
                                                
25 Immerwahr. 1966, p. 53, 60-61. Stahl. 1968, pp. 389-390. Flory. 1969. pp. 102-103. Long. 1986, pp. 
11, 23. Dewald, 1993, p. 61. Herington. 1997, p. 150. 
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connections.26 When the historian substitutes rather than repeats, however, he 
does so to draw the audience’s attention to a particular point.27 In the case of 
objects, substitution is a particularly effective method for shaping an object’s 
additional meaning. He does not transform the object into something alien; 
rather he merely substitutes one object for another object of the same type. For 
example, “a bottle of wine” in a man’s hands as he comes home to his wife has 
several potential connotations. If, however, the author retells the scene and 
changes the bottle of wine each time from “a gift-wrapped bottle of wine” to “a 
bottle of champagne” and then to “a box of wine,” he varies the connotations 
from gift to celebration to inebriation even though in all cases the object remains 
essentially the same. A similar effect occurs in the case of parallel scenes. If an 
author presents three men coming home to their wives, each carrying one of the 
above, then the author uses the related, but distinct, connotations of the “bottle of 
wine” to create an implicit comparison of the men’s intentions. 
 In a related manner, Herodotos presents an object in time to create similar 
variations. Instead of altering the type of object, the historian places a specific 
object in more than one temporal context. He indicates the state of the object at 
its time of creation (or dedication) and then again at a later time, perhaps the 
historian’s own day. While Naiden has shown how the historian uses this 
presentation to emphasize or allude to the impending decline of the object,28 the 
effect of this diachronic presentation has gone largely unnoticed. For example, 
                                                
26 Iser. 1974, p. 278. 
27 Stahl. 1968, p. 391. Long. 1986, p. 23. 
28 Naiden. 1999, pp. 135-140. See n. 76. 
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the passage of time on a “bottle of wine” can produce three results. First, the 
“bottle of wine” might remain unchanged in form and meaning. Second, the 
“bottle of wine” might improve with age and become a “fine bottle of wine,” 
altering its meaning in a positive manner. Finally, the “bottle of wine” might 
degrade into a “bottle of vinegar,” altering its meaning in a negative manner. The 
multiple images generated by the diachronic presentation inform the audience of 
an object’s significance through how it fares over time. 
Using both methods Herodotos creates multiple (even contrasting) images 
of an object. This almost cinematic technique allows the audience to perceive an 
object from a variety of perspectives and with a variety of connotations. The 
historian uses this multiplicity to transform an object into a text, a series of 
connotations that combine to form a coherent message. 
 
Royal Disrobing: The Chiton and the Queen of Lydia (i.8-11) 
 At the beginning of the Histories, Herodotos uses the first method of direct 
manipulation, the altered presentation of an object through repetition, to create a 
subtext with the queen of Lydia’s chiton. Enamored with his wife’s beauty, the 
Lydian king Candaules desired to display her naked form to his most trusted 
servant, Gyges. The king planned and carried out Gyges’ concealment in the 
royal bedchamber where he gazed upon the queen as she undressed. As Gyges 
slipped out of the bedroom, however, the queen noted the voyeur’s presence. 
Realizing Candaules' complicity, she confronted Gyges and compelled him either 
to murder the Lydian king and take his place on the throne as her husband or to 
 
37 
accept his own death for having seen what he ought not to have seen. Arming 
the hapless Gyges with a sword, she placed him again in the bedroom. When the 
king retired to bed, Gyges slipped out, killed his master, and took the throne. 
 While the story possesses elements of folklore,29 in tone, characterization, 
plot, and pacing Herodotos patterns the tale after tragic poetry.30 But the central 
action of his drama, the queen's disrobing, has special significance in tragedy 
that belies both the events and consequences of the tale. In the tragic genre, 
clothing is a means of power (or an avenue to resist power) and control for 
women.31 Clothes signify a woman’s status, and as her status changes, her clothes 
change.32 The removal of clothing in particular may evoke the stripping of the 
dead and hence may symbolize the loss of a primary trait, such as Cassandra's 
loss of prophecy along with the loss of her stevfo" or Iphigeneia's loss of 
marriageability with the removal of her pevplo" (Aes. Ag. 1264f and 232f).33 Yet in 
the Gyges episode, the queen's loss of clothing did not mark her downfall or 
destruction. Instead she was empowered and, as Stewart Flory puts it, she 
became the archetype of the vengeful queen in the Histories.34 Manipulating 
Gyges to murder her husband, the Lydian queen gained and asserted greater 
power than her clothing, or lack thereof, would suggest. 
                                                
29 Aly. 1969. pp. 32-33. 
30 Lattimore. 1939, p. 25. Stahl. 1968, passim. Lesky. 1977, pp. 224-226. Saïd. 2002, pp. 118-119. 
Travis. 2000, pp. 331-333. Chiasson. 2003, p. 21. 
31 Mueller. 2002. pp. 27-28. 
32 Segal. 1990. p. 304. Block. 1985. pp. 9-10. 
33 Griffith. 1988. p. 553. 
34 Flory. 1987, p. 42. 
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 Herodotos resolves this apparent paradox in the passage's subtext, which 
he creates through a carefully controlled depiction of the queen's dress. As 
Dewald and Travis note, the historian unfolds the plot around the queen’s 
body,35 but both fail to look beyond the queen’s nudity. Like the tragic poet, the 
historian uses her clothing to indicate her identity or status.36 Candaules’ plan 
threatened this status. Although his proposal sought to display his wife without 
her aijdwv",37 it also implicitly sought to redefine her identity. Candaules did not 
display his queen; rather he displayed the most beautiful of women (pasevwn 
kallisvthn - i.8.1). Yet Herodotos counters this redefinition by shielding her body 
from the audience's gaze. Through a varied presentation of her clothing, he 
creates the perception that she remained clothed and in control of her identity.  
In this logos, power is denoted through the act of viewing.38 Hence, 
Herodotos suggests Candaules’ power through his ability to display his wife's 
naked form. Yet while both he and Gyges anticipated viewing the queen's naked 
body (ejkeivnhn qehvseai gumnhvn / you will view that woman – i.8.2 / keleuvwn me 
devspoinan th;n ejmh;n qehvsasqai gumnhvn / ordering me to view my mistress 
naked – i.8.3), this power quickly dissipated when they began to plot her actual 
                                                
35 Dewald, 1993, p. 62. Travis. 2000, pp. 332-334. 
36 He uses clothing as an identifier in his ethnographic accounts (i.195; iv.74; iv.116; iv.189 et al.) 
and to illustrate status and identity or a change in the same (i.111 (the royal status of the infant 
Cyrus is apparent in his gilded clothing); iii.1-14 (see pp. 24-33); v.20 (Macedonian youth 
disguised as women murder Persian emissaries); v.87-88 (The Athenians and the statues of 
Damia and Auxesia); ix.22 (Masistios' golden armor – see chapter x); ix.76 (Persian concubine 
from Cos). 
37 Cairns. 1996, 78, 81. 
38 Travis. 2000, p. 333. 
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exhibition.39 She did not appear naked (gumnhv) either during Candaules' planning 
(i.9.2) or Gyges' execution of the deed (i.10.1-2). Rather during the actual display 
of the queen, Herodotos uses the adjective to describe not the queen but Lydian 
mores on male nudity:  
para; ga;r toi'si Ludoi'si, scedo;n de; kai; para; toi'si a[lloisi 
barbavroisi kai; a[ndra ojfqh'nai gumno;n ej" aijscuvnhn megavlhn 
fevrei.  
 
For among Lydian men, and among nearly most other barbarian 
races it is considered especially shameful for a man to be seen 
naked. (i.10.3) 
 
He refers to the queen's nakedness only implicitly through her disrobing 
(discussed below) or in retrospect and in her own words when she confronted 
Gyges with his crime and planned the murder of Candaules from the place that 
he displayed her: 
ajllæ h[toi kei'novn ge to;n tau'ta bouleuvsanta dei' ajpovllusqai, h] 
se; to;n ejme; gumnh;n qehsavmenon kai; poihvsanta ouj nomizovmena. 
 
But it is necessary for that man planning these things to die, or you 
who saw me naked and violated propriety. (i.11.3) 
 
o{qen per kai; ejkei'no" ejme; ejpedevxato gumnhvn,  
 
From where that man also displayed me naked. (i.11.5).  
 
The historian delays a direct reference to the queen’s naked body until her 
confrontation with Gyges, when she, at the height of her power, manipulated a 
dynastic change. 
                                                
39 Contra Travis. 2000, pp. 343-344. Travis maintains the shift in power from king to queen 
occurred when she appeared naked at i.10, but, as I argue, Herodotos undermines the image of 
the naked queen both through his depiction of her clothing his limited use of the term gumnhv. 
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 Moreover, through the description of her clothing Herodotos covers the 
queen’s implicit nakedness. He describes her disrobing three times: once 
figuratively (i.8.3), the second in the plans of Candaules (i.9.2), and the third in 
actuality (i.10.1). This drawn out striptease heightens the drama of the passage, 
but each time the historian refers to the queen's clothing, he alters its description, 
using repetition for emphasis and substitution to convey additional meaning.40 
Gyges first conjured the image of the naked queen by objecting to the Lydian 
tyrant’s plan to display his wife.  The servant told Candaules that a woman puts 
off her shame as she takes off her chiton or undergarment, the last layer of 
clothing between the man's gaze and her nude body (a{ma de; kiqw'ni ejkduomevnw/ 
sunekduvetai kai; th;n aijdw' gunhv / but at the same time that a woman removes 
her chiton she does away with her shame – i.8.3). Herodotos discards the chiton, 
however, when Candaules explained the details of his plan. The Lydian king 
stated that Gyges would be able to see the queen as she disrobed before getting 
into bed (kei'tai de; ajgcou' th'" ejsovdou qrovno": ejpi; tou'ton tw'n iJmativwn kata; 
e}n e{kaston ejkduvnousa qhvsei /A chair lies near the entrance; onto this she will 
place each piece of clothing as she undresses  – i.9.2). Powell rightly translates the 
plural form iJmativwn as "clothes," for the himation was typically one piece of 
clothing.41 The term iJmavtion commonly referred to a woman's outer garment.42 In 
many Greek communities, a woman would draw the himation across her face as a 
                                                
40 For Herodotos’ general use of repetition and variation see Long. 1986, p. 23. Unfortunately 
Long overlooks the repetition of objects in his study. 
41 Powell. 1960, p. 171. 
42 Evans. 1964, p. 48. 
 
41 
veil when in the presence of a man other than her husband and would ritually 
remove her veil during her wedding ceremony.43 By painting an image of the 
queen unveiling herself to Gyges, Candaules evoked an association with 
wedding rites44 and unwittingly presaged his wife’s marriage to Gyges. 
Moreover, the historian's shift from chiton to himation moves the audience's gaze 
from an inner to an outer garment and makes the queen appear more dressed 
while in the act of disrobing. 
 Herodotos alters his description of the queen’s clothing further in his 
narration of the disrobing scene. Hidden behind the door, “Gyges watched [the 
queen] as she entered [the chamber] and removed her clothes” (ejselqou'san de; 
kai; tiqei'san ta; ei{mata ejqhei'to oJ Guvgh" – i.10.1). As with iJmativwn, Powell 
translates ei{mata simply to mean “clothes,” but the introduction of yet another 
term invites another possible interpretation. Like the singular himation, heima 
refers to an exterior layer of clothing, usually a cloak or mantle worn on top of 
one's outer garments.45 In Herodotos, the Lydians customarily wore the heima as 
an outer garment. After a failed rebellion, Croesus advised Cyrus not to punish 
the Lydians, but to make them less warlike by ordering them to wear chitons 
beneath their cloaks (kevleue dev sfea" kiqw'nav" te uJpoduvnein toi'si ei{masi – 
i.155.4). The heima, then, diverts the audience's gaze away from her body to her 
cloak, and thus creates a competing image of the naked queen fully dressed. 
                                                
43 Galt. 1931, pp. 379-381. Nagler. 1974, pp. 44-47. Galt argues that the Athenian practice of veiling 
may have originated from the adoption of Ionian or rather Carian dress (Hdt v.87-88). 
44 Cairns. 1996, p. 80. 




 Whereas Herodotos mentions the queen's clothing in each iteration of her 
disrobing, no other object appears in each version. He refers to the chamber 
(oi[khma – i.9.2 and i.10.1) for the queen's second and third disrobing, but only 
mentions the bed (koivth"/koivthn – i.10.1, 2) in the final telling, and the doors to 
the chamber (quvrh"/qurevwn – i.9.2, 3) and the thronos upon which she places the 
clothes (qrovno"/qrovnou – i.9.2, 3) in the second telling. In contrast, the queen’s 
body occupies the spotlight. By including her clothing in each repetition, the 
historian emphasizes the changing state of her dress in the logos. 
 Herodotos strengthens the association between the queen's clothing and 
her royal power by noting her proximity to the thronos in the second account. As 
Candaules laid out the details of his plan to Gyges, the Lydian king mentioned 
that the queen would place her clothing upon the chair (thronos) that stood near 
the entryway (i.9.2).46 Herodotos primarily uses the term thronos to refer to the 
seat of a monarch, grandee, or official.47 Thus, the queen’s placement of her 
clothing upon the throne while disrobing implies a connection between the 
queen, her clothing, and royal power. 
 While the historian subverts the image of the naked queen, he implicitly 
depicts Candaules losing his clothing when he loses his life. After placing Gyges 
in his bedroom Candaules disappears from the narrative until his murder at i.12. 
According to the queen's plan, Gyges crept out from the exact spot where he had 
                                                
46 The royal connotation of the word "qrovno"" should not be overlooked regardless of Powell's (p. 
168) translation of the word here to mean a simple "chair." 
47 i.9.2, i.9.3 (chair); vii.40.4 (seat in Xerxes' chariot); i.14.3 bis, i.183.1, ii.149.2, ii.173.2, iii.30.2, 
iii.61.3, iii.64.1, iii.144, iii.155.1, v.25.1, v.25.2, v.26, v.72.3, vii.8a2, vii.16.1, vii.17.1, vii.15.3 (solemn 
seat or throne of monarch, grandee, or official). 
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gazed on her naked form and struck the sleeping king (kai; meta; tau'ta 
ajnapauomevnou Kandauvlew uJpekduv" te kai; ajpokteivna" aujto;n / and after these 
things, when Candaules was asleep, he crept out and killed him - i.12.2). In this 
scene, Herodotos describes the action after the king has entered bed and 
presumably already removed his clothes. Whether the king slept naked or 
changed into bedclothes, Gyges has gazed upon the naked Candaules before 
murdering him. Without clothes or weapons Candaules was reduced to the 
status of a woman.48 Hence, for Candaules, the historian completes the tragic 
paradigm that connects the loss of clothing with the loss of life and/or power. 
 In this logos, Herodotos uses clothing in a manner consistent with tragedy 
as an indicator of status or even death. As the story unfolds, however, Herodotos 
seems to subvert this paradigm. Candaules displayed his wife in a form of 
subjugation, but instead of this action leading to her destruction she was 
empowered and engineered his death. Playing out the tragic significance of their 
clothing in the subtext, the historian manipulates his description of the queen's 
nudity and clothing to forestall her loss of power and to hasten Candaules' 
destruction. Despite her husband's efforts, the queen controlled her body. She is 
described as naked only in Candaules' amorous description and in her self-
description once she has Gyges in her power. Moreover, the historian provides a 
subtext for the queen’s actual disrobing. He subverts the image by altering his 
depiction of her clothes from undergarment (kiqwvn) to cloak (iJmativwn) to outer 
garment (ei{mata). As the historian adds layers to her outfit he transforms her 
                                                
48 McCary. 1982, pp. 155-156. 
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from an object to an agent.49 Candaules failed to achieve his objective as the 
queen retained (and improved) both her clothing and her status. In contrast, the 
queen successfully stripped Candaules of his clothing and his life as she placed 
Gyges in a position to view and murder the naked monarch. 
 
Weapons, Wealth, and the Peisistratid Rise to Power (i.59-64) 
 Herodotos uses a similar combination of repetition and substitution of 
objects to illustrate the importance of money and arms to the rise of the 
Peisistratids. Yet, instead of repeating the same scene, here he capitalizes upon 
the historian's vantage point and contrasts the repetition of objects from distinct 
but related scenes at different times. In his description of Peisistratus’ three 
attempts at tyranny, he repeats elements typically centered on an object or 
objects. Using these repeating motifs, the historian illustrates the escalation of 
Peisistratus' behavior and the necessity of money and arms for the establishment 
and maintenance of a tyranny.50 
 In his narration of the first two attempts, Herodotos follows the same 
narrative pattern and refers to similar objects to illustrate the futility of a tyranny 
based on deception and limited violence. Although the historian esteems 
deception and deceivers,51 he demonstrates that it is not the path to secure 
tyrannical power. Elements common to both stories include a conveyance, arms, 
                                                
49 Long. 1986. p. 28. Long notes a similar transformation as Herodotos alters her description from 
‘woman’ or ‘wife’ (i.8.1, 2, 3, 4; i.9.1, 2; i.10.1, 2) to ‘queen’ (i.11.1, 2 and i.12.2). 
50 Contra Myres. 1971, p. 84. Myres arranges the passage within his 'pedimental' structure, 
making the second attempt the focal point of the story. As my argument will show the historian 
uses the three attempts for a cumulative effect. The similarity of the first two attempts stands in 
stark contrast to the different methods of the third. 
51 Lateiner. 1990, pp. 231-232. 
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and the goddess Athena represented through her temples or dress. In the first 
attempt, after wounding himself, Peisistratus drove a mule cart into the Agora to 
elicit the sympathy of the Athenian public (trwmativsa" eJwutovn te kai; hJmiovnou" 
h[lase ej" th;n ajgorh;n to; zeu'go" wJ" ejkpefeugw;" tou;" ejcqrouv" / wounding 
himself and his mules he drove his cart into the agora as though fleeing from 
enemies - i.59.4). The Athenians were duped and assigned Peisistratus a 
bodyguard armed with wooden clubs: 
oJ de; dh'mo" oJ tw'n  jAqhnaivwn ejxapathqei;" e[dwkev oiJ tw'n ajstw'n 
katalevxa" a[ndra" touvtou" oi} dorufovroi me;n oujk ejgevnonto 
Peisistravtou, korunhfovroi dev: xuvlwn ga;r koruvna" e[conte" 
ei{pontov oiJ o[pisqe  
 
The Athenian demos was deceived and picking men from the city 
gave to him these men who were not spear-bearers of Peisistratus, 
but club-bearers; for having clubs of wood they followed behind 
him. (i.59.5) 
 
Peisistratus then used these men to seize the Acropolis and established himself 
as ruler in Athens (i.59.6). Although Herodotos makes no explicit reference to 
Athena, the Acropolis is nearly synonymous with the goddess and her most 
famous shrine. 
 After the Athenians expelled Peisistratus from power the first time, 
Herodotos patterns the Athenian’s second attempt at tyranny upon the first one. 
This time, conspiring with Megacles, Peisistratus arranged two, more elaborate 
deceptions. First, he deceived Megacles by agreeing to marry his daughter, but 
restricting himself to non-reproductive intercourse with her (i.61.1). Second, 
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Peisistratus undertook to deceive the Athenian people by adopting the pose of 
Herakles or Theseus accompanied by the goddess Athena:52  
ejn tw/§ dhvmw/ tw/§ Paianievi h\n gunhv, th/§ ou[noma h\n Fuvh, mevgaqoß 
ajpo; tessevrwn phvcewn ajpoleivpousa trei§ß daktuvlouß kai; a[llwß 
eujeidhvß. tauvthn th;n gunai§ka skeuavsanteß panoplivh/, ejß a{rma 
ejsbibavsanteß kai; prodevxanteß sch§ma oi|ovn ti e[melle 
eujprepevstaton fanevesqai e[cousa h[launon ejß to; a[stu, 
prodrovmouß khvrukaß propevmyanteß, oi} ta; ejnetalmevna hjgovreuon 
ajpikovmenoi ejß to; a[stu 
 
In the deme of Paenia was a woman named Phye, lacking three 
fingers of four cubits in height and otherwise beautiful. Dressing 
this woman in a full panoply, mounting her in a chariot and posing 
her in the most impressive way they drove into the city, sending 
ahead heralds as forerunners, who arriving in the city proclaimed 
the things ordered. (i.60.4) 
 
While Peisistratus crafted an image of Athena to manipulate the Athenians,53 
Herodotos works on another level. In the second deception, he substitutes the 
objects of the first attempt at tyranny with more potent or dangerous props. He 
replaces the cart with a chariot, the wooden clubs with a full panoply of armor, 
and the Acropolis with the “goddess” herself.  
 Peisistratus' second failure, though, triggered a change in strategy and 
approach that Herodotos reflects in the objects and elements of his story. Rather 
than simply launch a third, grander scheme along the same lines as the first two, 
the former and future tyrant, at the urging of his son Hippias, spent several years 
amassing money from various sources and using it to gather a large force of 
mercenaries (i.61.3-4). While he gathered money (e{w" me;n Peisivstrato" ta; 
crhvmata h[geire), the Athenians made no move against the would-be tyrant 
                                                
52 Sinos. 1993, p. 82. 
53 Hollmann. 2005, pp. 289-290. 
 
47 
(i.62.2). But when he led his mercenaries to Attica (i.62.1), he encountered the 
Athenian army near the temple of Athena Pallenis where the two forces 
grounded arms: 
kai; ou|toiv te panstratih'/ h[isan ejpi; tou;" katiovnta" kai; oiJ 
ajmfi; Peisivstraton, wJ" oJrmhqevnte" ejk Maraqw'no" h[isan ejpi; 
to; a[stu, ej" twjuto; suniovnte" ajpiknevontai ejpi; Pallhnivdo"  
jAqhnaivh" iJrovn, kai; ajntiva e[qento ta; o{pla.  
 
Both these men came in full strength against the men returning 
from exile and the followers of Peisistratus, once they roused 
themselves and set forth from Marathon towards the city, coming 
together in the same place reached the temple of Athena Pallenis 
and grounded arms opposite one another. (i.62.3) 
 
Upon the advice of an oracle monger, Peisistratus launched a surprise attack, 
routed the Athenians, and secured power (i.63.1). 
 Herodotos repeats here the elements of Athena, weapons, and deception, 
but he alters the significance of each in important ways. While the historian 
escalates the magnitude of the tyrant’s deception, the nature of Peisistratus’ 
conveyance, and the role of Athena (from destination to participant) from the 
first to second attempts, he minimizes their roles in the third attempt. Although 
deception remains an element of the tale in the form of the surprise attack, 
Herodotos greatly reduces its importance.54 The tyrant only incorporated 
deception as an addendum to his plan, launching a surprise night attack after 
hearing the chresmologos’ prophetic words (i.63.1). Herodotos scatters fantastic 
events, such as the chresmologos’ proclamation, throughout the account of 
                                                




Peisistratus’ rise to power.55 But the seer’s description of the Athenians as tunnies 
running into a net merely reinforces their stupidity, which Herodotos highlights 
during the second attempt, not the magnitude of the tyrant's deception. The 
historian reduces the presence of Athena from the goal of the coup (Acropolis) or 
a co-opted participant (Phye) to a simple setting for the battle near one of her 
lesser temples (i.62.3). Finally, he abandons any reference to a conveyance, 
simple at first and then splendid, aside from Peisistratus’ mounted sons chasing 
the fleeing Athenians (i.63.2).  
In place of these elements, Herodotos further magnifies the role of arms 
and introduces a new factor: money. The historian replaces Athena's panoply 
with the arms of an entire army (ou|toiv te panstratih'/ … o{pla). In conjunction 
with arms, he repeatedly mentions money,56 stressing its role and giving the 
impression of the continual growth of Peisistratid strength and power.57 At the 
end of the logos, Herodotos underscores the importance of these two elements by 
noting that Peisistratus maintained his tyranny “through a steady income of 
money and many mercenaries” (ejpikouvroisiv te polloi§si kai; crhmavtwn 
sunovdoisi – i.64.1). Money and force differ from the previous elements in their 
ability to secure power for the tyrant. Although Peisistratus seized power the 
first time through deception and mild force, the historian notes that his rivals 
Megacles and Lycurgus removed the tyrant before his power could take root (kai; 
                                                
55 Lateiner. 1993, p. 184. 
56 i.61.3: dwtivna", crhvmata, crhmavtwn. i.61.4: misqwtoi;, crhvmata. i.62.2: crhvmata. i.64.1: 
crhmavtwn sunovdoisi. 
57 Lavelle. 1991, p. 320. 
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th;n turannivda ou[ kw kavrta ejrrizwmevnhn e[cwn ajpevbale / and having power 
that had not yet taken root he lost the tyranny - i.60.1). In the last attempt, 
however, the greater role of arms and the introduction of money allowed 
Peisistratus’ power literally “to take root” (ejrrivzwse th;n turannivda – i.64.1), to 
gain the stability that mild force and deception could not achieve. 
 Thus, through the repetition and substitution of related objects in the 
repeated context of the seizure of tyrannical power, Herodotos illustrates the 
tyrant’s most effective route to power: money and arms. In each attempt, the 
historian uses different objects of the same type to emphasize the escalation of 
Peisistratus’ attempts at power. In the first two attempts, the tyrant exchanged a 
temple for the goddess herself, a cart for a chariot, and wooden clubs for a full 
set of armor, but failed to secure his power. Hence he discarded the conveyance, 
minimized the role of Athena, and instead employed greater force (the arms of a 
mercenary army) and amassed money. Through the substitution of the objects, 
the historian emphasizes the necessity of the new elements – more arms and 
money – to the acquisition and maintenance of tyrannical power.  
 
The Anchor of Sophanes (ix.74-75) 
 In a similar manner, Herodotos describes the Athenian Sophanes in 
numerous contexts. He creates multiple images of Sophanes both from the Battle 
of Plataea and events from before and after the Persian war. Although the 
historian places the Athenian in a variety of situations and time frames, he relies 
on the objects in each section to characterize the behavior of Sophanes, who 
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otherwise receives little descriptive attention. As in the case of the preceding 
examples, when read together these multiple images provide a nuanced 
argument about the changing nature of Athens after the Persian War. The 
historian encourages such a reading through he brief history of Sophanes’ deme 
of Decelea. The historian links the aid that the ancient Deceleans gave to the 
Spartan king Tyndareus, when Theseus abducted his daughter Helen, to events 
in the fifth century. In gratitude for this assistance, the Spartans gave the 
Deceleans certain honors and later spared their lands from devastation during 
the Peloponnesian War (ix.73). The individual depictions of Decelea (the aid to 
Tyndareus or the sparing of Decelea) can stand alone, but when the historian 
places them together he provides a diachronic, if brief, picture of the Attic deme. 
 Herodotos presents Sophanes in a similar manner. He uses the multiple 
images of the Athenian, and the objects in these images, to present not only a 
brief history of the man’s life, but also a glimpse into the transformation of 
Athens. At Plataea, Herodotos recounts two diverse images of Sophanes’ 
performance in the battle. In the first, Sophanes used an iron anchor, curiously 
attached to his belt by means of a bronze chain, to maintain his place in the battle 
line (wJ" ejk tou' zwsth'ro" tou' qwvrhko" ejfovree calkevh/ aJluvsi dedemevnhn 
a[gkuran sidhrevhn /he bore an iron anchor attached to the belt of his thorax by a 
bronze chain – ix.74.1).58 In the second, the Athenian merely bore the image of an 
                                                
58 Elsewhere in the Histories, Herodotos uses anchors in nautical settings: vi.12.1 (At Lade, 
Dionysius of Phocaea proposes that the Greeks not beach their ships, but remain at anchor); 
vii.36.2 (the Persians set the ships of Xerxes’ Hellespontine bridge into position with anchors); 
vii.188.1 (most of the Persian fleet near Cape Sepias remains at anchor because the beach may 
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anchor on his shield (wJ" ejpæ ajspivdo" aijei; periqeouvsh" kai; oujdama; 
ajtremizouvsh" ejfovree a[gkuran / he bore an anchor which was always turning 
and never at rest on his shield – ix.74.2). Although both describe a hoplite, these 
images emphasize a range of Greek warfare from epic combat to the naval 
campaigns of the fifth century. In the first image, while the iron anchor may 
symbolize Athenian naval power, the bronze composition of the chain lends the 
object an epic tone. By planting his anchor in the battlefield before encountering 
his opponent, Sophanes fought in a manner better suited to the lone combat of 
epic than to hoplite warfare.59 The security of the anchor would have forced 
Sophanes out of step whenever the phalanx moved. The Athenian also wore a 
warrior's belt (zwsthvr) (ix.74.1), an accouterment common in the Iliad, but worn 
only by non-Greeks elsewhere in the Histories.60 In the second image, the anchor 
again symbolizes naval power, but its ever-turning nature (oujdama; 
ajtremizouvsh") recalls the characterization of the Athenians during the height of 
their arche (Thuc. i.70).61 Set in the context of a hoplite battle, these objects move 
Sophanes simultaneously backward and forward in time. 
                                                                                                                                            
only hold a small number of their ships). While Herodotos portrays the use of anchors at Lade as 
martial behavior, the other anchors are presented as simple nautical instruments.  
59 Krentz. 1985, pp. 54-55. Cawkwell. 1989, p. 387. Contra Flory. 1987, pp. 43-44. He views the 
account as "burlesque Greek heroism" designed to mock the self-congratulatory efforts of the 
Greeks after the Persian Wars. While a defensible reading, Flory overlooks the clearly epic and 
non-epic images of Sophanes prior and following the Persian Wars. 
60 Iliad: iv.132, 134, 136, 186, 213, 215; v.539, 615, vi.219; vii.305; x.77; xi.236; xii.189; xvii.519, 578; 
xx.414. Histories: i.215 (Massagetae); iv.9.5, 10.1, 10.3 (the Scythians). 
61 Although Thucydides does not use the term ajtremivzw to characterize the Athenians, he 
describes his countrymen, through the words of the Corinthian ambassador, as a daring, 
innovative people, who are quick to take action (oiJ mevn ge newteropoioi; kai; ejpinoh§sai ojxei§" 
kai; ejpitelevsai e[rgw/ a} a]n gnw§sin: … kai; mh;n kai; a[oknoi pro;" uJma§" mellhta;" kai; 
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 Herodotos emphasizes this diachronic view of Sophanes through the 
description of events from the man’s life before and after Plataea. First, the 
historian describes Sophanes’ actions during the Athenian siege of Aegina in the 
years before Plataea (c. 487-483 BC). There Sophanes killed Eurybates the Argive, 
a winner of the pentathlon, in an epic-styled challenge (o{te perikathmevnwn 
jAqhnaivwn Ai[ginan Eujrubavthn to;n jArgei'on, a[ndra pentaveqlon, ejk 
proklhvsio" ejfovneuse. / When the Athenians besieged Aegina, he killed 
Eurybates the Argive, a winner of the pentathlon, in single combat. – ix.75).62 
Similar to the first image at Plataea, Sophanes fought like an epic hero.  
 Directing the audience's gaze to the years after Plataea, Herodotos 
transforms the Athenian from an epic hero to an imperialist. No longer fighting 
for Greek unity, Sophanes advanced Athenian imperial ambitions in the 
Thraceward area63 where he led men into battle not as an epic champion, but as 
one of two strategoi (ix.75). In place of a warrior's belt, an iron anchor, and a 
bronze chain, Sophanes “was killed by the Edoni while fighting for control of the 
gold mines at Datum” (ajpoqanei'n uJpo; jHdwnw'n ejn Davtw/ peri; tw'n metavllwn 
tw'n crusevwn macovmenon – ix.75). This transition from bronze to gold reifies the 
transformation of Sophanes’ martial objectives from the Battle of Plataea and 
later years, replacing honor with income and the fight for Greek freedom with 
imperial ambition. 
                                                                                                                                            
ajpodhmtai; pro;" ejndhmotavtou" oi]ontai ga;r oiJ me;n th/§ ajpousiva/ a[n ti kta§sqai, uJmei§" de; tw/§ 
ejpelqei§n kai; ta; eJtoi§ma a]n blavyai. – i.70.2, 4). 
62 Flower. and Marincola. 2002, p. 240. 
63 Macan. 1973 (1908), p. 191. 
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 Through the four distinct images of Sophanes, Herodotos illustrates the 
changing nature of the Athenians and through him Athens itself. Focusing in 
particular upon the objects that Sophanes handled or fought for (an epic belt, the 
anchor, shield, and the gold mines), the historian moves the Athenian from epic 
combat in which kleos was the ultimate prize to an imperialistic campaign in 
which revenue was sought. He symbolizes the transitional nature that the 
Persian War represented for Athens through his changing description of this 
best, model, Athenian.  
 
Unconquered Chains: The Tegean and Athenian Chains (i.66 and v.77) 
While Herodotos uses the manner in which an object changes, or is 
replaced in a telling fashion, he uses the unchanging object to similar effect. Like 
the dog that did not bark in the night, the lack of change, highlighted through a 
diachronic presentation, may be as powerful an indicator of meaning as 
mutability. Herodotos presents the Tegean and Athenians chains of i.66 and v.77 
in such an unchanging fashion. Drawing upon the connotation these objects have 
with slavery and oriental imperialism, the historian uses the dramatic display of 
these sets of chains to illustrate the Greek rejection of such concepts. 
Herodotos places the first set of chains, and the first set of pedai in the 
Histories, in the hands of the Spartans during their attempt to expand their 
control over the Peloponnese. After Lycurgus reformed the Spartan constitution 
(i.65), the Lacedaemonians consulted Delphi about the conquest of Arcadia. In 
response, the oracle stated: 
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dwvsw toi Tegevhn possivkroton ojrchvsasqai kai; kalo;n pedivon 
scoivnw/ diametrhvsasqai. 
 
I will give you Tegea to dance with tapping feat and the beautiful 
plain to measure with a rope. (i.66.2)  
 
Misinterpreting the oracle's meaning, the Spartans confidently invaded Tegea 
bearing chains (oiJ de; pevda" ferovmenoi) with which to bind the Tegeans (i.66.3). 
But the Spartans were defeated and bound with their own fetters, which the 
Tegeans later hung in the temple of Athene Alea: 
eJsswqevnte" de; th'/ sumbolh'/, o{soi aujtw'n ejzwgrhvqhsan, pevda" te 
e[conte" ta;" ejfevronto aujtoi; kai; scoivnw/ diametrhsavmenoi to; 
pedivon to; Tegehtevwn ejrgavzonto. aiJ de; pevdai au|tai ejn th'/si 
ejdedevato e[ti kai; ej" ejme; h\san sovai ejn Tegevh/ peri; to;n nho;n 
th'" jAlevh" jAqhnaivh" kremavmenai.  
 
But they were defeated in battle, those who were taken prisoner 
wore the very chains they brought and they worked the Tegean 
plain measuring it out with a rope. But the chains in which they 
were bound were still preserved in my own lifetime in Tegea, 
hanging up around the temple of Athene Alea. (i.66.4)  
 
The pedai symbolized the immediate victory.64 But Herodotos emphasizes their 
description65 and thereby the enduring nature of Tegean resistance through the 
survival of the pedai over time (aiJ de; pevdai au|tai ejn th'/si ejdedevato e[ti kai; ej" 
ejme; h\san sovai – i.66.4).66 
Herodotos parallels this description in his account of the Athenian 
chains.67 After the overthrow of the Peisistratid tyranny, the Boeotians and 
Chalcidians attacked Attica during the Spartan king Cleomenes’ attempt to 
                                                
64 Higbie. 2003, pp. 249-250. 
65 Naiden. 1999, pp. 138-139, n. 18. See n. 41. 
66 The Tegean speaker before the Battle of Plataea proudly cited this continued resistance (ix.26.7). 
67 Gray. 1997.  
 
55 
install Isagoras in power (v.75-76). When the Peloponnesian force withdrew, the 
Athenians sought revenge upon the opportunistic Boeotians and Chalcidians. 
Defeating both and placing the prisoners in fetters, the Athenians displayed the 
chains on the Acropolis:  
ta;" de; pevda" aujtw'n, ejn th'/si ejdedevato, ajnekrevmasan ej" th;n 
ajkrovpolin: ai{ per e[ti kai; ej" ejme; h\san perieou'sai, kremavmenai 
ejk teicevwn peripefleusmevnwn puri; uJpo; tou' Mhvdou, ajntivon de; 
tou' megavrou tou' pro;" eJspevrhn tetrammevnou.  
 
[The Athenians] hung the chains, in which they [the Boeotians and 
Chalcidians] had been bound, on the Acropolis; they survived even 
to my day, hanging from the walls scorched by fire by the Persians, 
opposite the shrine that faces west. (v.77.3) 
 
Indicating that they survived to his own day (e[ti kai; ej" ejme; h\san perieou'sai), 
the historian once again emphasizes the chains and the victory they represent.68 
Beyond simple victory, however, the chains symbolize a victory over 
oriental-style (i.e. Persian) imperialism. While Herodotos employs a variety of 
terms to describe imprisonment, the binding of prisoners, and prisoners of war,69 
he reserves the use of pedai, apart from the Tegean and Athenian examples, for 
instances of Persian imperialism and subjugation. The historian often presents 
Persian subjects, whom were regarded as the Persian king’s slaves, in pedai. After 
the conquest of Lydia, Cyrus placed the defeated Croesus in chains (i.86.2), 
which the former monarch later dedicated to Delphi to indicate his servile status 
(i.90.2-4). Within the royal court, Persians wore golden torques and bangles that 
the perceptive Ethiopian king identified as pedai, indicative of their subservient 
                                                
68 Naiden. 1999, pp. 138-139, n. 18. 
69 devw, ejndevw, katadevw, metivhmi, zwgrevw, zeu§go", desmov". 
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status (iii.22.2). When the Greek doctor Democedes moved from a prison to the 
palace, his level of comfort changed, but not the presence of his chains (pevda" … 
pedevwn crusevwn duvo zeuvgesi: / chains … two golden chains - iii.129.3 and 
iii.130.4). Providing a Hellenic perspective, Democedes questioned whether his 
reward of two golden chains in place of his original chains signified the doubling 
of his woes (iii.130.4). The Persians even used chains in attempts to subdue the 
forces of nature. Angered by the destruction of his first bridge across the 
Hellespont, Xerxes attempted to enslave the body of water by casting a set of 
fetters into it (pedevwn zeu§go" - vii.35.1).  
 Although neither the Tegeans nor Athenians confronted the Persians in 
their respective logoi, their chains nevertheless symbolized their triumph over 
imperialism. In the Spartan invasion of Tegea, Herodotos emphasizes the 
measuring rope (scoivno") or the chains (pevdai),70 which reify the Spartan aim of 
dominion over all Arcadia (pavsh/ th'/ jArkavdwn cwrh/§ - i.66.1). Interpreting the 
oracle’s “scoivno"” to mean a measuring rope, the Spartans transformed the object 
into a tool of imperialism and enslavement:71 
oi} de; pevda" ferovmenoi ejpi; Tegehvta" ejstrateuvonto … wJ" dh; 
ejxandrapodiouvmenoi tou;" Tegehvta"  
 
Bearing chains they campaigned against the Tegeans … as though 
enslaving the Tegeans … (i.66.3)  
 
While the verb ajndrapodivzw ('to sell into slavery') appears in both Persian and 
non-Persian contexts, Herodotos employs the compound ejxandrapodivzw ('to lead 
                                                
70 i.66.2 (scoivnw), 66.3 (pevda"), 66.4 (pevda", scoivnw/, pevdai). 
71 Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 200-201. 
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a nation into captivity') only here and in his narration of Persian conquests.72 
Thus, when the Tegeans displayed the captured chains, the objects not only 
represented their victory over the Spartans, but also their defeat of oriental-style 
imperialism. 
 In Athens, Herodotos uses the diachronic presentation to broaden the 
symbolism of their pedai.73 Unlike the Spartan invasion of Tegea, the historian 
does not present the Boeotian or Chalcidian attacks in an imperial light. The 
invading Greeks neither bore chains with them nor sought to enslave the 
Athenians. Instead their actions resembled typical Greek warfare. The Boeotians 
seized two outlying demes while the Chalcidians devastated parts of Attica 
(v.74.2). Perhaps in an ominous allusion to the Athenian Arche, the pedai 
belonged to the Athenians, who used them to bind the prisoners from their 
retaliatory campaigns (v.77.3). But this sign of nascent Athenians imperialism is 
soon transformed into a symbol of defiance against Persian imperialism. 
Hanging amid the ruins of the Persian sack (kremavmenai ejk teicevwn 
peripefleusmevnwn puri; uJpo; tou' Mhvdou – v.77.3), the pedai are linked the 
Persians both through connotation and proximity. The pedai, like Athens, 
survived the sack (ai{ per e[ti kai; ej" ejme; h\san perieou'sai – v.77.3). The 
                                                
72 i.66.3 (the Spartan assault on Tegea); i.155.1, i.156.2 (Cyrus contemplated enslaving the 
rebellious Lydians); i.161 (the Persian commander Mazares carried off the people of Priene into 
slavery); iii.25.3 (Cambyses proposed to reduce the Ammonians to slavery); vi.9.4 (before the 
battle of Lade, the Ionian tyrants threatened that the Persians would enslave any Ionian city that 
resists Persian reconquest); vi.94.2 (Darius appointed Datis to enslave Eretria and Athens); 
vi.108.2 (in the context of the Persian invasion at Marathon, the Plataeans were advised to seek 
protection from Athens rather than Sparta to avoid enslavement); viii.126.2 (Artabazus attempted 
to enslave the rebellious Potidaea). 
73 Poudrier. 2002, p. 66. Poudrier notes that the chains represent a dual monument that signifies 
victory over the Greeks and later the Persians, but does not examine the diachronic presentation.  
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historian uses their continuing presence to extend the Athenian message of 
defiance from her fellow Greeks to Persian imperialism.   
An object that remains unchanged in the narrative, whether over time or 
through repeated references, then, like an object that changes or is replaced, may 
possess an added layer of meaning. But whereas Herodotos uses change to 
undermine or alter an object’s meaning, he uses constancy to reinforce or widen 
the application of an object’s significance. In this manner, Herodotos employs 
endurance over time to expand the significance of the Tegean and Athenian 
chains beyond their immediate victories. Drawing upon the link between pedai 
and oriental slavery and imperialism, the historian uses the respective chains to 
deny the creation or extension of imperialism into Greece. The Tegean chains 
were both a monument of their first victory over Sparta and a symbol of the limit 
placed upon Lacedaemonian imperial ambitions. Against Persian imperial 
ambitions, the historian transforms the Athenian chains from a simple 
monument commemorating a victory over neighboring Greeks into a denial of 
the expansion of Persian imperialism into Athens and Greece.  
 
Changing an object amid a consistent context, Herodotos creates varying 
images of the same or a similar object that inform the audience of its significance. 
Either he alters an object through repetition and substitution, replacing an object 
with another of the same type (e.g. a coat for a jacket), or he alters a specific 
object by depicting it over time. These changes generate multiple images, which, 





Herodotos, then, uses two opposing methods to transform objects into 
repositories of added meaning and significance. First, he uses the context of an 
unchanged object to evoke a particular connotation or meaning. Through setting, 
characters, or the action of the narrative, the historian emphasizes or 
deemphasizes an object’s connotation. In the case of complex objects, composed 
of several elements, Herodotos blends the respective connotations into an object-
based text. Rather than shaping meaning through the context, the historian may 
change the object by arranging a series of images of the object on a consistent 
background. Through repetition and substitution, the historian may replay and 
revise either the same scene or compare analogous contexts. Within this similar 
context, Herodotos exchanges the original object for one of the same type (e.g. a 
bottle of wine for a bottle of champagne). Additionally, the historian may present 
a specific object diachronically, highlighting how the object changes or remains 
the same over time. For both methods (repetition and diachronic presentation), 
he uses the subtle change in the object(s) and the resulting alteration in its (their) 
connotation to build up a complex message within the body of the object.  
Herodotos uses these two methods either individually or collectively to 
“charge” many objects in the Histories. In the subsequent chapters, further 
examples of the historian’s use of object manipulation (Chapter 2: The Fragile 
Future; Chapter 3: Comparative Objects) and contextual manipulation (Chapter 




Chapter 2:  
The Fragile Future: Monuments and Foreshadowing 
 
 
Time is the domain of the historian. Herodotos frequently manipulates 
this domain, arranging the sequence of the past to foreshadow his narrative’s 
future.1 One effective, but unstudied, tool is his use of royal monuments to 
presage events in his narrative.2 As the previous chapter demonstrates, the 
historian uses time to create multiple images of specific objects and to chronicle 
their changing (or unchanging) shapes and statuses over time. By carefully 
sequencing the events of his narrative, the historian presents royal monuments 
diachronically and uses their survival or deterioration to foreshadow the fate of a 
ruler and/or his kingdom, specifically Lydia, Babylon, Egypt, Samos, and 
Scythia as each polity is conquered by or successfully resists Persian power. 
Royal monuments are the key to this type of foreshadowing, but what do 
they signify? While monuments may commemorate a life or event, on a basic 
level they symbolize or represent the dedicant(s). According to Henry 
Immerwahr, Herodotos uses such monuments as tangible “yardsticks” for the 
measurement and display of a monarch’s greatness in the Histories.3 For example, 
the historian uses the pyramid of Cheops as a measure of the pharaoh’s great 
power and wealth (ii.124-125). Yet, while Immerwahr correctly identifies this 
                                                
1 For Herodotos’ general use of foreshadowing see: Lattimore. 1939, pp. 32-33. Flory. 1978, pp. 
150-151. Dewald. 1985, pp. 50-51. I. De Jong. 2001, p. 95. Poudrier. 2002, p. 49. Harrison. 2003, 
passim. Brock. 2003, pp. 14-15. 
2 For this chapter “royal monuments” includes not only monuments (e.g. the golden lion statue of 
Croesus, i.50), but also tombs (e.g. the tomb of Nitocris, i.187). 
3 Immerwahr. 1960, pp. 265-266. 
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basic significance of monuments as symbols of individual greatness, he 
overlooks the sophisticated manner in which the historian uses time to reshape 
many monuments and the significance this manipulation has for a monarch’s 
greatness. 
 As early as Homer, the Greeks regarded physical monuments as 
memorials for themselves and their deeds. When Hector proposes to duel an 
Achaean champion, he vows that he will hang the armor of the man he kills in 
the temple of Apollo, but will return the champion’s body for burial: 
to;n de; nevkun ejpi; nh§a" eju>ssevlmou" ajpodwvsw, 
o[fra eJ tarcuvswsi kavrh komovwnte" jAcaioiv, 
sh§mav te oiJ ceuvwsin ejpi; platei§ JEllhspovntw/. 
kaiv potev ti" ei[ph/si kai; ojyigovnwn ajnqrwvpwn, 
nhi>; poluklhvi>di plevwn ejpi; o[inopa povnton: 
æajndro;" me;n tovde sh§ma pavlai katateqnhw§to", 
o{n potæ ajristeuvonta katevktane faivdimo" {Ektwr.æ 
w{" potev ti" ejrevei: to; dæ ejmo;n klevo" ou[ potæ ojlei§tai.  
 
…but his corpse I will give back to the strong-benched ships 
so that the flowing-haired Achaeans may bury him 
and heap a mound over him by the broad Hellespont. 
And one day someone of the men yet to be will say,  
as he sails a many-benched ship on the wine-dark water: 
‘This is the tomb of the brave man buried long ago, 
whom performing feats glorious Hector killed.’ 
So will one speak someday; and my glory will never die. 
(Iliad vii.84-90) 
 
In Hector’s view, the funeral mound will be a monument that preserves the 
memory of the deeds of both victor and vanquished. Often referring to 
monuments as mnh§ma, mnhmhvion, and mnhmovsunon,4 Herodotos, too, frequently 
                                                
4 mnh§ma – vii.167.2, 228.3. mnhmhvion – ii.126.1, 135.3. mnhmovsunon – i.185.1, 186.1; ii.101.2, 110.1, 
121.1, 135.3, 148.1; iii.136.3; iv.81.6, 88.2, 166.1; vi.109.3; vii.24, 226.2; ix.16.2. 
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links commemoration with a physical object.5 Whether it memorializes a person 
or deed, the object becomes a measure for the greatness of the individual who 
dedicated the monument. Although the object may tell the audience little about 
the individual’s personal qualities, Herodotos uses the memorial as an indicator 
of “… the unmeasurable quality, human greatness.”6  
 Time, however, mars this legacy of greatness by diminishing or even 
effacing its physical representation. Homer illustrates this danger when Nestor, 
advising his son Antilochus during the funeral games of Patroclus, points out the 
burial mound of an unknown ancient hero:  
h[ teu sh§ma brotoi§o pavlai katateqnhw§to", 
h] tov ge nuvssa tevtukto ejpi; protevrwn ajnqrwvpwn, 
kai; nu§n tevrmatæ e[qhke podavrkh" di§o" jAcilleuv".  
 
… either it is the tomb of a mortal buried long ago, 
or the racing goal fixed by men who lived before us, 
and now swift-footed Achilles made it a turning post.  
(Iliad xxiii. 331-333) 
 
Time has changed the séma. While it remains physically unchanged, time has 
altered the object’s relationship (or recognition) by the world. The identity of the 
man who built or is buried in the mound is lost and Nestor can only guess at its 
function.  
Herodotos, too, recognizes the ability of time to affect the physical world. 
He argues that the Nile was once a gulf of the Mediterranean and that the Nile 
                                                
5 Steinkopf. 1957, pp. 74-75. Immerwahr. 1960, pp. 266-267. Bakker. 2002, p. 26. 
6 Immerwahr. 1960, p. 265. “Greatness is then simply wealth and power, and these we measure 
by reckoning up the trouble undergone in the erection of monuments, and by the marvelous size 
of the surviving structures. The motivation attributed by Herodotus to the great builders is 
precisely that of arousing in the beholder a feeling of marvel, and thus perpetuating their fame.” 
For the use of an object, particularly a statue, as a representation of the individual see also: Ducat. 
1976, p. 243. Vernant. 1990, pp. 75, 79-82. Steiner. 2001, pp. 11-14.  
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Delta was a recent addition due to the accretion of silt (ii.11-12). He even posits 
that in ten or twenty thousand years the continued accumulation of silt will alter 
the course of the great river towards the Red Sea (ii.11.4). In his proem, the 
historian recognizes the threat such change over time poses to monuments, 
proposing to preserve the deeds and works of men from aklea over time: 
wJ" mhvte ta; genovmena ejx ajnqrwvpwn tw'/ crovnw/ ejxivthla gevnhtai, 
mhvte e[rga megavla te kai; qwmastav, ta; me;n  {Ellhsi, ta; de; 
barbavroisi ajpodecqevnta, ajklea' gevnhtai…  
 
… so that the achievements of men may not be forgotten in time, 
and that the great deeds and wonders, the ones displayed by the 
Greeks and the others displayed by the barbarians, may not be 
without glory … [proem] 
 
The erga that Herodotos seeks to preserve include both monuments and deeds, 
which he regards collectively as “achievements.”7 In the case of monuments, the 
historian expresses his doubts about their continued survival. He uses the 
prospective imperfect and the accompanying statement kai es eme (or the like) to 
create the impression that while an object has survived to the point of his 
narration it may not endure much longer.8 Hence, recognizing the vulnerability 
of physical monuments to the passage of time, the historian seeks to preserve 
their kleos through the process of his apodexis.9 
 
Foreshadowing Objects 
Herodotos preserves the majority of the monuments in his work and with 
them the kleos of their dedicants. Yet, in rare cases, objects in the Histories do 
                                                
7 As noted earlier, supra p. 2, n. 9. 
8 Naiden. 1999, pp. 136-138. e.g. i.93.2f (the inscriptions on the tomb of Alyattes). 
9 Bakker. 2002, pp. 24-26. 
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deteriorate over time. Herodotos limits this deterioration to monuments 
associated with monarchs.10 With the exception of the decay of the maiden 
statues erected by Mycerinus, used to favor one tradition over another,11 he 
employs these monuments as evaluative tools. For example, he exemplifies 
Xerxes’ impiety through the king’s theft of the golden statue of Babylon (i.183).12 
Additionally, the historian catalogs the deterioration of the victory monuments 
erected in other lands by the Egyptian conqueror Sesostris (ii.102-110): 
ta;" de; sthvla" ta;" i{sta kata; ta;" cwvra" oJ Aijguvptou basileu;" 
Sevswstri", aiJ me;n pleu'ne" oujkevti faivnontai perieou'sai… 
 
Most of the stelai, which the Egyptian pharaoh Sesostris erected in 
the conquered lands, have disappeared. (ii.106.1) 
 
While Herodotos observes that many of the stelai no longer survive, he does so, 
in part, to emphasize the survival of the others. The continued existence of these 
stelai in hostile terrain (Palestine and Asia Minor) testifies not only to the past 
achievement, but the continuing fame of the Egyptian conqueror. 
Aside from these examples, Herodotos restricts the diachronic 
presentation of royal monuments to the major Persian campaigns against polities 
with a monarchic figure: Lydia, Samos, Babylon, Egypt, and Scythia. No such 
presentation appears in lesser campaigns such as Cyrus’ failed attempt to 
                                                
10 i.50-52, i.91 (the dedications of Croesus); i.183 (the golden statue of Babylon); i.187 (the tomb of 
Nitocris); ii.102-110 (the victory monuments of Sesostris); ii.130-131 (the maiden statues of 
Mycerinus); iii.122-123 (the furniture of Polycrates); iv.87 (the stelai of Darius). One possible 
exception is the golden statue of Apollo (vi.118). But Herodotos does not present the 
deterioration of the statue over time. Rather, he credits Datis with an attempt to restore the statue 
to its sanctuary. 
11 Herodotos cites the presence of maiden statues’ hands on the chamber floor to argue against 
the story that Mycerinus’ wife cut off the hands of her servants. Instead, the historian argues, the 
hands clearly fell off over time (ii.131). 
12 See Chp. 3, pp. 101-103. 
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conquer the Massagetae, the Persian expedition against the Libyans at Barca 
(i.201-216 and iv.197-202), or in the great campaigns against the Greek poleis in 
Ionia and Greece. The accounts of the first two campaigns are shorter and the 
historian omits a lengthy treatment of their customs, leaders, and a narrative of 
their history before the Persian invasion. In his presentation of the Greek 
campaigns, Herodotos describes no single figure as supreme leader; figures such 
as Aristagoras, Histiaeus, Leonidas, and Themistocles were not autocratic. 
Herodotos does present a Greek victory trophy, a captured Phoenician trireme, 
diachronically at viii.121, but only after the major victory at Salamis.13 In the 
examples discussed below, the historian presents such monuments before his 
account of a war even begins, anticipating rather than commemorating the 
results. For the major campaigns against kingdoms, the historian includes an 
account of the country’s significant monuments and memorials. In the course of 
this review, he presages the polity’s fall through the description of monuments 
belonging to the final (or last significant) ruler. 
Herodotos manipulates such objects, or more precisely his audience’s 
perception of them, to alter the monument’s function from commemorative to 
predictive. By changing the object’s physical description diachronically, he 
redirects the audience’s attention from the monarch’s past greatness to his or her 
future greatness – the monarch’s fate or legacy. As the monument, a measure of 
monarchic greatness, surrenders to the passage of time, it implies a similar 
decline in the monarch and, described on the eve of a conflict with Persia, the 
                                                
13 See Chp 5, pp. 223-224 for an analysis of the trireme’s significance. 
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subjugation of his or her kingdom. In the first two cases, Lydia and Samos, 
Herodotos describes the portentous monuments at the moment when the 
respective monarchs, Croesus and Polycrates, decided to challenge Persian 
power. In the next two examples, the historian illustrates the fates of Babylon 
and Egypt through the monuments of their penultimate monarchs, Nitocris and 
Amasis, who feared the growth of a foreign power. In the final example, that of 
Scythia, the historian alters this pattern. He uses the survival of the Scythian 
king’s monument and the deterioration of Darius’ monument to foreshadow the 
Persian king’s defeat. In each campaign, then, the historian uses these 
“yardsticks” not merely as an indicator of royal greatness, but as an indicator of 
royal destiny as well. 
 
The Dedications of Croesus (i.50-52) 
 The first monarch to succumb to Persian power in the Histories is the tragic 
figure Croesus.14 Herodotos fills the account of the king with foreshadowing, 
from Solon’s description of the happiest man (i.30-33) to the monarch’s dream 
about his son’s death (i.34), presaging the disasters that will befall Croesus.15 In 
addition to these warnings, Herodotos uses the Lydian king’s dedications to 
Delphi and the Amphiareion (i.50-52) to foreshadow the monarch’s fall in his 
war against Persia. Presenting the objects at a critical moment – Croesus’ 
consultation with Delphi about the war – Herodotos describes them 
diachronically, removing each notable monument from the monarch’s control at 
                                                
14 Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 69-71. White. 1969, pp. 47-48. Segal. 1971, p. 50. Saïd. 2002, pp. 134-7. 
15 Stahl. 1975, pp. 4, 8-9. 
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the moment of its description. Through this catalog, the historian creates a 
subtext of failure that paves the way for a negative reading of the subsequent 
ambiguous oracles (i.53-55). 
Herodotos compiles a highly selective catalog of Croesus’ dedications at 
i.50-52. He describes the physical deterioration or appropriation of each of the 
Lydian king’s notable dedications. Yet, after Croesus’ fall from power (i.84-91), 
the historian describes other dedications belonging to the Lydian king more 
objectively. Cataloging several other notable monuments, Herodotos simply 
states that some survived and other did not: 
tau'ta me;n kai; e[ti ej" ejme; h\n perieovnta, ta; dæ ejxapovlwle tw'n 
ajnaqhmavtwn:  
 
… these dedications survived even to my own day but others have 
perished; (i.92.1) 
 
The mixture of these monuments’ fates contrasts sharply with the uniform 
destruction and degradation of monuments in the earlier catalog. For example, 
he states that Croesus sent both a golden shield that was displayed in the temple 
of Athena Pronaia at Delphi and a golden tripod to the temple of Ismenian 
Apollo (i.92.1). Despite his lengthy description of other Lydian dedications at the 
same shrines in his earlier catalog (i.50-52), the historian reserves the mention of 
these offerings until after Cyrus’ conquest of Lydia. His delay in the description 
of these other notable dedications until i.92 suggests that the historian carefully 
shapes his presentation of the dedications at i.50-52.16 
                                                
16 For the selectivity of Herodotos’ catalog at i.50-52 see Parke. 1984, p. 222. and Flower. 1991, p. 
67 n. 69. Parke argues that Herodotos conflated several discrete dedicatory acts into one display 
of generosity. Flower notes several recent archaeological finds that have been attributed to the 
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 According to Herodotos, Croesus initiated his contact with Delphi and the 
Amphiareion to see whether he might check the growing power of Cyrus, the 
king of Persia. Seeking to win the gods favor, Croesus conducted animal 
sacrifices and sent splendid gifts to the two shrines. While Herodotos' 
description of these dedications may stem from an interest in wealth17 or his 
reliance upon object-driven mnemonic traditions,18 he also notes the frailty of 
each to the passage of time. 
 Herodotos begins the catalog with the sacrifices that Croesus conducted in 
Lydia. The monarch sacrificed to the god costly yet functional items such as 
gold- and silver-plated klinae, golden phialae, purple cloaks and chitons, which he 
burned on a large pyre (i.50.1). Next, he ordered the Lydian people to sacrifice to 
Apollo, each according to his ability and collected the precious metal for his own 
dedication. From this metal he had built a statue base composed of gold and 
electrum half-bricks, whose size and weight Herodotos carefully notes in order 
to emphasize the wealth of Lydia (i.50.2). Atop this base, the historian continues, 
Croesus placed a golden statue of a lion, the symbol of the Mermnadid dynasty,19 
weighing ten talents. But Herodotos no sooner describes its erection than he 
describes its fall in the great fire that destroyed the Temple of Apollo:  
ou|to" oJ levwn, ejpeivte katekaiveto oJ ejn Delfoi'si nhov", katevpese 
ajpo; tw'n hJmiplinqivwn (ejpi; ga;r touvtoisi i{druto), kai; nu'n 
                                                                                                                                            
Lydian dynasty, suggesting that Croesus’ dedications exceeded those described within the 
Histories.  
17 Flory. 1987, p. 85. Konstan. 1987, pp. 68-73. 
18 Flower. 1991, pp. 69-70. 
19 How and Wells. 1912, loc. sit. Asheri.1988, pp. 292-293. Both commentaries focus upon the 
historical issues of the statue (its dimensions, et al.). 
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kei'tai ejn tw'/ Korinqivwn qhsaurw'/, e{lkwn staqmo;n e{bdomon 
hJmitavlanton: ajpetavkh ga;r aujtou' tevtarton hJmitavlanton.  
 
This lion, when the temple at Delphi burned down, fell from its 
base of half-bricks (upon which it had been placed), and now lies in 
the Corinthian Treasury. It weighs six and one-half talents; for 
three and a half talents of it melted in the fire. (i.50.3) 
 
Described both before and after the temple fire, the statue wastes away before 
the eyes of the audience, losing nearly four talents worth of gold. The statue’s fall 
from its base of bricks, funded by the Lydian people, may be understood to 
signify the end of Croesus’ leadership of his people. The wasting away of the 
lion, the symbol of the king’s dynasty, presages Croesus’ impending reduction 
from monarch to slave.20 
In addition to the physical deterioration, Herodotos undermines Croesus’ 
claim to the monument. Once Croesus dedicated the statue to Apollo, it became 
the god’s property. But, as the dedicant, the Lydian king retained a link with the 
object and through it a special connection to the god. Noting the movement of 
the monument from its place of honor near the temple to the Corinthian treasury 
(kai; nu'n kei'tai ejn tw'/ Korinqivwn qhsaurw/§ / and [it] now lies in the Corinthian 
Treasury – i.50.3), Herodotos challenges this link.21 This placement weakened 
Croesus’ connection with the statue and established a new connection between 
the statue and the Corinthians.  
In the context of public display at Delphi, a thesauros has a proprietary 
significance. While a personal gift expressed an individual’s relationship with the 
                                                
20 Kurke. 1999, p. 62. Kurke has also noted the implication of the damage to the statue, but 
overlooks the significance of its new placement and the similar presentation of Croesus' other 
dedications. 
21 Since the fire damaged the statue, the dedication presumably originally stood near the temple. 
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god, the thesauros removed the dedication from the individual sphere and placed 
it in the context of the polis. The treasury re-contextualized the dedication. While 
the dedication still reflected well on the dedicant, it now also glorified the polis.22 
Thus, in the case of Croesus’ monuments, the placement of a dedication within 
the control of another polity signaled the end of the object’s exclusive connection 
with the Lydian king. Hence, when the golden statue was moved, it ceased to be 
a solely Lydian dedication. Croesus’ claim to the statue and the privileged 
relationship with the god it represented was then shared with the Corinthians. 
Through this redefinition, Herodotos transforms the Lydian king’s enduring 
symbol of his power into a more malleable, even transitory, image. Altering its 
size, shape, and location, he presents the statue as a changeable object against an 
unchanging (albeit restored) background of temple and treasury. 
 Herodotos similarly undermines Croesus’ link to his other notable 
dedications. The historian first describes the fate of two immense23 and 
exceptional24 kraters, one gold, and the other silver:  
krhth'ra" duvo megavqei> megavlou", cruvseon kai; ajrguvreon, tw'n oJ 
me;n cruvseo" e[keito ejpi; dexia; ejsiovnti ej" to;n nhovn, oJ de; 
ajrguvreo" ejpæ ajristerav. metekinhvqhsan de; kai; ou|toi uJpo; to;n 
nho;n katakaevnta kai; oJ me;n cruvseo" kei'tai ejn tw'/ Klazomenivwn 
qhsaurw'/, e{lkwn staqmo;n ei[naton hJmitavlanton kai; e[ti duwvdeka 
mneva", oJ de; ajrguvreo" ejpi; tou' pronhivou th'" gwnivh", cwrevwn 
ajmforeva" eJxakosivou":  
 
There are two large kraters, one gold and the other silver, the gold 
one was placed on the right side of the temple entrance, the silver 
                                                
22 Neer. 2001, p. 284.  
23 For a structural analysis of the golden krater’s that supports Herodotos’ description of the vessel 
see: Blackman and Sawyer. 2000, pp. 319-321. 
24 Asheri. 1988, pp. 293-294. Besides labeling the kraters as “not everyday works,” the historian 
emphasizes their splendor with the reference to the famed artist/architect Theodorus of Samos. 
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one on the left. They were moved when the temple burned down 
and the gold krater located in the Clazomenian Treasury, weighs 
nine half-talents and twelve minae, the silver krater located in the 
corner of the temple’s pronaos, holds six hundred amphorae. (i.51.1-
2) 
 
Although they survived the fire, the kraters, like the lion statue, were relocated in 
the aftermath. They were separated and moved to positions of lesser honor 
(another building and the corner of the pronaos). Once again Herodotos re-
contextualizes Croesus’ dedications by establishing connections between his 
monuments and other polities. Although the Clazomenians were subjects of 
Croesus,25 their treasury was not his. The placement of the golden krater within 
their structure would have re-contextualized the object as a Clazomenian 
dedication. Similarly the silver krater fell prey to appropriation by the Delphians, 
who used the krater in their Theophania celebration (ejpikivrnatai ga;r uJpo; 
Delfw'n Qeofanivoisi. / wine is mixed in it by the Delphians for the Theophania 
– i.51.2). Although these dedications retained a link to Croesus, Herodotos uses 
their movement to establish other claims than those of the Lydian king and hence 
to undermine his connection to these monuments. 
 Like the kraters, the silver pithoi and golden sprinklers passed outside of 
Lydian control. Herodotos locates the four silver pithoi in the Corinthian treasury 
(kai; pivqou" te ajrgurevou" tevssera" ajpevpemye, oi} ejn tw'/ Korinqivwn qhsaurw'/ 
eJsta'si / He also sent four silver pithoi, which stand in the Corinthian Treasury – 
i.51.3). The historian uses this observation once again to undermine Croesus’ 
connection to his dedications. Placing these vessels in another polity’s thesauros, 
                                                
25 Balcer. 1984, p. 81. 
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Herodotos transforms them from aristocratic dedications into a public, even 
foreign, gifts to the god. Croesus’ loss of his golden sprinkler was more blatant. 
According to the historian, a Delphian stole the sprinkler by falsely engraving 
the name of the Lacedaemonians upon it and allowing the Spartans to 
incorporate it into a statue of a boy: 
kai; perirranthvria duvo ajnevqhke, cruvseovn te kai; ajrguvreon, tw'n 
tw'/ crusevw/ ejpigevgraptai Lakedaimonivwn famevnwn ei\nai 
ajnavqhma, oujk ojrqw'" levgonte":  
 
…and he dedicated two sprinklers, both gold and silver, of which 
the gold one has the name of the Lacedaemonians engraved upon it 
and they claim it is their dedication, but they do not speak the 
truth; (i.51.3)26  
 
The theft provides an explicit indication that, once again, one of Croesus' 
dedications has changed location, function, and ownership.  
Croesus’ dedications to the shrine of Amphiaraus suffered a similar fate. 
According to Herodotos, the Lydian king deemed the oracle to be truthful (i.49) 
and rewarded this honesty with the gift of a golden shield and a spear with a 
golden shaft and head (i.52). Although the Lydian king dedicated the shield and 
spear at the Amphiareion, Herodotos describes their placement in the temple of 
Ismenian Apollo in his own day. The implicit movement of the dedications 
challenges the link that Croesus sought to establish between himself and the god. 
Additionally, although the historian states that the objects were still extant in his 
own day (ta; e[ti kai; ajmfovtera ej" ejme; h\n / both of these were still in existence 
                                                
26 West.1985, p. 280. West notes that the false inscription and Herodotos' correction as a warning 
against undue confidence in epigraphic evidence. This may also be the case, but it does not 
negate the argument that Herodotos is also using the sprinkler to illustrate Croesus' loss of 
control over his dedications. 
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in my day – i.52), he implies that the objects will not long survive. He frequently 
uses the prospective imperfect with the phrase “in my time” (e[ti kai; ej" ejme; h\n) 
to suggest an object’s imminent decay.27 Thus described, Croesus’ dedications to 
the Amphiareion, like those to Delphi, soon passed beyond his control and, 
although not destroyed or damaged, they faced an uncertain future. 
In his account of the dedications sent to Delphi and the Amphiareion, 
Herodotos differentiates between notable (or marked) objects and unremarkable 
(or “unsigned”) objects. The Lydian king’s dedications of the latter type suffered 
no deterioration over time. Croesus sent silver basins, the golden statue of a 
woman, which the Delphians claimed was of his baker, and his own wife’s 
jewelry and girdle (i.51.5). Although hardly less impressive than the other 
dedications,28 Herodotos does not mention any deleterious effects time may have 
had upon them. However, the historian distinguishes these enduring objects by 
describing them as Croesus’ “unremarkable” or, more literally, “unmarked” 
dedications (a[lla te ajnaqhvmata oujk ejpivshma polla; / and many unmarked 
dedications - i.51.5).29 These are minor works that possess no explicit link to the 
Lydian king. Hence, the historian does not employ them as indicators of Croesus’ 
fate.  
                                                
27 Naiden. 1999, p. 138, n. 17. 
28 The silver pithoi do not appear to stand out from the silver basins. Similarly a golden statue, 
even of a baker, appears to be a more remarkable sign of wealth than the stolen sprinklers. 
Finally, Croesus' dedication of his wife's jewelry and clothing would seem to offer a possible 
resonance to the clothing of Candaules' wife.  
29 Powell, p. 137 s.v. ejpivshmo" (2) defines the adjective to mean "remarkable," but LSJ, p. 656 s.v. 
ejpivshmo" II defines the adjective to mean "having a mark, inscription."  
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 The major dedications, however, occupy a central role and Herodotos 
links Croesus’ subsequent consultation of the oracles to them. The historian 
describes the Lydian ambassadors as the men who were bringing the gifts (toi'si 
de; a[gein mevllousi tw'n Ludw'n tau'ta ta; dw'ra ej" ta; iJra; ejnetevlleto oJ 
Kroi'so" ejpeirwta'n ta; crhsthvria / Croesus ordered the Lydians about to 
bring these gifts to the temples to ask the oracle … – i.53.1) and offered the 
dedications (oiJ Ludoi; ajnevqesan ta; ajnaqhvmata / the Lydians offered the 
dedications - i.53.2). When these men addressed the oracles, they identified 
Croesus, who sought the oracle, as the man that gave worthy gifts to the shrine:  
Kroi'so" oJ Ludw'n te kai; a[llwn ejqnevwn basileuv", nomivsa" tavde 
manthvia ei\nai mou'na ejn ajnqrwvpoisi, uJmi'n te a[xia dw'ra e[dwke 
tw'n ejxeurhmavtwn, kai; nu'n uJmeva" ejpeirwta'/ eij strateuvhtai ejpi; 
Pevrsa" kai; ei[ tina strato;n ajndrw'n prosqevoito suvmmacon. 
 
Croesus the king of the Lydians and other nations, believing these 
oracles alone to be true among men, both gave gifts worthy of 
divination, and now asks you if he should wage war against the 
Persians and if he should seek an alliance. (i.53.2)  
 
But, as Herodotos shows, these worthy gifts have an unfortunate future, which 
suggests the meaning of the oracles’ ambiguous answers. The historian, then, 
uses the fate of these gifts to foreshadow that the great empire that Croesus 
would destroy when he campaigned against the Persians (h]n strateuvhtai ejpi; 
Pevrsa", megavlhn ajrch;n min kataluvsein: / …if he should wage war against the 
Persians, that he would destroy a great empire - i.53.3) would be his own. 
 Herodotos reiterates this destiny through the krater at i.70, which the 
Spartans sent to Croesus to commemorate an alliance (i.69.4 – 70.1). Similar to the 
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noteworthy dedications at Delphi and the Amphiareion, Herodotos describes the 
krater emphatically, noting in particular its composition, decoration, and great 
size:  
tou'to de; poihsavmenoi krhth'ra cavlkeon zw/divwn te e[xwqen 
plhvsante" peri; to; cei'lo" kai; megavqei> trihkosivou" ajmforeva" 
cwrevonta h\gon,   
 
They had this bronze krater made, in size large enough to hold 
three hundred amphorae, and covered with figures around a rim 
on the exterior (i.70.1) 
 
The fate of this krater, though, like those the Lydian king dedicated in Greece, 
foreshadows Croesus' fall. According to the historian, the vessel never reached 
Sardis for one of two reasons. Either the Samians stole the krater (i.70.2) or the 
Spartan ambassadors sold it to the Samians when they learned of Croesus’ 
capture by Cyrus (i.70.3). No matter which version of events the audience 
believes, the result is the same. Croesus lost “his” krater to the Samians who 
dedicated it at their Heraion (i.70.3). Like the earlier dedications, then, the 
historian uses the krater’s transfer to another’s control to foreshadow the Lydian 
king’s fall.30  
Thus, through his discussion of Croesus’ dedications at Delphi and the 
Amphiareion at i.50-52, Herodotos creates a subtext of destruction and loss that 
foreshadows the fall of the Lydian king and his kingdom on the eve of war with 
Persia. Presenting the significant objects diachronically before revealing the 
Lydian king’s fate or his questions to the oracles, Herodotos emphasizes the 
negative fate of the objects most closely linked to Croesus. As an indicator of the 
                                                




Lydian king’s greatness, the deterioration of these objects presages Croesus’ 
similar decline from monarch to slave. Herodotos reinforces this perception by 
structurally linking the monuments closely to his inquiry about the war. 
Although the king cannot perceive it, the god gives the audience a clear 
indication of the monarch’s future through the fate of his many dedications. 
 
The Couch of Polycrates (iii.121-123) 
 Like Croesus, Polycrates too considered interfering with the affairs of 
Persia. The satrap of Sardis, Oroetes, lured the tyrant to his death with an offer of 
gold in return for his support for a supposed rebellion from Persia. At the 
moment of Oroetes’ offer to Polycrates, Herodotos uses the diachronic 
presentation of an object that belongs to the tyrant (the furniture of his andreion) 
to foreshadow the Samian's fall. The decisive moment occurs when Oroetes, an 
enemy unknown to Polycrates, devised a plan to lure the tyrant to the mainland 
in order to kill him. Dispatching a messenger to the Samian court (iii.121), the 
Persian offered Polycrates gold in return for help (iii.122). Although the historian 
refers to the tyrant's impending fall in the episode of Polycrates’ ring (iii.39-43), 
he presents no specific expectation of disaster in this passage until the warnings 
of several soothsayers and Polycrates' daughter just prior to the tyrant’s 
departure for Magnesia (iii.124). Drawing upon the funerary imagery of 
Polycrates’ kline and Maeandrius’ dedication of the tyrant’s belongings, the 
historian anticipates these explicit warnings. 
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 Herodotos uses two notable objects to reflect both the intent and the fate 
of the two men: Oroetes' larnakes and the furniture from Polycrates' andreion 
(particularly his kline). The purpose of the first object is clearly deceptive. The 
historian presents the larnakes transparently, showing that Oroetes filled them 
with stones and then covered the stones with a thin layer of gold to give the 
appearance of a great hoard of wealth (iii.123.2). In a manner reminiscent of 
Thrasybulus' deception of Alyattes during the siege of Miletus (i.22), Oroetes 
used an apparent abundance of an object to manipulate another's behavior. 
While Oroetes used the larnakes to entice Polycrates, though, the historian uses 
the objects to emphasize the Persian's duplicitous nature. 
 Polycrates' gullibility is to be expected. Previously, when faced with the 
highly significant events surrounding his signet ring, the tyrant only perceived 
their superficial meaning.31 Unlike the tyrant, the Egyptian pharaoh Amasis 
recognized the significance of the ring’s recovery. He broke off his friendship 
(xenia) with Polycrates, seeking to avoid the grief that he would feel for his friend 
when some inevitable and horrible mischance (suntucivh" deinh'") befell him 
(iii.43.2). Herodotos notes this turn of Polycrates’ luck when the tyrant, reclining 
in his andreion, greeted Oroetes’ emissary. According to the historian, either by 
design or chance (suntucivh) the tyrant faced the wall as the messenger delivered 
the Persian satrap’s message:  
                                                
31 van der Veen. 1993, pp. 435-448, esp. 446-448. Polycrates failed to follow Amasis’ advice. 
Instead of discarding an object whose loss would cause him to suffer (ajlgei§n), the tyrant selected 
an object whose loss would merely grieve him (ajsa§sqai). 
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kaiv kw" ei[te ejk pronoivh" aujto;n kathlogevonta ta;  jOroivtew 
prhvgmata, ei[te kai; suntucivh ti" toiauvth ejpegevneto: tovn te 
ga;r khvruka to;n  jOroivtew parelqovnta dialevgesqai, kai; to;n 
Polukravtea (tucei'n ga;r ajpestrammevnon pro;" to;n toi'con), ou[te 
ti metastrafh'nai ou[te ti uJpokrivnasqai.  
 
And it happened that Polycrates was facing the wall when Oroetes’ 
messenger came to speak, whether from intention to slight Oroetes’ 
power or by some sort of chance, and he neither turned around nor 
gave an answer. (iii.121.2)  
 
Like the Lydian monarch Meles, who overlooked (kathlovghse) guarding the 
precipitous portion of Sardis' acropolis (i.84.3),32 Polycrates contributed to his 
downfall by overlooking the danger inherent in Oroetes' message and the turn of 
his luck. 
 Herodotos alludes to this downfall through Polycrates' manner and 
position upon his kline. Although the historian does not mention the piece of 
furniture, he describes the tyrant as “lying down in his andreion” (katakeivmenon 
ejn ajndrew'ni). The tyrant’s presence and placement in the room implies the 
presence of a kline, a piece of furniture commonly found in Greek andreia. As in 
the episode of his signet ring, the tyrant remained blind to the impending 
danger, a position Polycrates physically emulated by facing the wall during the 
audience (ajpestrammevnon pro;" to;n toi'con). Moreover, the tyrant’s position 
upon the kline heightens the sense of danger. In addition to its symposiastic 
                                                
32 Herodotos uses this verb only three times – in the tale about Meles (Mhvlh" oJ provteron 
basileu;" Sardivwn …  kathlovghse … / Meles, an earlier king of Sardis, disregarded this ...  - 
i.84.3), the athlete Agasicles' disdain for established custom that led to Halicarnassus' expulsion 
from the Triopium (ajnh;r w\n  JAlikarnhsseuv", tw'/ ou[noma h\n  jAgasiklevh", nikhvsa" to;n 
novmon kathlovghse / The man was a Halicarnassian, by name Agasicles, who although he 
emerged victorious disregarded the custom … - i.144.3), and Polycrates' oversight here (iii.121.2). 
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connotation, a kline possessed a funereal significance.33 Frequently Greek art 
presents the honored dead in the position of a symposiast, lying upon his kline 
with all the accoutrements of the feast (side table, food, wine, et al.).34 The image 
of Polycrates lying (katakeivmenon) upon the kline supports this sepulchral view. 
Moreover, this verb is often used to describe the laying out of an animal for 
sacrifice or a body for burial.35 Herodotos, then, uses the kline and Polycrates’ 
appearance on it to create an ambiguous image of the tyrant both at a feast and at 
a funeral. 
 The fate of the tyrant’s kline supports this funereal image. After hearing 
the satrap's proposal, Polycrates sent his secretary Maeandrius to verify Oroetes' 
offer of riches (iii.123.1). However, Herodotos interrupts the flow of the narrative 
here and notes that: 
o}" crovnw/ ouj pollw'/ u{steron touvtwn to;n kovsmon to;n ejk tou' 
ajndrew'no" tou' Polukravteo" ejovnta ajxioqevhton ajnevqhke pavnta 
ej" to;  {Hraion.  
 
[Maeandrius] not much later than these events dedicated all the 
magnificent furniture of Polycrates’ andreion, which is worthy of 
seeing, to the Samian Heraion. (iii.123.1) 
 
Describing the dedication as “worthy of seeing,” Herodotos emphasizes the 
furniture that would have included Polycrates’ kline and alludes to a time when 
the tyrant would no longer have need of it. Through this second description of 
the tyrant’s furniture, immediately after Polycrates consented to Oroetes' 
proposal, the historian signals the outcome of the logos – the death of Polycrates. 
                                                
33 Boardman. 1990, pp. 127-129. 
34 Murray. 1983, p. 263. and Boardman. 1990, pp. 126-128. 
35 Sacrifice: Od. x.532; Funerary: Il. 24.10, 527; Tyrt. 11.19; Ar. Ach. 70. Herodotos uses the verb 
only two other times to refer to the laying out of the sick (iii.29.3 and vii.229.1). 
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 Like Croesus, Polycrates fell from power when he attempted to interfere 
with Persia. In both cases, Herodotos describes not merely the individual's 
decision, but explores the moment of decision-making, in which he uses the fate 
of the ruler’s property to foreshadow the fate of the ruler himself. For Croesus, 
he focuses upon the dedications with which the king hoped to win the favor of 
Delphi; for Polycrates he focuses upon the kline from which the tyrant consented 
to a plan that lead to his execution. Depicting the objects over time, Herodotos 
uses the future state of the dedications to reflect the future state of the monarch 
or tyrant. Damaged, destroyed, or more commonly displaced (in location and 
association), the object foreshadows the fate of an individual no longer able to 
maintain control over his possessions. 
 
The Tomb of Nitocris of Babylon (i.187) 
In the conquests of Babylon and Egypt, Herodotos instead focuses on a 
notable monarch who reacted to the growing power of another nation rather 
than a monarch conquered by the Persians.36 Through the presentation of their 
monuments, the historian foreshadows the impending conquests of the 
kingdoms but not the rulers’ individual destinies. Like the accounts of Lydia and 
Samos, Herodotos foreshadows the fall of Babylon at a critical moment in the 
narrative – on the eve of the Persian invasion. Although Cyrus defeated the 
Babylonian king Labynetus, the historian focuses on his mother, Queen Nitocris, 
                                                
36 Nitocris strengthened the fortifications of Babylon in response to the growing power of the 
Medes (i.185.1). Fearful of the power of Persia (iii.1.2), Amasis could not refuse Cambyses' 
request for the pharaoh's daughter in marriage (iii.1). 
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and her effort to strengthen the Babylonian defenses. Presenting her tomb 
diachronically immediately before the invasion, the historian demonstrates the 
futility of her attempt to safeguard the city. He transforms the queen from 
Babylon’s protector into the means of its capture. 
Babylon became a Persian target after Cyrus’ conquest of Asia Minor. 
Before the invasion, however, Herodotos describes the ancient city, its temples, 
and its extensive fortifications (i.178-183). Queen Nitocris, whose son would face 
Cyrus’ invading armies, attempted to strengthen these fortifications. Like 
Croesus, Nitocris feared a neighboring power, the Medes rather than the 
Persians, but to a Greek audience the two were often synonymous (i.185). 
Diverting the course of the Euphrates into a reservoir, she built walls along the 
banks of the river within the city (i.185-186). This project would later provide 
Cyrus with the means to capture the city (i.190-191).37  
Herodotos illustrates the futility of the queen’s efforts through the 
description of her tomb, which she placed atop a heavily trafficked gate of the 
city: 
uJpe;r tw§n mavlista lewfovrwn pulevwn tou' a[steo" tavfon eJwuth'/ 
kateskeuavsato metevwron ejpipolh'" aujtevwn tw'n pulevwn,  
 
She had a tomb built for herself atop one of the most-heavily 
trafficked gates of the city right above the gates themselves… 
(i.187.1)  
 
Outside the tomb she inscribed an invitation to future rulers of the city to remove 
money from the chamber in time of need (i.187.1-2). The queen’s resting place 
                                                
37 See Chp. 5, pp. 195-196. 
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remained undisturbed until years after the Persian conquest, when Darius, vexed 
that he could not use the gate38 and desiring the money, opened the tomb: 
th'/si de; puvlh/si tauvth/si oujde;n ejcra'to tou'de ei{neka, o{ti uJpe;r 
kefalh'" oiJ ejgivneto oJ nekro;" diexelauvnonti. ajnoivxa" de; to;n 
tavfon eu|re crhvmata me;n ou[, to;n de; nekro;n kai; gravmmata 
levgonta tavde: eij mh; a[plhstov" te e[a" crhmavtwn kai; 
aijscrokerdhv", oujk a]n nekrw'n qhvka" ajnevw/ge".  
 
And he never used these gates for this reason, because there would 
be a corpse above his head as he drove through. But opening the 
tomb he did not discover the money, but her corpse and an 
inscription, which read: if you had not been greedy for money and 
avaricious, you would not have opened the chamber of the dead. 
(i.187.4-5) 
 
While Herodotos presents Nitocris as a vengeful queen39 who mocked Darius for 
his wasteful behavior,40 he also uses her tomb to reveal the failure of her efforts to 
safeguard Babylon. First, in her inscribed invitation, the historian states that the 
queen wrote her message for future monarchs of Babylon (i.187.2). Although 
Darius, as the king of Persia, was also king of Babylon, it is unlikely that Nitocris 
anticipated that her successor would have been a foreign conqueror.  
Second, Herodotos uses the violation of the queen’s tomb to undermine 
the efficacy of Babylon’s reinforced fortifications. The historian’s placement of 
the episode is purposeful. He does not recount the tale during Darius’ siege of 
the city in book III when the story would make the most sense chronologically. 
Instead, Herodotos places the description of the tomb at a pivotal point in the 
                                                
38 How and Wells. 1912, loc. sit. Dillery. 1992, pp. 36-37. Dillery posits that Darius’ unwillingness 
to pass beneath a corpse stemmed from the monarch’s Zoroastrianism. 
39 Flory. 1987, pp. 41-42. 
40 Avery. 1972, pp. 545-546. Avery’s claim that the episode creates an implicit comparison 
between Darius and Cyrus is questionable. Darius' actions and the objects with which he interacts 
have no counterpart in the later chapters on Cyrus. Hence the comparison as presented by Avery 
is one based upon the actions of Darius and the inaction of Cyrus in dissimilar circumstances. 
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Babylonian logos: directly after his lengthy description of the city’s fortifications 
(i.178-186) and immediately before Cyrus’ breach of these same defenses (i.188-
191). The historian closely links the city’s teichea to Nitocris, who is the only 
individual named in their construction. She even enhanced the already 
formidable walls with a set of interior walls and gates along the banks of the 
Euphrates (i.184-186). Finally, she placed her tomb within the exterior teichos, 
above one of the city’s heavily trafficked, strong, bronze gates (i.187.1).41 Here, 
she provided a modicum of protection against foreign invaders; for she rendered 
the gate unusable to Darius, whom Persian or Zoroastrian nomoi may have 
prevented from passing under a grave (i.187.4).42 When Herodotos describes the 
opening of her tomb by a successor of Cyrus, whose siege immediately follows, 
he presents the metaphorical penetration of the city’s defenses that he so closely 
associated with the queen, and he reveals the futility of her efforts. 
 Herodotos emphasizes the link between Nitocris’ attempt to secure 
Babylon and Babylon’s failure to hold out against Cyrus’ siege. Frustrated by the 
old defenses of Babylon (i.190), Cyrus exploited the recent channels and reservoir 
that Nitocris had built to divert the Euphrates and to reinforce the Babylonian 
defenses. Using these structures, the Persian king diverted the river (i.191.1) and 
breached the city’s defenses through the walls and gates that Nitocris 
constructed along the riverbanks within the city (i.191.5). Since the Babylonians 
neglected to guard these positions, the failure of these defenses did not lie with 
                                                
41 Presumably this gate, like each gate of the city possessed a bronze door, jamb, and lintel (puvlai 
de; ejnesta'si pevrix tou' teivceo" eJkatovn, cavlkeai pa'sai, kai; staqmoiv te kai; uJpevrqura 
wJsauvtw" - i.179.3). 
42 Dillery. 1992, p. 37. 
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Nitocris. But the queen’s construction of the channels and reservoir allowed 
Cyrus to expose these unguarded sections and to capture the city.  
Hence, Herodotos uses the dual image (intact and violated) of Nitocris’ 
tomb not merely to illustrate Darius’ greed, but also to foreshadow the Persian 
conquest of Babylon. Linking the tomb to the queen’s fortification efforts and 
placing it in the text before the Persian siege, Herodotos transforms the tomb into 
a weathervane of Babylon’s fortunes. As Darius would one day breach her tomb 
so also would Cyrus breach the city’s vaunted defenses. 
 
Amasis and the Temple of Hephaestus (ii.176) 
 Like Babylon, Herodotos foreshadows the fall of Egypt through the 
monuments of the penultimate pharaoh Amasis, against whom Cambyses 
launched the Persian invasion. But instead of presenting Amasis’ monuments 
diachronically, the historian allows the unchanging image of the monuments to 
equate the pharaoh to a fallen warrior. Herodotos describes the monuments after 
his account of the pharaoh’s rise to power and the nature of his rule (ii.162-174), 
but before his description of the Persian conquest (ii.181f).43  
Although Amasis dedicated many noteworthy works to a variety of 
temples (ii.176.1), the historian focuses upon his dedications to the Temple of 
                                                
43 Although Herodotos first mentions Cambyses’ desire to invade Egypt at ii.1 and implies 
Egypt’s conquest at ii.110, he does not specify when the conquest took place until this point (wJ" 
ejpekravthse Kambuvsh" Aijguvptou – ii.181.5). Only after this revelation does the historian 
diachronically describes some of Amasis’ dedications to Greek temples that survived until 
Herodotos’ day (ai} ejn tw'/ nhw'/ tw'/ megavlw/ iJdruvato e[ti kai; to; mevcri ejmeu', - ii.182.1). The 
survival of these dedications does not undermine Herodotos’ foreshadowing at ii.176, for, as in 
the case of Croesus’ surviving notable monuments (i.91), the historian delays their description 
until after he reveals the fate of Egypt. 
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Athene at Sais and the Temple of Hephaestus. In the Egyptian logos, temples, 
particularly the temple of Hephaestus, provide an arena of display for the 
different pharaohs. Herodotos uses the temple of Hephaestus as the setting for 
royal dedications that in some way symbolized the dedicants.44 Beyond the 
bounds of sacred precincts, as well, the historian uses objects to reify some aspect 
of a pharaoh’s nature. He recounts the dimensions and construction techniques 
for several pyramids, which he uses to symbolize the despotism of Cheops 
(ii.124-125), the prostitution of his daughter (ii.126), and the lesser despotism of 
Chephren (ii.127) and others.45 In the case of the militaristic Necos, the historian 
mentions none of the typical dedications, but links the pharaoh to slipways for 
triremes and states that he dedicated the clothes he wore in a battle against the 
Syrians to Apollo and Branchidae (ii.159). Finally, Amasis used an object to 
symbolize himself. He transformed a golden footbath into the statue of a god as a 
metaphor for his own transformation from commoner to pharaoh (ii.172).46 
 Herodotos uses Amasis’ monuments at the temples of Athene and 
Hephaestus in an equally revealing way. In the first temple the pharaoh erected a 
propylaia, a large stone chamber, and male-sphinxes as symbols of his greatness 
(ii.175).  But his next two dedications, two recumbent statues placed before this 
temple and the temple of Hephaestus, suggest a limit to this greatness:  
                                                
44 The first pharaoh, Min, was credited with the temple’s foundation (ii.99). His successor 
Sesostris erected large statues of himself and his family before the temple, which the historian 
links to his legacy as a conqueror (ii.110). The blind Pheros dedicated two stone obelisks as a 
thank-offering for the recovery of his sight. Sethos dedicated a statue of himself with a mouse, the 
creature that helped him to ward off a foreign invasion (ii.141). 
45 Moeris (ii.101); Mycerinus (ii.134); the two pyramids of the duodecarchs (ii.149). 
46 Dewald. 1993, pp. 59-60. Hollmann. 1998, p. 159. 
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ajnevqhke de; kai; ejn toi'si a[lloisi iJroi'si oJ [Amasi" pa'si toi'si 
ejllogivmoisi e[rga to; mevgaqo" ajxioqevhta, ejn de; kai; ejn Mevmfi 
to;n u{ption keivmenon kolosso;n tou' JHfaisteivou e[mprosqe, tou' 
povde" pevnte kai; eJbdomhvkonta eijsi; to; mh'ko": ejpi; de; tw'/ aujtw'/ 
bavqrw/ eJsta'si Aijqiopikou§ ejovnte" livqou duvo kolossoiv, ei[kosi 
podw'n to; mevgaqo" ejw;n eJkavtero", oJ me;n e[nqen, oJ dæ e[nqen tou' 
megavlou. e[sti de; livqino" e{tero" tosou'to" kai; ejn Savi, keivmeno" 
kata; to;n aujto;n trovpon tw'/ ejn Mevmfi.   
 
Amasis also dedicated to all the other temples of note works 
worthy of seeing for their size, and in Memphis there is a colossal 
recumbent statue in front of the temple of Hephaestus, which is 
seventy five feet long; on the same platform stand two colossal 
statues of Ethiopian stone, each being twenty feet in height, on both 
sides. There is another such stone statue in Sais, lying in the same 
manner as the one in Memphis. (ii.176.1-2)  
 
Herodotos emphasizes the statues indirectly by placing them between other 
noteworthy dedications (ajxioqevhta) and the most noteworthy temple of Isis that 
Amasis built at Memphis (ajxioqehtovtaton). Despite these epithets the historian 
focuses on the statues in between, giving the other dedications and the temple 
scant attention. The positions of the statues were unusual, and it is likely that 
either they had fallen over by Herodotos’ time or had never been erected to the 
vertical position.47 The historian overlooks the possible implication of each 
statue’s fall and concentrates upon their recumbent (u{ption) position. At first 
such a figure might seem to suit the symposiastic lifestyle that the monarch so 
enjoyed (ii.173), but the figures were lying on their backs (u{ption), a position 
unsuited to the symposium.48 Rather, in Homer, the term commonly refers to a 
                                                
47 Lloyd. 1993, vol. II p. 218. 
48 Neither Herodotos nor his contemporaries use u{ption in a symposiastic context. In 
Aristophanes Lysistrata 195 the adjective refers to an inverted kylix, not a person. 
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person who has fallen onto his back in death, usually during combat.49 Hence, at 
not one, but two Egyptian temples, the historian describes statues of Amasis, 
symbols of the pharaoh’s greatness, which resembled fallen warriors.  
 
 Thus, for four major Persian conquests (Lydia, Babylon, Egypt, and 
Samos) Herodotos uses royal monuments to foreshadow the fall of the kingdom. 
For Lydia and Samos, he focuses on their respective rulers as they considered 
confronting Persian power or interfering with Persian affairs. Selecting the 
moment of decision (Croesus' consultation of Delphi and Polycrates' 
consideration of Oroetes' offer), the historian then describes the deterioration of 
objects closely associated with the rulers. The display of the object's loss, damage, 
or destruction in turn reflects upon the owner and indicates the likely result of 
the current decision (Croesus' enslavement and Polycrates' death). In the cases of 
Babylon and Egypt, though, Herodotos instead chooses monuments not of the 
monarchs defeated by Persia, but their immediate and more prominent 
predecessors (in both cases their parents). Here, the historian combines the 
diachronic technique with the object's nature to indicate the fate of the monarch's 
kingdom. Darius’ breach of Nitocris’ tomb provides a metaphor for the breach of 
the Babylonian defenses and Amasis’ recumbent statues symbolize Egypt’s 
impending fall. Hence, Herodotos uses the message of failure that he creates 
through an object linked to an important or ruling monarch as a means to 
foreshadow not only the downfall of the ruler, but also their kingdom as well. 
                                                




Enduring Monuments and Victory over Persia - Scythia 
 Herodotos reverses this paradigm for the Persian campaign against 
Scythia. As in the other invasion logoi, Herodotos describes notable monuments – 
the Scythian krater and the stelai of Darius – immediately before his description of 
the Persian invasion. The appearance of the Persian king’s monument is 
unprecedented. Never in the campaigns of Cyrus and Cambyses, or even Darius’ 
campaign against Babylon, does the historian describe a Persian war monument 
and certainly not one that commemorates the beginning of a war. The outcome of 
the campaign was as unusual as its monument: Persian defeat. Herodotos 
foreshadows this result through the two royal monuments. Presenting both 
diachronically, the historian transforms the krater from a symbol of the Scythian 
population into an anticipatory victory monument and the stelai into symbols of 
Darius’ impending failure. 
 As in the preceding invasion narratives, Herodotos presents an extensive 
examination and review of Scythian customs and marvels. Near the end of this 
Scythian ethnography, on the eve of Darius’ invasion, the historian describes a 
large bronze krater that was situated between the Borysthenes and Hypanis 
rivers and was constructed by the Scythian king Ariantes as a symbol of the 
Scythian population. Ariantes ordered every male Scythian, upon pain of death, 
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to bring him an arrowhead, which he had melted down and cast into a lasting 
memorial, a gigantic krater that held six hundred amphorae:50 
boulovmenon ga;r to;n sfevteron basileva, tw/' ou[noma ei\nai 
jAriavntan, tou'ton eijdevnai to; plh'qo" to; Skuqevwn keleuvein min 
pavnta" Skuvqa" a[rdin e{kaston mivan ajpo; tou' ojistou' komivsai. 
o}" dæ a[n mh; komivsh/, qavnaton ajpeivlee. komisqh'naiv te dh; crh'ma 
pollo;n ajrdivwn kaiv oiJ dovxai ejx aujtevwn mnhmovsunon poihvsanti 
lipevsqai. ejk toutevwn dhv min to; calkhvion poih'sai tou'to kai; 
ajnaqei'nai ej" to;n jExampai'on tou'ton.  
 
For their king named Ariantes wanting to know the number of 
Scythians ordered all the Scythian men to bring one arrowhead to 
him. And whoever did not bring an arrowhead would be put to 
death. A great number of arrowheads were brought and it seemed 
best to Ariantes to make a memorial from them. From these he 
made this bronze vessel and set it there at Exampeus. (iv.81.5-6) 
 
While the object’s function as a symbol, something to be interpreted by the 
historian, has been well noted, what the krater symbolizes has not been 
adequately explained. As Dewald and Hollmann note, the krater clearly signifies 
the male population of Scythia.51 But Herodotos imbues the krater with a military 
significance as well. Comprised of arrowheads, the chief weapon of the Scythian 
cavalry, the vessel represented not merely the male population of Scythia, but its 
military power. The historian emphasizes this military aspect through its 
comparison to the krater that Pausanias dedicated to commemorate his victory 
over the Persians:52  
ejn touvtw/ tw'/ cwvrw/ kei§tai calkhvion, megavqei kai; eJxaplhvsion 
tou' ejpi; stovmati tou' Povntou krhth'ro", to;n Pausanivh" oJ 
Kleombrovtou ajnevqhke.  
                                                
50 For the debate on the krater’s size and the veracity of Herodotos’ account see: Armayor. 1978, 
pp. 51, 57. Fehling. 1989, p. 223. Pritchett. 1993, pp. 245-255.  
51 Dewald. 1993, pp. 55-56. Hollmann. 1998, p. 159. 




… in this place lies the bronze vessel, and in size it is six-times 
larger than the krater at the mouth of the Pontus, which Pausanias 
the son of Cleombrotus dedicated. (iv.81.3) 
 
A mere 1/6th the size of Ariantes’ twenty-two and a half ton vessel, the selection 
of this Greek krater at first seems curious. In terms of size, the Lydian kraters at 
Delphi (i.51.2), even if their sizes are somewhat inflated in Herodotos’ account,53 
were more comparable and equally as recognizable to Herodotos’ audience as 
the krater of Pausanias.54 Comparable size, then, must not have been the reason 
for the choice. Rather the historian selects the Greek krater for its comparable 
significance. Pausanias dedicated the vessel to celebrate his victory over the 
Persians at Plataea and the defeat of the third Persian invasion of Europe 
(Nymphis FGrH 432, fr. 9). The historian draws significant parallels between this 
final Persian invasion and the first (Darius’ invasion of Scythia), equating the 
Scythian defeat of Darius to the Greek defeat of Xerxes.55 Read within this 
broader context, Herodotos' comparison of the two vessels not only gives an 
indication of relative sizes, but also an indication of significance, transferring the 
victorious symbolism of Pausanias' krater to Ariantes'. Moreover, the Scythian 
krater’s larger size and the source of its bronze imply that Darius was about to 
invade a country that possessed six times the military power of the Greeks, the 
                                                
53 Griffith. 1988. Arguing that a golden vessel, the size of which Herodotos attributes to Croesus’ 
golden krater, could not support its own weight, Griffith suggets that the Lydian krater was 
actually made of bronze. For an impressive response to Griffith's argument see Blackman and 
Sawyer. 2000, pp. 319-321. The work of these two engineering students successfully counters the 
Griffith's suggestion that the Lydian krater, if measuring 600 amphorae in volume, must have 
been made of bronze. Their study shows that tensile strength of gold is sufficient to make a vessel 
of that size. 
54 How and Wells. 1912, loc. sit. Corcella. 1993, p. 299. and Marincola. 1996, p. 576. see also 
Kimball. 1978, p. 51 for a critique of the Scythian krater's implausible size. 
55 Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 106-107. Hartog. 1988, passim, but esp. pp. 36-37. 
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people who would defeat his son years later. Hence, the historian presents the 
krater as a victory monument that anticipates the Scythian success against the 
Persians. 
 Presenting the krater diachronically, Herodotos strengthens the association 
of Ariantes’ krater with victory. Through his combined use of the present (kei§tai 
calkhvion) and past tenses (qavnaton ajpeivlee), Herodotos describes the state 
krater at the time of its construction and its implicitly unchanged state in the 
historian’s day. His presentation implies that the krater, still lying between the 
two rivers, survived the impending Persian invasion, unlike the royal 
monuments of Lydia, Samos, and Babylon.   
  As Herodotos uses the krater to presage Scythian victory, so he uses the 
stelai of Darius to warn of Persia’s imminent defeat. The historian closely links 
Darius’ first land crossing of the Bosphorus to Jason’s first sea passage through 
the area, symbolized by the Clashing or Cyaenan Rocks.  Herodotos frequently 
incorporates allusions to Greek myth and legend in his work, echoing Homeric 
language, particularly speeches and scenes, to color his narrative and give 
greater weight to his words.56 Physical artifacts are natural conduits for such 
allusions and the importation of meaning. Herodotos elevates the battles at 
Thermopylae and Cithaeron in part through his equation of the corpses of 
                                                
56 Jacoby. 1913, pp. 502-503. Giraudeau. 1984, pp. 4-6. Boedeker. 2002, pp. 100-107. See especially 
Huber. 1965, pp. 31-33. Huber argues that Herodotos uses Homeric language and allusions to 
recall famous passages of Homeric epic and hence to increase the weight and impact of his own 
language. Essentially, the allusions convey greater meaning with significant brevity.  
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Leonidas and Masistios with Patroklos and Hektor.57 He also uses Protesilaus’ 
grave to link the final Greek victory to the opening chapters of the Trojan War 
(ix.116f).58 For the Persian invasion of Europe, the historian uses the earlier 
passage of Jason, reified in the Cyanean Rocks, to highlight the impiety and 
failure of Darius’ act. 
Herodotos frames Darius’ crossing within references to the famed exploit 
of the Argo. Before leading his army across the bridge over the Bosphorus, Darius 
viewed the Cyanean Rocks (ta;" Kuaneva" kaleumevna", ta;" provteron plagkta;" 
{Ellhne" fasi; ei\nai /the rocks called the Cyanean, which previously the Greeks 
say were roaming - iv.85.1) through which Jason passed on his voyage to find the 
Golden Fleece.59 After the Persian entry into Europe the historian again refers to 
the legendary rocks (iv.89), suggesting that Darius’ crossing should be read 
within that context.60 Throughout his work, Herodotos uses the Argo’s exploits to 
place the events of his narrative within this earlier context.61 At the Bosphorus, 
the historian links the Persian king directly with the passage through the 
Cyanean Rocks, which feat the Greeks most closely associated with the Argo’s 
                                                
57 vii.225 and ix.21f (respectively). Masaracchia 1978. p. 162. Boedeker. 2001. p. 122. Flower and 
Marincola. 2002. pp. 143-144. The fight between the Greeks and Persians for possession of the 
cavalry commander's corpse also follows the general pattern that battles for heroic corpses in the 
Iliad follow (cf. the battle over the body of Sarpedon xvi.691f and the battle for Amphimachos 
xiii.193f). See Chp 4, for a further discussion of Herodotos’ imitation of Homer in this regard. 
58 Boedeker. 1988, pp. 47-48. 
59 How and Wells. 1912, loc. sit. Corcella. 1993, p. 301. While both commentaries note the clear 
allusion to the Argo’s voyage, neither considers the relationship between Darius, his bridge, and 
the Rocks. 
60 Pace Immerwahr. 1954, p. 26. Hartog. 1988, pp. 36-37. Both Immerwahr and Hartog overlook 
the significance of this earlier crossing, focusing primarily upon the similarity between Darius’ 
and Xerxes’ bridging of Asia and Europe. 
61 iv.145-6; iv.179; vii.193. Vandiver. 1991, pp. 34-38, 41-42. Newman. 2001, pp. 323-324. Calame. 
2003, pp. 138-139. Most references are for aetiological or ethnographic purposes. 
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voyage.62 When Darius arrived at the site of his bridge, the Persian king boarded 
a ship and sailed to the Cyanean rocks: 
Darei'o" de; ejpeivte poreuovmeno" ejk Souvswn ajpivketo th'" 
Kalchdonivh" ejpi; to;n Bovsporon i{na e[zeukto hJ gevfura, ejnqeu'ten 
ejsba;" ej" neva e[plee ejpi; ta;" Kuaneva" kaleumevna", ta;" provteron 
plagkta;" {Ellhnev" fasi ei\nai, eJzovmeno" de; ejpi; rJivw/ ejqhei'to 
to;n Povnton ejovnta ajxioqevhton: 
 
When Darius marching from Susa arrived at Chalcedon on the 
Bosphorus where the bridge was erected, boarding a ship from 
there he sailed to the Cyanaens, which the Greeks say once were 
wandering, and sitting upon the promontory he gazed at the 
Pontus, which is worth seeing; (iv.85.1) 
 
Seated upon this now fixed promontory, Darius viewed the Pontus that the 
Argonauts first glimpsed from amid the churning waves caused by the 
movement of the same rocks (Apollonius Rhodius Ar. ii.579-580).63 Returning to 
his bridge, Darius ordered his army to cross over into Europe and his fleet to sail 
into the Black Sea (iv.89.1). Here the historian again notes the presence of the 
Cyanean Rocks (Kuaneva"), through which the fleet sailed (iv.89.2). Framing 
Darius’ crossing between the Cyanean Rocks, Herodotos causes the audience to 
recall and so compare the two crossings of continental boundaries. 
                                                
62 Williams. 1991, p. 129. Pindar Pythian 4.207-211 regards the passage as the only trial that the 
Argonauts faced before reaching Colchis. Whether Herodotos is drawing upon a particular 
literary source for his material or is shaping his own version is unknown. The fragmentary nature 
of early Argonautica texts, such as those by Cinaethon, Ibycus, and Stesichorus, precludes a clear 
determination. Nevertheless its widespread use as a poetic subject, even for the comic poet 
Telestes at the end of the fifth century, made the Argo’s voyage a common and readily perceptible 
allusion for Herodotos’ text. 
63 h[d dæ e[nqa kai; e[nqa dia; platu;" ei]deto Povnto", | kaiv sfisin ajprofavtw" ajnevdu mevga 
ku§ma pavroiqen | kurtovn, ajpotmh§gi skopih§/ i[son: oiJ dæ ejsidovnte" | h[musan loxoi§si karhvasin. 




 The historian credits Jason’s voyage with no causative role in Darius’ 
invasion. At the beginning of his work he identifies Croesus as the immediate 
cause of East-West hostility (i.5) and discounts the arguments of Persian logioi, 
who traced a series of reciprocal rapes, including Medea’s, as the cause of the 
conflict (i.2-5). At the beginning of the Scythian logos, Herodotos attributes the 
Persian invasion to Darius’ desire to avenge a previous Scythian attack (iv.1). 
Yet, while they do not share a causative link, Jason’s passage and Darius’ 
crossing do share a similar theme – the first passage/crossing of a continental 
division or boundary. Whereas Jason acted within a divine plan and with the 
support of the gods, Darius violated the separation of the continents. Aided by 
Athena, Jason slipped the Argo through the rocks and fixed their position, which 
the gods had decreed would happen once humans had passed between them 
(A.R. Ar. ii.604-607). In the Histories, however, Herodotos presents the crossing of 
such boundaries in a negative light.64 He describes Darius' march across his 
bridge from Asia to Europe with the verb diabaivnw,65 which term often denotes 
some form of physical and moral transgression.66 Hence, his references to the 
Cyanean Rocks and their allusive force in recalling Jason’s divinely sponsored 
passage emphasize Darius’ violation of the divine order and the natural 
boundaries between continents. 
Herodotos deepens the contrast between Darius’ and Jason’s crossings 
and foreshadows the failure of the Persian campaign through the diachronic 
                                                
64 Immerwahr. 1966. pp. 84, 293. Lateiner. 1985, pp. 89-91.  
65 iv.88.1; iv.89.1; iv.89.3. 
66 Lateiner. 1985, p. 91. 
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presentation of both the bridge and the rocks. After the Argonauts successfully 
navigated the hazardous passage: 
pevtrai dæ eij" e{na cw'ron ejpicedo;n ajllhvlh/sin 
nwleme;" ejrrivzwqen, o} dh; kai; movrismon h\en 
ejk makavrwn, eu\tæ a[n ti" ijdw;n dia; nhi; perhvsh/.  
 
… the rocks were now rooted close to each other, 
which fate was decreed by the gods whenever some 
mortal seeing the rocks sailed through them.  
(A.R. Ar. ii.604-607) 
 
The Cyanean Rocks remained a permanent monument to Jason’s passage. 
Herodotos acknowledges this altered and now unchanged state in his 
description of the Cyanean Rocks as the ones once called the Wandering Rocks 
(ta;" provteron plagkta;" - iv.85.1). In contrast, the historian describes Darius’ 
bridge as a temporary structure, a pontoon bridge (scedivh) that would hardly 
endure. Instead Darius erected two commemorative stelai: 
qehsavmeno" de; kai; to;n Bovsporon sthvla" e[sthse duvo ejpæ aujtw/§ 
livqou leukou', ejntamw;n gravmmata ej" me;n th;n jAssuvria ej" de; 
th;n JEllhnikav, e[qnea pavnta o{sa per h\ge:  
 
Gazing upon the Bosphorus he erected two stelai of white stone 
there, inscribing on them in Assyrian and Greek letters, all the 
many races that he led. (iv.87.1) 
 
Unlike the Cyanean Rocks, however, these monuments were not fixed in place. 
Years later the stelai were moved: 
th'/si mevn nun sthvlh/si tauvth/si Buzavntioi komivsante" ej" th;n 
povlin u{steron touvtwn ejcrhvsanto pro;" to;n bwmo;n th'" 
jOrqwsivh" jArtevmido", cwri;" eJno;" livqou: ou|to" de; kateleivfqh 





Years later the people of Byzantium moved these stelai, except for 
one, to their city and used them for an altar to Artemis the 
Protectress. The other stone remained near the temple of Dionysus 
in Byzantium full of Assyrian letters. (iv.87.2). 
 
Darius attained no lasting memorial for his achievement.67 As in the cases of the 
Lydian, Babylonian, and Samian rulers, Herodotos challenges Darius’ control of 
his memorial at the moment of its dedication.  
Rather the only memorial of the bridge belonged to the Greek architect 
Mandrocles, who dedicated a painting of Darius and the bridge to the temple of 
Hera on Samos with this inscription: 
Bovsporon ijcquoventa gefurwvsa" ajnevqhke 
Mandroklevh" {Hrh/ mnhmovsunon scedivh", 
auJtw'/ me;n stevfanon periqeiv", Samivoisi de; ku'do", 
Dareivou basilevo" ejktelevsa" kata; nou'n. 
 
Bridging the Bosphorus full of fish, Mandrokles 
dedicated the memorial of the bridge to Hera, 
winning a crown for himself, and praise for Samos, 
fulfilling the design of king Darius. (iv.88.2) 
 
Although the memorial noted the prominent role of Darius, it presented the 
bridge as the work of Mandrocles. Thus, while the Cyanean Rocks forever served 
as a testament to Jason's voyage, Darius’ memorials were short-lived. Only the 
work of a Greek, Mandrocles, memorialized the deed, but to his own glory and 
on Greek soil far away from Darius’ bridgehead. 
                                                
67 The stelai may also be read in the context of the historian's comparison of Darius and the 
Egyptian Sesostris described in ii.102-110. According to Herodotos, when Darius visited Egypt he 
desired to erect a statue of himself in front of the monumental statues of Sesostris, his wife, and 
sons that stood before the temple of Hephaestus (Min). The priests, however, refused this request 
since Darius had not matched the accomplishments of Sesostris, whose dominions were as vast as 
Darius' and also included the Scythians, whom Darius failed to subdue (ii.110.2). Sesostris 
commemorated his conquests with the erection of stelai (sthvla") with his name and country 
(ii.102.4). Unlike the stelai of Darius, which were dismantled in less than a century, the 
monuments of Sesostris survived the passage of many centuries (ii.106.1).  
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 Herodotos, then, uses the Cyanean Rocks to evoke an uncommon, even 
innovative, connotation for Darius' bridge and stelai. In the context of Jason’s 
divinely sponsored passage through the once-Clashing Rocks, the historian 
emphasizes Darius’ violation and minimizes his achievement. While the rocks 
remained an enduring memorial of the Argo’s passage, Darius’ memorials 
succumbed to the passage of time. Hence, in the Scythian logos, Herodotos 
reflects the reversal of victor and vanquished through the monuments of the 
notable Scythian king, Ariantes, and the invasion’s architect, Darius. By 
comparison to the krater that Pausanias dedicated to commemorate the Greek 
victory over the Persians, the historian transforms the Scythian krater, a symbol 
of the kingdom’s military might, into an anticipatory victory monument that 
survives the passage of time. Against this might, Darius’ monument failed, 
passing into the control of others and foreshadowing the Persian failure. 
 
Conclusion 
 Herodotos, then, links the fate of the animate to the inanimate, monarch to 
object. While the historian is cognizant of the deleterious effect that time has 
upon objects, he rarely depicts their actual deterioration in his narrative. He 
reserves this negative depiction primarily for a few select cases that foreshadow 
the Persian conquests of Lydia, Babylon, Egypt, and Samos as well as the Persian 
defeat in Scythia. On the eve of each campaign or the decision to interfere in 
Persian affairs, the historian describes a royal monument belonging to the 
kingdom’s current or the last notable monarch. In the cases of Lydia, Babylon, 
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and Samos, the loss or decay of royal monuments illustrates the monarch’s 
downfall (subjugation, failure, or death) and the kingdom’s conquest by Persia. 
For Egypt, the historian instead relies upon the significance of the object itself to 
achieve similar results. In Scythia, Herodotos follows this paradigm to reflect the 
defeat of Persia. Instead of depicting the decline of a Scythian monument, he 
emphasizes its endurance and martial significance. Simultaneously, he illustrates 
the impending Persian defeat through the loss of a monument that Darius 
erected to commemorate the invasion. Thus, Herodotos not only uses his 
description of royal monuments as “yardsticks” of a monarch’s greatness, but he 








Herodotos need not change an object physically to shape its meaning. 
Instead, he may simply change its appearance through the use of repetition and 
substitution. As shown in Chapter 1, the historian alters an object’s connotation 
or meaning by changing his presentation in a retelling of the same scene or in 
analogous circumstances. For example, in the case of the Lydian queen, the 
historian alters the significance of her clothing by changing its description from 
chiton to himation to heima in three accounts of her disrobing. Although the action 
of the narrative remains constant (the queen disrobed), the change in the 
clothing’s description creates a subtext, or visual text, for the audience. 
Herodotos uses this same technique to contrast different characters. 
Characterization and the study of characters’ temperaments is a central feature of 
Herodotos’ Histories. Through the use of speeches,1 elaborate settings,2 and even 
gestures,3 Herodotos explores the natures of his characters, paying particular 
attention to kings and tyrants.4 Placing characters in analogous circumstances, 
the historian contrasts individual characteristics and invites the audience to draw 
parallels. Two commonly cited examples of this are the historian’s implicit 
                                                
1 Solmsen. 1944, p. 253. 
2 Stahl. 1968, p. 391. Segal. 1971, pp. 39-40. 
3 Lateiner. 1977, pp. 173-173. Lateiner. 1987, pp. 90-95. 




comparison of Darius and Xerxes’ invasions of Europe (iv.87 and vii.54-55)5 and 
the reversals that Candaules and Xerxes suffer at the hands of their wives (i.8-11 
and ix.108-113).6 
Although scholars have long studied the historian's penchant for 
comparison,7 they have given scant attention to the function that objects play in 
many of these comparisons.8 In place of a single character, such as the Lydian 
queen, Herodotos places two or more characters in comparable scenes that share 
the same or similar objects. Whether the change is dramatic (like the 
deterioration of Croesus’ lion statue) or superficial (like the Lydian queen’s 
clothing), Herodotos uses the change as a means of establishing a contrast. The 
object’s change takes the form of an alteration or a substitution. In the first case, 
he places characters in identical settings in which he emphasizes an object’s 
modified state. In the second case, he places characters in analogous settings in 
which he substitutes the original object with a similar but distinct object. 
Emphasizing the alteration or substitution of the object, Herodotos uses the 
change to distinguish individual characteristics. This method allows the historian 
to create succinct, elegant, portraits of the individuals in his narrative. 
Through select examples, this chapter examines Herodotos’ use of object-
based comparisons in two parts. In the first set of examples (the Golden Statue of 
Babylon and Datis and the Golden Statue of Apollo), this chapter examines the 
                                                
5 Immerwahr. 1954, pp. 25-26. Hartog. 1988, pp. 36-37. 
6 Herrington. 1997, p. 152. Larson. 2006, pp. 236-241. 
7 For work on Herodotos' use of comparisons see: Aly. 1969, passim. Immerwahr.1960, pp. 265-
270. Immerwahr. 1966, passim. Avery. 1972, pp. 529-546. Flory. 1987, passim, esp. pp. 25-26. 
Hartog. 1988, passim. Gray. 1995, passim. Gray. 2001, pp. 17-18. Munson. 2001, esp. pp. 45-47. 
8 Munson 2001, p.45 states that Herodotos may create comparisons using objects, but she does not 
pursue the subject or provide significant examples. 
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immediate repetition of an object to create a comparison. In the second set of 
examples (the Ethiopian Bow and the Kraters of Lydia), this chapter examines the 
repetition and substitution of objects within similar contexts to create 
comparisons.  
 
The Golden Statue of Babylon (i.183) 
 In his narration of the Persian conquest of Babylon, Herodotos creates a 
comparative portrait of three of his main actors (Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes). 
Describing Babylonian thomata, Herodotos compares the three Persian monarchs 
through his diachronic presentation of a golden statue. Located inside the temple 
of Bel, the statue is presented in the context of each reigning monarch. Noting 
how each Persian king treated (changed) the statue, the historian highlights the 
greed of Darius, the cruel impiety of Xerxes, and the nobility of Cyrus, the 
founder of the empire.9  
 After a lengthy account of the temples of Bel and the various notable 
objects within the temples (i.181-183.2), Herodotos describes a large golden 
statue of a man situated in the lower temenos:  
h\n de; ejn tw'/ temevnei> touvtw/ e[ti to;n crovnon ejkei'non kai; ajndria;" 
duwvdeka phcevwn cruvseo" stereov".  
 
Still in that time there was also in this temenos a twelve-foot tall 
statue of a man made of solid gold. (i.183.2)  
 
                                                
9 Cf. Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 175-176, who notes the use of the statue to compare Darius to Xerxes 
(one of several instances of such a comparison). He overlooks, however, the effect of the 
diachronic presentation and the implicit comparison to Cyrus. Arieti. 1995, pp. 176-177. Arieti too 
notes the comparison of Darius and Xerxes, but overlooks the additional contrast to Cyrus and 
the diachronic presentation. 
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Unlike his previous account of the statue of Bel (i.183.1), the historian constructs 
only a meager description of the golden statue. He focuses instead upon the 
object’s fate during the reigns of the successive Persian monarchs. Beginning his 
narrative in a time before the Persian conquest, Herodotos implies that the statue 
stood in the temple’s temenos, where it remained unchanged through the reign of 
Cyrus (e[ti to;n crovnon ejkei'non – i.183.2).10 Later, Darius desired the statue, but 
lacked the daring to carry through his design (Darei'o" me;n oJ  JUstavspeo" 
ejpibouleuvsa" oujk ejtovlmhse labei'n – i.183.3). Xerxes, however, removed the 
the statue and killed the priest (Xevrxh" de; oJ Dareivou e[labe kai; to;n iJreva 
ajpevkteine ajpagoreuvonta mh; kinevein to;n ajndriavnta. / Xerxes son of Darius 
took the statue and killed the priest when he forbade him to move the statue. - 
i.183.3).  
 In addition to recording the statue’s changed physical state, Herodotos 
alters, or rather alternatively emphasizes, the object’s connotations. While he 
initially stresses the statue’s religious connotation through its placement in a 
temenos and proximity to a cult statue, Herodotos later emphasizes the golden 
object’s intrinsic value through Darius’ desire to seize it. Containing these two 
meanings, the statue becomes a gauge by which the historian creates 
comparative portraits of the Persian kings. Hence, Cyrus’ inaction implies a 
respect for sacred objects consistent perhaps with his merciful treatment of 
conquered Ionia, but at odds with his impious treatment of the captured 
                                                
10 How and Wells. 1912, loc. sit. 
 
103 
Croesus.11 Darius’ desire and inaction illustrate this monarch’s greed and his 
timidity or alternatively his respect for propriety.12 Finally, Xerxes’ theft 
exemplifies the monarch’s impiety, a characteristic that becomes emblematic of 
the king later in the narrative. 
 Through the diachronic presentation of the golden statue at Babylon, then, 
Herodotos creates four scenes: the statue’s initial state and the varying 
interactions of monarch and statue. Changing both the object’s physical state, 
inviolate and violated (or stolen), and alternatively emphasizing different 
connotations, the historian creates contrasting portraits of the three Persian 
monarchs. 
 
Datis and the Golden Statue of Apollo (vi.118) 
Herodotos creates a similar comparative portrait of Datis through the 
diachronic presentation of a gold-covered statue of Apollo that the Persians 
removed from Delium during their invasion in 490 BC. As the Persians sailed 
back to Asia, the Persian commander Datis received a dream about the theft and 
ordered a search of his fleet when it put in to Myconos. Discovering the statue on 
a Phoenician vessel, the general placed it in the temple of Apollo on Delos for 
safekeeping, and instructed the Delians to return the stolen item (vi.118.1-2). 
                                                
11 Cf. i.169 and i.86. Unlike Darius’ later subjugation of Ionia, Herodotos makes no mention of the 
Persian destruction of Ionian temples. After the defeat of Croesus, however, Cyrus violated 
Persian nomos by attempting to burn Croesus alive (How and Wells. 1912, loc. sit. and Avery. 
1972, pp. 533-534). 
12 For the nature of Darius’ greed see Kurke. 1999, pp. 71-80, 99. Darius’ forbearance here 
resembles the respect he showed to the priests of the Egyptian Temple of Hephaestus, who 




While Datis' careful piety in relation to Apollo and Delos has been noted,13 the 
fact that the history of the statue illustrates the relative piety of Datis and the 
Delians has been overlooked.  
There are few golden statues in the Histories.14 When they do appear, 
Herodotos typically uses the object to create a sub-text. He uses the golden 
statues of a lion to foreshadow the fall of Croesus (i.50; see Chp. 2, pp. 66-76), the 
golden statue of a man to contrast three Persian kings (i.181.3; see pp. 101-103), 
and the golden statue of a god to illustrate the change of Amasis from commoner 
to pharaoh (ii.172.2 bis, 4).15 Those gold statues that he does not use directly in 
this manner, he places in passages with significant meaning. The historian places 
the golden statues of Bel immediately before his comparative characterization of 
the Persian kings (i.181.1). He includes the statue of the Lydian baker-woman as 
one of the gifts that Croesus sent to Delphi before his downfall (i.51.5). He links 
the golden statue of Apollo in Sparta to the Lacedaemonian krater that 
foreshadows Croesus’ downfall (i.70-71; see Chp. 2, pp. 74-75). Most statues of 
gold in the Histories, then, either directly or indirectly signify an additional layer 
of meaning in the text. 
The gold-covered statue of Apollo in Delos directly denotes an additional 
meaning. Like the golden statue of Babylon, the statue in Delos is both an object 
of value and an object of reverence. After the statue’s theft, Herodotos uses the 
                                                
13 Stadter. 1992, p. 791. 
14 Solid gold statues: i.50 (Croesus’ lion statue); i.51.5 (the statue of Croesus’ baker); i.181.1 (the 
statue of Bel); i.181.3 (the statue of a man); ii.172 bis, 4 (the statue of a god that Amasis constructs 
from his golden foot pan). Gold-covered statues: i.69.4 (the Spartan statue of Apollo, which 
according to Pausanias was merely gold-covered (iii.10.8)); vi.118 (the gold-covered statue of 
Apollo from Delium). There are no silver statues in the Histories. 
15 Dewald. 1993, pp. 59-60. Hollmann. 1998, p. 159. 
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object’s mobility as recognition of its religious significance and the object’s 
immobility as recognition of its monetary value. When Datis discovered the 
Phoenician booty, the Persian attempted to amend the crime by moving the 
god’s statue to one of his sacred precincts. Due to his recent defeat at Marathon, 
Datis was unable return the statue to Delium and ordered the Delians to 
complete the task: 
kai; ajpivkato ga;r thnikau'ta oiJ Dhvlioi ojpivsw ej" th;n nh'son, 
katativqetaiv te ej" to; iJro;n to; a[galma kai; ejntevlletai toi'si 
Dhlivoisi ajpagagei'n to; a[galma ej" Dhvlion to; Qhbaivwn:  
 
By that time the Delians had also returned to the island, and he 
placed the statue in the temple and ordered the Delians to bear the 
statue back to Delium, which was in the land of the Thebans. 
(vi.118.2) 
 
Although the movement of the statue from ship to temple reflects Datis’ piety, its 
continued presence on Delos reveals a Delian lack of piety. The Delians failed to 
perform their allotted task:  
to;n de; ajndriavnta tou'ton Dhvlioi oujk ajphvgagon, ajllav min diæ 
ejtevwn ei[kosi Qhbai'oi aujtoi; ejk qeopropivou ejkomivsanto ejpi; 
Dhvlion.  
 
The Delians did not return this statue, but twenty years later the 
Thebans themselves carried it back on the advice of an oracle. 
(vi.118.3) 
 
Only when the Thebans arranged for the return of the statue did the Delians at 
last discharge their pious duty. 
 Through the statue’s brief history, Herodotos creates an anomalous 
portrait of Datis as a pious man. Elsewhere in the Histories this Persian displays 
no similar consideration, burning the city and temples of Naxos (vi.96) and the 
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temples of Eretria (vi.101). At Delos, though, the Persian was different. He 
spared the island sanctuary at the outset of his expedition to Greece and upon his 
return exhibited his pious regard for Apollo’s cult figure.16 Appearing in the 
statue’s changing context, the Persian stands out from thieving Phoenicians and 
indifferent Delians as an example of piety. 
 
The Ethiopian Bow and the Madness of Cambyses (iii.21 – 37) 
 Herodotos creates a more complex version of this type of comparison in 
his treatment of Amasis, the Ethiopian king, and Cambyses. Although the 
monarchs do not appear side by side in his text as in the previous example, the 
historian places them in strikingly similar contexts: the drawing of a king's bow. 
Defining each king's nature through his use of the bow, Herodotos also 
establishes this object as a means contrast. In particular, he compares the physical 
and mental prowess of the Ethiopian and Persian kings. As Cambyses descends 
into madness,17 Herodotos uses the bows and attendant objects to gauge the 
Persian monarch's deterioration. The historian presents a consistent portrait of 
the Persian monarch not merely as a mad king, but as the antithesis of the 
Ethiopian king. 
In the Histories, the bow is a royal weapon. While Herodotos mostly 
describes bows in the context of a mass of archers,18 he pairs individual bows 
                                                
16 Stadter. 1992, pp. 787-788. 
17 For studies of Cambyses' madness see: Aly. 1969, pp. 84f. Bruns. 1961, pp. 79-80. Avery. 1972, 
pp. 535-6. Flory. 1978, pp. 150-151. Brown. 1982, pp. 387-403. Munson. 1991, pp. 43-66. Thomas. 
2000, pp. 34f. 
18 Tovxon: ii.141.5; iv.3.4; vii.61.1; vii.64.1, 2; vii.65; vii.67.1 bis, 2; vii.69.1; vii.77; vii.92; ix.62.1. Tovxa: 
v.49.3. Tovxeuma (bow implied): iv.132.3; iv.139.1; vi.112.3; vii.218.3; vii.226.1; vii.128.1, 2; ix.22.1; 
ix.49.3; ix.61.3; ix.72.1. Toxeuvw (bow implied): ii.136.2; i.214.2; iv.22.2; iv.94.4; iv.94.4; iv.114.3; 
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with regal characters. Cyarxes, the Median king, hired Scythians to teach his sons 
the techne of the bow (th;n tevcnhn tw'n tovxwn – i.73.2). The stelae of Sesostris 
depicted a figure with a bow in his left hand (th'/ de; ajristerh'/ tovxa – ii.106.3). 
The magus who impersonated Smerdis attempted to defend himself with a bow 
(tovxa) against Darius and the Persian conspirators, but was unable to use it 
(iii.78.2 bis, 3).19 Herakles left a bow (tovxon) in Scythia as a test for his sons by the 
viper maiden (iv.9.5; 10.1). The Scythian king Saulius shot Anacharsis for 
practicing a foreign religious rite (toxeuvsa" aujto;n - iv.76.5). After hearing about 
the sack of Sardis, Darius called for his bow (tovxon), shot an arrow into the air 
and asked Zeus to let him punish the Athenians (v.105.1, 108.1). Finally, 
Herodotos associates bows with Amasis, Cambyses, and the Ethiopian king 
(ii.173.3; iii.30.1, iii.35.3, iii.36.4, iii.74.1; iii.21.3, iii.22.1). 
 The Ethiopian bow plays an important role in this comparison. The 
Ethiopian king gave the bow to the Fish-Eaters, whom Cambyses sent to explore 
the country as a prospective conquest and to alleviate suspicion of Persian 
intentions with the presentation of gifts. Perceiving Cambyses' imperialist 
design,20 the Ethiopian king responded with the gift of a large unstrung bow: 
nu§n de; aujtw/§ tovxon tovde didovnte" tavde e[pea levgete: basileu;" oJ 
Aijqiovpwn sumbouleuvei tw'/ Persevwn basilevi, ejpea;n ou{tw 
eujpetevw" e{lkwsi ta; tovxa Pevrsai ejovnta megavqei> tosau'ta, tovte 
                                                                                                                                            
viii.52.1; viii.128.1; ix.49.2. Toxovtai (bows implied): i.215.1; iii.39.3; iii.45.3; vii.158.4; ix.22.1; 
ix.60.3. Toxofovroi (bows implied): i.103.1; ix.43.3. 
19 In light of the association between bows and kings, the magus’ inability to use the bow may be 
a reflection of his status as impersonator. Herodotos emphasizes this inability by mentioning it 
twice (iii.78.2 and 78.4 respectively).  
20 Dewald. 1993, p. 58. 
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ejpæ Aijqivopa" tou;" makrobivou" plhvqei> uJperballovmenon 
strateuvesqai:  
 
Now giving this bow to him [Cambyses] say these words: the 
Ethiopian king advises the king of the Persians that, whenever the 
Persians might easily draw a bow of such a size, then raising a 
large army let them campaign against the long-lived Ethiopians. 
(iii.21.3)  
 
Through the unstrung bow, a symbol of Ethiopia in Egyptian hieroglyphs,21 the 
king sent a symbolic message to warn Cambyses that he attacked Ethiopia at his 
peril.22 Unlike the Scythian tokens sent to Darius (iv.131), the Ethiopian king 
accompanied his token with an explicit message about its significance. He used 
the bow merely to underscore the verbal message about Ethiopian strength and 
power.  
 The bow's greater significance lies in its secondary function as a test for 
the Persians. As his message states, the Ethiopian king advised Cambyses not to 
invade his country “…until he found a man able to draw such a large bow 
easily” (ejpea;n ou{tw eujpetevw" e{lkwsi ta; tovxa Pevrsai ejovnta megavqei> 
tosau'ta – iii.21.3). This test of strength resembles others in Greek literature such 
as the Bow of Odysseus that Penelope uses to test her suitors.23 Whoever proves 
his strength by stringing the bow would become her new husband (Od. xix.572f, 
xxi.65ff). When Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, attempts to string the bow, 
however, the task is not merely a test of strength, but of his identity as well (Od. 
                                                
21 How and Wells. 1912, loc. sit. 
22 Dewald. 1993, p. 58. Hollmann. 1998, p. 162. 
23 Aly. 1969, p. 85. Aly equates Herodotos' use of bows both to the Homeric usage and to other 




xxi.404ff).24 Through the act, the hero reclaims his home, his wife, and his place in 
Ithacan society.25 The bow serves a similar function for Telemachus, who verifies 
his paternity and his manhood by nearly stringing the bow (Od. xxi.128-135).26  
 While Herodotos regards most bows simply as weapons of war,27 he also 
employs this trope – the bow as a questing or identifying instrument. In the 
opening sections of the Scythian logos, the historian recounts the tale of Herakles' 
bow and girdle, which the hero left behind as a test for his children by the viper 
maiden: 
ejpea;n ajndrwqevnta" i[dh/ tou;" pai'da", tavde poieu'sa oujk a]n 
aJmartavnoi": to;n me;n a]n oJra'/" aujtw'n tovde tovxon w|de 
diateinovmenon kai; tw/ zwsth'ri tw'/de kata; tavde zwnnuvmenon, 
tou'ton me;n th'sde th'" cwvrh" oijkhvtora poieu': o}" dæ a]n touvtwn 
tw'n e[rgwn tw'n ejntevllomai leivphtai, e[kpempe ejk th'" cwvrh".  
 
When you see that the boys have become men, do the following 
and you will not err: whichever one of them you see string this bow 
thusly and don this girdle in this way, make that one the inhabitant 
of this land; but whoever fails these tasks that I order, send him 
from the land. (iv.9.5) 
 
Herakles, then, offered the bow and girdle to the viper maiden as a means of 
identifying their most worthy child, the one that would become the founder of 
the Scythian kingdom. 
 Herodotos uses the three royal bows in a similar manner, although less for 
identification than for characterization of the respective monarchs. In the first 
pairing of king and bow, Amasis did not string a bow to prove his identity or 
worth; rather he identified his nature through the metaphor of a bow. He 
                                                
24 Woodhouse. 1930, pp. 98-101. Austin. 1975, pp. 229-230, 234-235. 
25 Hoffner. 1995, p. 530. 
26 Olson. 1994, p. 370. 
27 tovxon – i.73.2; ii.141.5; iv.3.4; vii.61.1 et al. 
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conducted the business of government until mid-morning at which point he 
turned his attention to wine and frivolity. He defended this latter behavior, 
which his supporters considered unsuited to his office, by comparing himself to 
an archer's bow:  
o} dæ ajmeivbeto toisivde aujtouv". ta; tovxa oiJ ejkthmevnoi, ejpea;n me;n 
devwntai cra'sqai, ejntanuvousi, ejpea;n de; crhvswntai, ejkluvousi. eij 
ga;r dh; to;n pavnta crovnon ejntetamevna ei[h, ejkrageivh a[n, w{ste 
ej" to; devon oujk a]n e[coien aujtoi'si cra'sqai. ou{tw de; kai; 
ajnqrwvpou katavstasi": eij ejqevloi katespoudavsqai aijei; mhde; ej" 
paignivhn to; mevro" eJwuto;n ajnievnai, lavqoi a]n h[toi manei;" h] o{ 
ge ajpovplhkto" genovmeno":  
 
He [Amasis] replied to them: archers, whenever they want to use 
the bow, they string it, but after they use the bow, they unstring it. 
For if a bow should be strung at all times, it would break, so that it 
would not be able to use it when needed. So also is man’s nature; if 
he should wish always to take himself seriously and never to 
partake of his share of amusement, he would surely go mad or 
suffer a stroke; (ii.173.3-4). 
 
In this defense of the bon vivant’s behavior, Herodotos establishes the bow as a 
means of identifying or characterizing a monarch. He transforms the bow into a 
measure for the entire spectrum of kingship. In the case of Amasis, the bow’s 
dual state, strung and unstrung, signifies Amasis’ balanced approach to 
kingship. But through the pharaoh’s description of the dangers of an unbalanced 
bow, the historian warns against an unbalanced approach to kingship and 
prepares the audience for the subsequent pairings of bow and king. Indeed, he 
fulfils Amasis’ warning that an ever-strung bow (man) would go mad or have a 
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stroke (manei;" h] o{ ge ajpovplhkto" genovmeno") in his account of Cambyses’ 
madness and epilepsy later in the narrative.28 
 Before moving to the high-strung Cambyses, however, Herodotos directs 
the audience's gaze to the unstrung bow of the Ethiopian king. This king does 
not fit easily within Amasis' model, for his unstrung bow does not accompany a 
pleasure-absorbed monarch.29 Instead the bow creates a separate contrast 
between Cambyses and the Ethiopian king. Unlike Amasis this monarch did not 
seek to define himself simply through his bow. The historian moves the questing 
tool into his own hands instead and uses it to compare the latter two monarchs 
(the Ethiopian king and Cambyses). First, he combines the bow with his 
description of the Ethiopian king’s reaction to the Persian gifts to illustrate the 
monarch's physical vitality and mental acuity. According to the historian: 
oiJ de; Aijqivope" … levgontai ei\nai mevgistoi kai; kavllistoi 
ajnqrwvpwn pavntwn. novmoisi de; kai; a[lloisi cra'sqai aujtouv" 
fasi kecwrismevnoisi tw'n a[llwn ajnqrwvpwn kai; dh; kai; kata; 
th;n basilhivhn toiw'/de: to;n a]n tw'n ajstw'n krivnwsi mevgistovn te 
ei\nai kai; kata; to; mevgaqo" e[cein th;n ijscuvn, tou'ton ajxiou'si 
basileuvein.  
 
                                                
28 Madness: ejmavnh (iii.30.1); ejxemavnh (iii.33); ejxemavnh (iii.34.1); parafronevein (iii.34.3); maivnomai 
(iii.35.4). Apoplexy: kai; ga;r tina; ejk geneh'" nou'son megavlhn levgetai e[cein oJ Kambuvsh", th;n 
iJrh;n ojnomavzousi tinev". (iii.33).  While apoplexy differs from the epilepsy that Herodotos later 
attributes to the Persian monarch, the Greeks viewed the two afflictions as related (Hippocrates 
On Breaths 13-14). 
29 It is possible to read the Ethiopian king and his unstrung bow within Amasis' range of 
kingship, but in doing so one must invert the expected association between a strung bow and 
work and an unstrung bow and relaxation. Within this framework the Ethiopian king and his 
unstrung bow appears to be the symbol of sobriety and good governance, Cambyses and his 
ever-strung bow (see below) appears to be the symbol of excess and bad governance, and Amasis 
appears to be a balance of the two. This reading, however, requires the unlikely association of 




The Ethiopians are said to be the tallest and most handsome of all 
men. They say that they use customs different from other men 
especially with regard to kingship; whomever of the city-men they 
judge to be the tallest and strongest in proportion to his height, 
they deem this one worthy to be king. (iii.20.1-2) 
 
This paradigm of physical perfection selected a bow to test the Persians, stating 
that they should not invade his country until they could draw such a bow easily 
(eujpetevw" - iii.21.3). The implication of his statement is that the Ethiopians, and 
their king, could have drawn the bow with ease. The bow, then, is not only a 
challenge to the Persians, but also a statement of the king’s strength.   
 But the Ethiopian king was not merely a man of muscle. He displayed 
wisdom and intelligence commensurate with his physical powers. As previously 
discussed, the monarch displayed considerable forethought and prudence with 
regards to food (Chp. 1, pp. 17-24). The Ethiopian king matched this prudence 
with great perspicacity, which the historian reveals through the king’s reaction to 
the Persian gifts. Penetrating Cambyses' deceptive offer of friendship, the king 
perceived his counterpart's intent to enslave Ethiopia.30 He correctly labeled the 
clothing and the Fish-Eater ambassadors as deceitful gifts borne by deceitful men 
(dolerou;" me;n tou;" ajnqrwvpou" e[fh ei\nai, dolera; de; aujtw'n ta; ei{mata. /he 
said that them men and their clothes were deceptive – iii.22.1). Nevertheless the 
monarch displayed mercy when he spared the ambassadors/spies from any 
retribution. Whereas the Ethiopian discerned the true significance of the clothes, 
Cambyses failed to understand the purpose of the fine clothing worn by the 
                                                
30 Dewald. 1993, p. 58. 
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Egyptians. After his failed invasion of Ethiopia, Cambyses returned to Egypt 
where he found the Egyptians at Memphis, dressed in their finest clothes:  
ajpigmevnou de; Kambuvsew ej" Mevmfin ejfavnh Aijguptivoisi oJ 
\Api", to;n {Ellhne" [Epafon kalevousi: ejpifanevo" de; touvtou 
genomevnou aujtivka oiJ Aijguvptioi ei{mata ejfovreon ta; kavllista 
kai; h\san ejn qalivh/si.  
 
When Cambyses arrived at Memphis, the Apis calf appeared to the 
Egyptians, which the Greeks call Epaphus; and when this appeared 
the Egyptians immediately donned their finest clothing and 
entered into revelry. (iii.27.1) 
 
Cambyses decided to investigate this behavior31 before simply reacting; he 
summoned the governors of Memphis to question them about the celebration. 
Unlike the Ethiopian king's investigation of the Persian gifts, however, Cambyses 
failed to perceive the veracity of their explanation about the Apis calf:: 
oi} de; e[frazon w{" sfi qeo;" ei[h fanei;" dia; crovnou pollou' 
ejwqw;" ejpifaivnesqai, kai; wJ" ejpea;n fanh'/ tovte pavnte" 
Aijguvptioi kecarhkovte" oJrtavzoien. tau'ta ajkouvsa" oJ Kambuvsh" 
e[fh yeuvdesqaiv sfeva" kai; wJ" yeudomevnou" qanavtw/ ejzhmivou.  
 
They said that a god had appeared to them and that he was 
accustomed to appear to them after a long period of time, and so 
whenever he appeared then all the Egyptians rejoiced and 
celebrated a festival. Hearing these things Cambyses said the men 
lied and for liars the punishment was death. (iii.27.3) 
 
Confronting both monarchs with fine clothing, Herodotos compares their 
characters through their ability to interpret its meaning. Cambyses answered the 
Ethiopian king's astuteness and mercy with thoughtlessness and cruelty.   
                                                
31 Christ. 1994, pp. 180-182. Christ claims that Herodotos uses Cambyses' investigation of Ethiopia 




Herodotos further distinguishes the two monarchs and their kingdoms 
through their reaction/interaction with jewelry and fetters. For while the 
Persians wore golden torques and bangles, the Ethiopians used gold to forge 
chains for their prisoners: 
deuvtera de; to;n cruso;n eijrwvta to;n strepto;n to;n periaucevnion 
kai; ta; yevlia. ejxhgeomevnwn de; tw'n jIcquofavgwn to;n kovsmon 
aujtou' gelavsa" oJ basileu;" kai; nomivsa" ei\naiv sfea pevda" ei\pe 
wJ" paræ eJwutoi'siv eijsi rJwmalewvterai toutevwn pevdai.  
 
Next he [the Ethiopian king] asked about the gold torques and 
bangles. When the Fish-Eaters explained the jewelry, the king 
laughing and believing them to be chains said that there were 
stronger chains than these in his own land. (iii.22.2) 
 
The historian personalizes the contrast in the Ethiopian king’s tour of his 
prison: 
ajgagei'n sfeva" ej" desmwthvrion ajndrw'n, e[nqa tou;" pavnta" ejn 
pevdh/si crusevh/si dedevsqai.  
 
He led them to a prison, there all the prisoners were bound in 
golden chains. (iii.23.4) 
 
In contrast to the Ethiopian prison, Cambyses instead presided over a lone 
puppy on a leash. When Cambyses staged a combat between a puppy and a lion 
cub, one of the puppy's littermates broke free:  
nikwmevnou de; tou' skuvlako" ajdelfeo;n aujtou' a[llon skuvlaka 
ajporrhvxanta to;n desmo;n paragenevsqai oiJ, duvo de; genomevnou" 
ou{tw dh; tou;" skuvlaka" ejpikrath'sai tou' skuvmnou.  
 
When the puppy was losing, another puppy, its sibling, broke its 
leash and came to his aid, and there being two the puppies thus 




Rather than a monarch who displayed golden-fettered men (pevdh/si crusevh/si) in 
prisons (desmwthvrion), Cambyses imprisoned animals, puppies and cubs, which 
he restrained with simple leashes (desmo;n). The Persian king also failed to 
perceive the symbolic importance of the combat. Whereas his sister-queen 
regarded the puppies as symbols of Cambyses and his brother Smerdis, whose 
recent execution deprived the Persian king of such similar aid, it is also possible 
to interpret Cambyses as the lion cub soon beset by the two magi.32 The Persian 
king responded to such interpretations with irrational violence, killing his wife to 
death (iii.32.3). Hence the contrast of fetters (gold chains/leashes) and the 
prisoners over which the monarchs preside (humans/animals), presents 
Cambyses as a petty, violent individual compared to his Ethiopian counterpart. 
Herodotos extends the contrast through the respectful and disrespectful 
treatment of mummified corpses. In Ethiopia, families preserved a relative’s 
corpse in a crystal coffin and then displayed it in their oikos for one year (iii.24.2-
4). In Egypt, embalmers treated corpses with a variety of methods, but all aimed 
at the preservation of the deceased’s body (ii.86-87). But Cambyses repeatedly 
mistreated such objects, defiling the corpse of Amasis (iii.16) and opening many 
Egyptian tombs to examine the remains (iii.37).33 The Persian king’s impropriety 
extended into his own household. He executed his brother Smerdis and kicked 
his pregnant sister-wife in the stomach, causing her death, after she used a 
stripped head of lettuce as a metaphor for her husband's treatment of the house 
                                                
32 iii.32.2. McNellen. 1997, p. 16.  
33 Munson. 1991, p. 46. Cambyses' actions are not merely impious, but a violation of nomos – both 
Egyptian and Persian. 
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of Cyrus (iii.32.4).34 In this way, the historian contrasts the mental faculties of the 
two monarchs. While he presents the Ethiopian king as astute, prudent, and 
merciful, he depicts his Persian counterpart as obtuse, thoughtless, and brutal. 
Cambyses is in every way the inferior of his Ethiopian adversary. 
 Herodotos continues this comparison by following the Ethiopian bow 
once it was brought to the Persian court. Although every Persian boy was taught 
the use of the bow (i.136.2), Cambyses and his fellow Persians were unable to 
draw the bow and failed this Ethiopian test of strength. His brother Smerdis 
alone was able to make any progress with the bow, drawing it a mere two 
fingers' breadth:  
kai; prw'ta me;n tw'n kakw'n ejxergavsato to;n ajdelfeo;n Smevrdin 
ejovnta patro;" kai; mhtro;" th'" aujth'", to;n ajpevpemye ej" Pevrsa" 
fqovnw/ ejx Aijguvptou, o{ti to; tovxon mou'no" Persevwn o{son te ejpi; 
duvo daktuvlou" ei[ruse, to; para; tou' Aijqivopo" h[neikan oiJ 
jIcquofavgoi, tw'n de; a[llwn Persevwn oujdei;" oi|ov" te ejgevneto.  
 
The first of all the evils he carried out was against his brother 
Smerdis, who was of the same father and mother. Cambyses sent 
him back to Persia from Egypt due to jealousy, because he alone of 
the Persians drew the bow, which the Fish-Eaters brought back 
from Ethiopia, although only as much as two fingers’ breadth; none 
of the other Persians were able to draw the bow. (iii.30.1) 
 
Like Telemachus with Odysseus' bow, Smerdis proved his relative worth 
through the bow.35 But what does the stringing (or near-stringing) of the bow 
signify? As previously discussed, the Greeks viewed such a contest as a proof of 
worth or identity. Since the Ethiopian king designed the test, the answer must lie 
                                                
34 The head of lettuce offers another possible contrast between the Ethiopian and Persian 
monarchs. In Ethiopia, Herodotos describes the Table of the Sun, loaded with meat for all to 
enjoy. In the household of the Persian king, however, the historian describes a table, bare but for 
a head of lettuce picked clean. 
35 Aly. 1969, pp. 84-85. 
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with him. As Herodotos states, the healthy, long-lived Ethiopians selected their 
king based upon his great height and strength relative to his size (iii.20). They 
defined kingship through physical strength and vitality. Hence when the 
Ethiopian king proffered the unstrung bow, a bow that he presumably could 
string, he initiated not merely a test of a person's strength, but also of his 
suitability (from an Ethiopian perspective) for kingship.  
Hence, Smerdis' near-success and Cambyses' failure signifies that the 
former appeared more physically able, and hence more regal, than his brother. 
As in the case of the Ethiopian king, Herodotos couples this feat of strength with 
physical stature. For in Cambyses' subsequent dream about Smerdis, he saw his 
brother seated on the royal throne with his head touching the heavens: 
ejdovkeev oiJ a[ggelon ejlqovnta ejk Persevwn ajggevllein wJ" ejn tw'/ 
qrovnw/ tw'/ basilhivw/ iJzovmeno" Smevrdi" th'/ kefalh'/ tou' oujranou' 
yauvseie.  
 
It seemed to him that a messenger coming from Persia reported 
that Smerdis sitting on the royal throne touched the sky with his 
head. (iii.30.2) 
 
Pairing greater height and strength in Smerdis, Herodotos presents Cambyses' 
brother as closer to the Ethiopian ideal of kingship. In contrast, within the 
parameters of the Ethiopian kingship, Cambyses is found wanting and appears 
as the opposite of the Ethiopian king both mentally and physically.  
 Herodotos refines this straightforward opposition of kings into a definite 
image through the third bow: the bow of Cambyses. Unlike Amasis, who strung 
and unstrung his bow as needed, or the Ethiopian king, who presented the 
Persians with an unstrung bow, Cambyses kept his bow strung and ready for 
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use.36 He was ignorant of Amasis’ warning that an ever-strung bow would break 
or the like-minded man would suffer from madness or apoplexy (manei;" h] o{ ge 
ajpovplhkto" genovmeno"). Indeed, Cambyses was thus afflicted. After his murder 
of the Apis calf, Herodotos describes the king, who was formerly “far from 
sound in his mind” (frenhvrh") as insane.37 He claims that Cambyses suffered 
from epilepsy (iii.33) and links these two maladies through the Persian king's 
bow.38 Discounting the Egyptian claim that Cambyses' impious murder of the 
Apis calf at iii.29 caused the king’s madness, the historian instead posits the 
likelihood of an underlying physical cause:39 
tau'ta me;n ej" tou;" oijkhivou" oJ Kambuvsh" ejxemavnh, ei[te dh; dia; 
to;n \Apin ei[te kai; a[llw", oi|a polla; e[wqe ajnqrwvpou" kaka; 
katalambavnein: kai; ga;r tina; ejk geneh'" nou'son megavlhn 
levgetai e[cein oJ Kambuvsh", th;n iJrh;n ojnomavzousi tinev". ou[ nuvn 
toi ajeike;" oujde;n h\n tou' swvmato" nou'son megavlhn nosevonto" 
mhde; ta;" frevna" uJgiaivnein.  
 
Cambyses performed these mad acts against his family, whether on 
account of the Apis calf or some other reason, as many sorts of 
maladies afflict mankind; for Cambyses is said to have suffered 
from some serious illness from birth, which some call the sacred 
                                                
36 Cf. iii.35.2 and iii.36.4. Cambyses abruptly drew his bow and shot Prexaspes’ son while talking 
to the father (tau'ta de; eijpovnta kai; diateivnanta to; tovxon balei'n to;n pai'da – iii.35.3). Later, 
when angered by Croesus, the Persian king took up his bow to shoot the former monarch, who 
was only saved by swift feet (tau'ta de; ei[pa" ejlavmbane to; tovxon wJ" katatoxeuvswn aujtovn, 
Kroi'so" de; ajnadramw;n e[qee e[xw. – iii.36.4). In both cases, Herodotos omits any reference to 
stringing the bow and the quick pace of the narrative suggests that such a step was unnecessary.   
37 ejmavnh; ejxemavnh; maivnomai – iii.30.1; iii.33; iii.35.4. 
38 Contra Munson. 1991, p. 56. Munson argues: "What the metanarrative labels ‘clinical madness,’ 
the narrative describes in ethical and sociocultural terms. The text and the metatext cooperate to 
force two different aspects of reality together, suggesting their equivalency while keeping them 
distinct at the same time." Munson overlooks the significance that Cambyses' murder of 
Prexaspes' son has for the Herodotean diagnosis of the cause of the royal madness (see below). 
39 Thomas. 2000, pp. 34-35. Thomas notes Herodotos' preference for a physical rather than divine 
cause of Cambyses' madness, suggesting that he is here following Hippocratic thinking. She 
overlooks, however, the equivocal nature of the link between the disease and madness at iii.33 
and the role that the bow plays in constructing that link (see below). 
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disease. It is not strange that a body suffering from a serious illness 
would not enjoy good mental health. (iii.33) 
 
Herodotos presents two such possible causes: first epilepsy and later excessive 
drink. But at no point does the historian explicitly favor one or the other. 
Although he mentions the sacred disease while positing the likelihood of a 
physical cause, he uses levgetai to distance himself from the diagnosis.40 
 Herodotos resolves the issue in Cambsyes' confrontation with Prexaspes. 
When the servant expressed the Persians' concern that their king was too fond of 
wine (filoinivh/ - iii.34.2), Cambyses reacted violently and exclaimed that the 
Persians thought that excessive drinking had driven him mad: 
Prhvxaspe", koi'ovn mev tina nomivzousi Pevrsai ei\nai a[ndra tivna" 
te lovgou" peri; ejmevo poieu'ntai… to;n de; eijpei'n: w\ devspota, ta; 
me;n a[lla pavnta megavlw" ejpainevai, th'/ de; filoinivh/ sev fasi 
pleovnw" proskei'sqai. to;n me;n dh; levgein tau'ta peri; Persevwn, 
to;n de; qumwqevnta toiavde ajmeivbesqai: nu'n a[ra mev fasi Pevrsai 
oi[nw/ proskeivmenon parafronevein kai; oujk ei\nai nohvmona:  
 
Prexaspes, what sort of man do the Persians think I am and what 
do they say about me? Prexaspes responded, “O master, you are 
highly praised in all other regards, but they say that you are too 
fond of wine.” After he said these things, Cambyses grew angry 
and responded with the following words: “Now the Persians say 
that my fondness for drink has driven me mad and that I am not 
sane; (iii.34.2-3) 
 
Cambyses alone connected his drinking and his sanity, but such a link was not 
unknown. Elsewhere in the Histories, the Spartans attributed Cleomenes' 
madness to his practice of drinking unmixed wine (vi.84). Cambyses, however, 
decided to test this imagined assertion. In a confusion of two tenets of Persian 
                                                
40 For Herodotos' use of levgetai as a means to distance himself from a particular claim see 
Lateiner. 1989, p. 22. 
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education (telling the truth and using the bow), Cambyses proposed to shoot an 
arrow through the heart of Prexaspes' son.41 If the arrow pierced the boy's heart, 
the king maintained, then he would disprove the Persians' complaint and 
demonstrate his sanity: 
eij me;n ga;r tou' paido;" tou' sou' tou'de eJstew'to" ejn toi'si 
proquvroisi balw;n tuvcw mevsh" th'" kardivh", Pevrsai fanevontai 
levgonte" oujdevn: h]n de; aJmavrtw, favnai Pevrsa" te levgein ajlhqeva 
kai; ejme; mh; swfronevein.  
 
For if I happen to shoot your son standing in the doorway through 
the middle of the heart, then the Persians appear to be speaking 
nonsense; but if I miss, the Persians speak the truth and I am not in 
my right mind. (iii.35.2) 
 
Shooting the arrow into the boy's chest, Cambyses cut open his chest and found 
the arrow lodged in his heart. Laughing, he rejoiced in the proof of his “sanity”:42 
wJ" de; ejn th/§ kardivh/ euJreqh§nai ejneovnta to;n ojistovn, eijpei§n pro;" 
to;n patevra tou§ paido;" gelavsanta kai; pericareva genovmenon: 
Prhvxaspe", wJ" me;n ejgw; te ouj maivnomai Pevrsai te 
parafronevousi, dh'lav toi gevgone.  
 
When the arrow was found lodged in his heart, he [Cambyses] 
laughing and extremely pleased said to the boy’s father: Prexaspes, 
it has been made clear that I am not mad and the Persians are 
insane. (iii.35.3-4) 
 
But the act was not really a test of sanity, and Prexaspes rightly regarded it as the 
work of a madman (Prhxavspea de; oJrw'nta a[ndra ouj frenhvrea / …and 
Prexaspes saw that the man was unbalanced… –  iii.35.4). Herodotos uses the act 
as a test, but for the cause of the king's madness rather than its existence. The 
accuracy of Cambyses' aim proved his contention that he was not significantly 
                                                
41 Georges. 1994, p. 187. 




affected by wine. Hence, wine could not have been the underlying physical cause 
of his madness. By process of elimination, then, Herodotos uses the feat of skill to 
assert that the physical cause must have been epilepsy (as he thought likely) and 
thereby links the king's mental ailment to this physical malady. 
 Thus, Herodotos uses the two bows and attendant objects to create 
contrasting pictures of the Ethiopian king and Cambyses. Through his 
description, bow, and review of the Persian gifts, the Ethiopian king appears to 
have been a physically vigorous and mentally acute man. In contrast, Herodotos 
uses the Ethiopian bow, Persian bow, and other objects to demonstrate 
Cambyses' physical and mental weakness. He links these two infirmities together 
through an apparent act of physical prowess: the accurate shooting of Prexaspes' 
son. Through this act, Herodotos demonstrates that Cambyses suffered from 
mental and physical maladies, making him the opposite of the vital, vigorous, 
and astute Ethiopian king. 
 Herodotos completes the physical opposition of Cambyses to the 
Ethiopian king by coupling the Persian king's physical weakness with a dwarfish 
frame. As in his metaphoric description of Smerdis, whose display of strength 
was followed by a dream that implied large stature, Herodotos couples 
Cambyses' revealing use of his bow with an image that belittles his height: the 
cult statue at the temple of Hephaestus (iii.37). Visiting the temple, the Persian 
king ridiculed the cult statue, yet again displaying his deranged state. This scene, 
however, reflects the king's physical as well as mental state. Previously in the 
Histories, the historian describes the temple formulaically. Herodotos literally 
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constructs the temple complex, one piece at a time, over the course of the 
Egyptian king list. At some point in his description of each pharaoh, the historian 
notes the monarch's various dedications, many of which were made to the 
Temple of Hephaestus. He uses several of these dedications to reflect the 
character or greatness of the respective monarchs.43  
Curiously, though, none of the eleven previous references to the temple 
complex describes the central figure: the cult statue of the temple. Herodotos 
postpones his description of this statue until the visit of the current de facto 
pharaoh: Cambyses. This pairing of monarch and monument in the temple 
complex perpetuates the formula of the king list and implicitly links the Persian 
monarch and the monument. The historian's description of the statue is 
provocative: 
w}" de; dh; kai; ej" tou'  JHfaivstou to; iJro;n h\lqe kai; polla; tw'/ 
ajgavlmati kategevlase: e[sti ga;r tou'  JHfaivstou tw[galma toi'si 
Foinikhivoisi Pataiv>koisi ejmferevstaton, tou;" oiJ Foivnike" ejn 
th'/si prwv/rh/si tw'n trihrevwn periavgousi. o}" de; touvtou" mh; 
o[pwpe, ejgw; de; shmanevw: pugmaivou ajndro;" mivmhsiv" ejsti.  
 
So he also came to the temple of Hephaestus and laughed greatly at 
the statue; for the statue most closely resembles the Phoenicians 
Pataici, which the Phoenicians carry around on the prows of their 
triremes. I will describe them for whoever has not seen one: it 
resembles a pygmy. (iii.37.2) 
 
By simple proximity, the historian links Cambyses to this symbol both of his 
ironic “greatness” and metaphorical lack of physical stature. Herodotos provides 
no details about Cambyses' actual height, but, viewed from the framework laid 
out by the Ethiopian king and his test, great strength is coupled with great 
                                                
43 Immerwahr. 1960, pp. 265-266. 
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height. A corollary of this definition of kingship is that weakness (through lack of 
strength, infirmity, or both) is coupled with a slight frame. The historian uses the 
statue to complete this corollary. Hence, Cambyses was not merely mad, but the 
mental and physical opposite of the Ethiopian king – a mentally and physically 
infirm pygmy.  
Herodotos, then, uses the repeated pairing of bow and monarch to 
contrast and hence define the Persian king with respect to his two 
contemporaries. First, he uses Amasis' bow to establish a relationship between 
the stringing of a bow and a king's identity or character. Amasis used his bow to 
espouse a balanced approach to kingship that involved work and relaxation. A 
lover of drink (filopovth"), the pharaoh wisely divided his day between his royal 
duties and pleasures. Within the parameters of Amasis' metaphor, the alcoholic 
(filoinivh/) Cambyses was a “snapped bow,” living and ruling in an excessive 
fashion.  
Next, Herodotos uses the second and third bows as well as the gifts of the 
Persian embassy and similar objects later in the narrative to contrast the physical 
and mental states of the Ethiopian king and Cambyses. First, he describes the 
Ethiopian king as physically tall and strong, a description that the king’s bow 
supports. The historian couples this physical vitality with mental acuity, which 
he reveals through the king's analysis of the Persian gifts as well as his 
management of food and drink. Second, through his depiction of Cambyses' 
interaction with objects similar to the gifts, he presents the Persian king as 
obtuse, imprudent, and insane. Cambyses fell short physically as well, failing the 
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test of strength posed by the Ethiopian bow. He finished behind his brother 
Smerdis, whose greater success placed him closer to the Ethiopian ideal of 
kingship based upon physical vitality. Failing the Ethiopian king's test, 
Cambyses next arranged one of his own using his own bow and in doing so links 
his mental and physical infirmities. Shooting Prexaspses' son through the heart, 
the Persian king ironically demonstrated his insanity and its underlying cause – 
the sacred disease. Lastly, Herodotos implicitly links Cambyses' mental and 
physical shortcomings with slight stature, associating the Persian monarch with 
the pygmy statue of Hephaestus. The historian creates a complex set of 
comparisons between these three kings, but links their behavior and his 
evaluation of them through a set of unchanging objects and in particular the 
stringing of their respective bows. 
 
The Kraters of Lydia (i.14, i.25, and i.51) 
Herodotos uses this same method to evaluate dynasties through the 
evaluation of its successive members. The succession from father to son typically 
invites comparison as seen within the pages of epic44 and within the Histories 
itself.45 Instead of using objects to illustrate the characters/natures of the 
respective generations, the historian evaluates the relative success or failure of 
each generation. In the first book of the Histories, Herodotos associates kraters 
solely with the Lydian Mermnadid dynasty. These monarchs alone dedicate, 
                                                
44 E.g. Odysseus to Telemachus (Od. i.204-205; iv.140-146, et al.) 
45 Cf. i.183 (the comparison of Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes) and iii.34 (Croesus’ comparison of 
Cyrus and Cambyses). 
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receive, or manipulate these vessels prior to the Pelusian krater at iii.11.46 Despite 
this privileged relationship, little attention has been given to their significance 
save as examples of the historian’s interest in wealth.47 But kraters in the Histories 
are often exceptional objects that the historian uses to convey additional 
meaning. Herodotos describes their use in sacrifices, has them offered as 
dedications/monuments, and introduces them into scenes of elaborate dining.48 
We have explored how the historian uses the Pelusian krater to signifiy the 
changing status of Egypt from freedom to servitude (iii.11.2 – Chapter 1, pp. 24-
33) and the krater of Ariantes to foreshadow Scythia’s victory over Persia (iv.81 – 
Chapter 2, pp. 88-97). Herodotos uses the Lydian kraters in book 1 in a similar 
fashion. But while Poudrier notes the aristocratic significance of Croesus’ use of 
kraters,49 an idea supported by the use of kraters in epic as "a symbolic kernel of 
power within the princely oikos,”50 she limits her analysis to the single 
Mermnadid monarch. Yet Gyges, Alyattes, and Croesus, the three Lydian 
                                                
46 i.14.1; i.25.2; i.51.1; i.70; i.207.6. Dedications: Gyges offered several kraters as part of his thank-
offering to Delphi (krhth're" oiJ ajriqmo;n e}x cruvseoi - i.14.1); Alyattes made a similar dedication 
to the sanctuary after his recovery from a near-fatal illness (krhth'rav te ajrguvreon mevgan  - 
i.25.2); Croesus sent two monumental kraters to Delphi prior to his campaign against Persia 
(krhth'ra" duvo – i.51.1). Gifts: the Spartans sent a bronze krater to Croesus as a gift (krhth'ra 
cavlkeon – i.70). Manipulation: after Cyrus defeated Croesus, the former Lydian monarch 
accompanied his master in his campaign against the Massagetae, where he advised the Persian 
king to bait a trap for the Massagetae with a sumptuous banquet and kraters full of unmixed wine 
(krhth'ra" ajfeidevw" oi[nou ajkrhvtou – i.207.6). 
47 Flory. 1987, p. 85. 
48 Sacrifices: iii.11.2 bis (the Pelusian krater – see Chp. 2, pp. 24-33); iv.61.1 (Herodotos compares 
the shape of a Scythian cauldron to a Lesbian krater); vii.54.3 (Xerxes pours wine and throws a 
golden krater into the Hellespont as a possible sacrifice). Dedications/Monuments: iii.47.1, 2; 
iii.48.1 (the Spartan krater, which was intended for Croesus, revisited); iv.81.3 (the Scythian krater 
– see Chp. 3, pp. 88-97); iv.152.4 (krater dedication at the Samian Heraion to commemorate a 
profitable trading voyage); viii.122 (Aeginetan krater – placed beside the dedications of Croesus). 
Dining: iv.66 (Annual Scythian celebration); vii.119.2, 4 (Antipater hosted Xerxes’ army with 
golden kraters that the Persians took with them); ix.80.1 (These were the gold and silver kraters 
found in the Persian camp after Plataea). 
49 Poudrier. 2002, pp. 24-25.  
50 Luke. 1994, p. 24. 
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monarchs prominently described by Herodotos, all engaged in similar behavior – 
the dedication of monumental kraters to Delphi. Similar to the repetition of royal 
bows, the historian uses the recurrence of Lydian monumental kraters to compare 
the three monarchs, in particular Gyges to Croesus, and to illustrate the 
dynasty’s changing fortunes. 
 As we have already discussed, Herodotos uses the unchanged state of a 
monument, such as the stelai of Sesostris, to emphasize a monarch’s legacy or 
fame (Chp. 2, p. 64). In contrast, the historian uses Croesus’ gold and silver 
kraters to foreshadow the Lydian monarch’s fall. Immediately after the 
description of the kraters, the historian describes their relocation. Through his 
presentation of the objects as mutable against the immutable background of 
Delphi, he undermines the king’s connection to his dedications and the god they 
celebrated (Chp. 2, pp. 66-76). In many respects, these kraters appear similar to 
the dedications of his father Alyattes and ancestor Gyges. Like Croesus, these 
monarchs dedicated large or numerous kraters composed of precious metal to the 
sanctuary at Delphi (krhth're" oiJ ajriqmo;n e}x cruvseoi … krhth'rav te ajrguvreon 
mevgan – i.14.1 and i.25.1 respectively). Although his forebears sent these vessels 
to Delphi as thank-offerings rather than an attempt to win the god’s favor, the 
kraters of Croesus matched the previous dedications in composition and location. 
The resemblance, however, ends there. Herodotos distinguishes the kraters 
of Croesus from those of his predecessors both in his assessment of their worth 
and their fate. Worth is a familiar criterion for many of the sights and wonders 
that the historian includes in his narrative. The attribution of worth underscores 
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the splendor of the monument, and through it, the monarch’s greatness.51 In the 
Lydian logos, Herodotos almost completely reserves the classification of worth(y) 
(of seeing, recalling, description, or reckoning) to the Lydian dynasty and its 
monuments.52 After his usurpation of the Lydian throne, Gyges sent dedications 
worthy of remembrance such as six golden kraters: 
pavrex de; tou§ ajrguvrou cruso;n a[pleton ajnevqhke a[llon te kai; 
tou' mavlista mnhvmhn a[xion e[cein ejstiv, krhth'rev" oiJ ajriqmo;n e}x 
cruvseoi ajnakevatai.  
 
Besides the silver he dedicated a great deal of gold objects and the 
most noteworthy are six golden kraters. (i.14.1) 
 
Herodotos frames his account of Alyattes’ reign with similar terms, beginning 
with the king’s deeds most worth description (a[lla de; e[rga ajpedevxato ejw;n ejn 
th'/ ajrch'/ ajxiaphghtovtata tavde. / While in power he performed these other 
deeds most worthy of mention – i.16.2) and concluding with the description of 
his krater and bowl-stand: 
ajnevqhke de; ejkfugw;n th;n nou§son deuvtero" ou|to" th§" oijkivh" 
tauvth" ej" Delfou;" krhth'rav te ajrguvreon mevgan kai; 
uJpokrhthrivdion sidhvreon kollhtovn, qevh" a[xion dia; pavntwn tw'n 
ejn Delfoi'si ajnaqhmavtwn.  
 
After he recovered from the illness this king, the second of his 
house to do so, dedicated a great silver krater and a welded iron 
stand, a sight worth seeing of all the dedications at Delphi. (i.25.2) 
 
                                                
51 Immerwahr. 1960, p. 267. 
52 a[xio" (i.14.1; i.25.2; i.32.1, 7), ajxioqevhto" (i.14.3), ajxiaphvghto" (i.16.2). The only exception is the 
throne of Midas, which Herodotos describes as “worthy of seeing” (ajxioqevhton – i.14.3). He uses 
this object, however, as a reference point for the dedications of Gyges. The historian does not use 
another form of ajxio- again until i.107.2, after the conclusion of the Lydian Logos.  
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But Herodotos denies this appellation to Croesus and his works. When Solon 
awarded the title of the “the happiest” (ojlbiwvtato") to other men, the king asked 
why the Athenian did not regard Croesus as even “the equal in worth to 
commoners” (oujde; ijdiwtevwn ajndrw'n ajxivou" hJmeva" ejpoivhsaß… - i.32.1). In a 
similar manner, Herodotos withholds such a classification from the Lydian 
monarch’s kraters. For despite their impressive size and composition, he at no 
point describes the vessels, or any other dedications of Croesus, as “worthy.”  
 Herodotos correlates this disparity of worth to the manner in which the 
kraters of the Lydian kings endured the passage of time. While the kraters of 
Croesus were lessened due to the passage of time, the kraters of Alyattes and 
Gyges endured the passing years with no negative effect. In the case of Alyattes, 
Herodotos presents the krater simply without any overt consideration of the 
passage of time (i.25.2). Yet, while the historian describes the dedication in the 
past tense, he implies that the krater still existed in his own day in that it was 
worth seeing.  
For Gyges, though, Herodotos presents the monarch's kraters in an 
explicitly diachronic fashion similar to the dedications of Croesus, but with the 
opposite result. Like Croesus, the first Mermnadid sent golden and silver 
dedications to the sanctuary. Amid this endless (a[pleton) supply of golden 
objects, the historian notes six golden kraters worthy of mention (i.14.1), which he 
locates in the Corinthian treasury: 
eJsta'si de; ou|toi ejn tw'/ Korinqivwn qhsaurw'/ staqmo;n e[conte" 
trihvkonta tavlanta: ajlhqevi de; lovgw/ crewmevnw/ ouj Korinqivwn 




These stood in the Corinthian treasury and weighed thirty talents. 
In truth, though, it is not the treasury of the Corinthians, but of 
Cypselus son of Eëtion. (i.14.2) 
 
Similar to the location of Croesus’ golden krater in the Clazomenian treasury, the 
location of these kraters recontextualized the dedication and linked it with the 
Corinthians as well as Gyges. The fixed limit placed upon the Mermnadid 
dynasty, however, namely that it would fall in the fifth generation (i.13.2), 
explains this lessening of the Lydian dedication. Moreover, the historian 
reinforces the Lydian identity of the objects, describing the kraters and other 
dedications as the “Gygean Treasure” (kalevetai Gugavda" – i.14.3). 
While Herodotos presents both Croesus’ and Gyges’ kraters with a sense of 
their dynasty’s demise, however, he reverses the relationship of their dedications 
and the landscape over time. Whereas the historian alters the location of the 
kraters of Croesus against an unchanged landscape, he presents the kraters of 
Gyges as fixed points against a changed landscape. Describing the treasury at 
two points in time, he places the kraters in one place but notes the changed 
ownership of the treasury building from Cypselus to the Corinthians (ajlhqevi de; 
lovgw/ crewmevnw/ ouj Korinqivwn tou' dhmosivou ejsti; oJ qhsaurov", ajlla; Kuyevlou 
tou'  jHetivwno"./ In truth, though, it is not the treasury of the Corinthians, but of 
Cypselus son of Eëtion. - i.14.2). Against the background of the treasury building, 
then, the kraters of Gyges appear to suffer no change, no decline over time, unlike 
the kraters of his ancestor Croesus. As previously discussed, Herodotos moves 
that monarch’s vessels against an unchanged background. After the temple fire, 
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the Lydian vessels were moved from their position of honor at the entrance of 
the temple of Apollo to the corner of the new temple’s pronaos and the 
Clazomenian treasury (i.51.2).53  
  Through the Lydian kraters, then, Herodotos reifies different phases of the 
Mermnadid dynasty: its rise, rule, and fall. Restricting the vessels to the Lydian 
monarchy, Herodotos places the vessels in analogous contexts with distinct 
results to illustrate the relative greatness of Gyges and to a lesser extent Alyattes 
with respect to Croesus. Withholding the classification of “worthy” from the 
kraters of Croesus, the historian distinguishes the last Mermnadid monarch from 
his predecessors. Additionally, he uses the repetition of two elements – the 
kraters and a treasury building – and the passage of time to illustrate the secure 
and insecure power of Gyges and Croesus, the rise and fall of the Mermnadid 
dynasty. Whereas the historian presents Gyges’ kraters as unchanged or 
unmoved against a changing background, he presents the kraters of Croesus as 
changed or mobile against an unchanged background.  
 Within the parameters of dynastic generations, then, Herodotos uses the 
repetition and variation of objects to create a message about the entire dynasty 
rather than individual characters. Selecting a consistent set of objects (kraters in 
the case of the Mermnadae), the historian evaluates the dynasty’s status through 
these signature objects. He uses the alteration or interruption of the expected 
pattern to signal a change (usually for the worse) of the family’s fortunes. 
                                                
53 See Chp. 2, pp. 66-76 for a complete discussion. Herodotos uses a different portion of the 
Delphic landscape for his account of Croesus' dedications, replacing the Cypselid/Corinthian 
treasury with the Clazomenian (i.51.2). But in the next section, which details the fate Croesus' 
four silver pithoi, the historian reintroduces the familiar Corinthian structure and provides 





Herodotos, then, alters objects on two different levels (specific objects and 
objects of the same category). In the case of specific objects, he changes them 
either through a diachronic presentation or through repetition and substitution. 
Like a simple flipbook, Herodotos creates a cinematic technique through the 
multiplicity of images, each with a slightly different connotation or meaning. In 
the case of objects of the same category, the historian utilizes the same 
techniques, but over a more extended section of the narrative. He either reuses 
the same object or introduces another of the same type (e.g.: Cambyses’ bow for 
the Ethiopian bow). He places this new object in an analogous context to ensure 
the audience perceives the connection. Hence, even though Alyattes dedicated a 
different krater to Delphi than Croesus, the similarity of the contexts – two kings 
dedicating kraters to the same Greek sanctuary – encourages the comparison 
between the two objects, scenes, and kings.  
In both the immediate and extended comparisons, Herodotos uses objects 
to create contrasting character portraits. The initial objects convey a distinct 
connotation in each scene that aids in characterization. When changed or 
replaced, the object(s) again conveys a connotation that aids in characterization, 
but the contrast between meanings is revealing. The historian uses the familiar 
context and object to invite the audience to contrast these two meanings, and by 
extension, the characters with whom they are associated. Hence, objects provide 
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the historian with a stable, yet malleable, vehicle with which to characterize the 




The Masistios Logos (ix.20 – 31.1) 
 
In addition to creating or altering an object’s connotation through its 
direct manipulation, Herodotos may evoke a particular meaning through the 
context of the passage. In this way, the historian emphasizes or de-emphasizes an 
object’s various potential connotations. Thus, as in the example of the Pelusian 
Krater, Herodotos draws upon the connotation of wine with peace and water 
with subservience to Persia to illustrate the transition of Egypt from one state to 
another (Chp. 1, pp. 24-33). The historian uses some objects, however, not merely 
as a means to convey additional meaning, but also as a means to arrange and 
structure the narrative.  
One such example is Herodotos' treatment of the battle in the foothills of 
Cithaeron and its aftermath. Beginning with the heroic figure and corpse of the 
Persian Masistios, the historian focuses on heroic death, heroic corpses, and 
corpses in general to impart an epic tone to the action and characters. 
Minimizing or overlooking the importance of these corpses, scholars have 
viewed the battle in the foothills of Cithaeron (ix.20 – 25.1), the movement of the 
Greek camp (ix.25.1 – 26.1), the Tegean/Athenian debate (ix.26.2 – 28.1), and the 
catalogue of Greek forces (ix.28.2 – 30) as independent sections of the narrative.1 
                                                
1 Macan. 1973 (1908), pp. 629-657. How and Wells. 1912, loc. sit. Myres. 1971, pp. 115, 133. 
Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 289-291. Masaracchia. 1978, pp. 160-168. Flower and Marincola. 2002, pp. 
138-161. Macan treats each section as a different stage of the larger battle narrative, but does not 
note any particular relation between them. How and Wells divide the logos at ix.25.1 and takes no 
notice of the heroic qualities of Masistios. Myres' pedimental approach seeks to draw a closer 
correspondence between the various sections and events after the catalogue, such as cavalry 
engagement (ix.20-24) and the Persian attack on the Greek supply train (ix.38-39), than between 
the various parts. Immerwahr generally follows Myres arrangement of this logos, dividing it 
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This chapter, however, argues that these sections comprise the Masistios logos 
(ix.20 – 31.1) and work as a unit.  
Herodotos employs objects (primarily corpses) to link the various sections 
of the logos together. Using related items (e.g. corpses) or the repetition of the 
same item (e.g. the corpse of Masistios), the historian creates a highly structured 
narrative and links one section to another. He organizes the first section (ix.20-
25.1) around the heroic figure of Masistios and later the struggle for his corpse. 
Next, the historian widens the scope from one heroic figure to several as the 
Greek camp moves from one heroic gravesite to another (ix.25.1-26.1). As the 
Greeks advance from a struggle of arms to a struggle of words, Herodotos 
retains heroic combat and death as a significant theme within the 
Athenian/Tegean debate (ix.26.1-28.1). While the historian does not include 
heroic corpses in the third section, his catalog of the Greek forces (ix.28.2-30), he 
models the section on the epic catalogs of Homer, perpetuating the epic tone of 
the logos. Finally, he concludes the section with a return to the corpse of 
Masistios, providing a summation of the episode and signaling the end of a 
unified narrative section. 
The structural unity of these passages suggests a thematic unity as well. 
Herodotos uses heroic death and corpses to place and to evaluate the characters 
and events in an epic context. At the beginning of the logos, Herodotos employs 
the living Masistios to compare the Athenians favorably with other Greeks and 
                                                                                                                                            
between the Greek to Cithaeron followed by the cavalry engagement (ix.19-24) and the Greek 
movement to Gargaphia (ix.25-32). Masaracchia notes several Homeric influences upon the 
passage, but makes no effort to tie the various sections together. Flower and Marincola divide the 
passage into the engagement, the movement of the camp, the debate, and the catalogue of Greek 
and Persian forces. 
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later the Persian commander's corpse to place the Athenians into the role of an 
epic hero (ix.20-25.1). Next, he perpetuates the Iliadic setting and continues the 
presentation of the Athenians as the “hero” of Cithaeron in the Greek review of 
Masistios' corpse (ix.25), comparable to the review of Patroklos and Hektor's 
corpses. During the debate between the Tegeans and the Athenians (ix.26-27), the 
historian again compares the Athenians favorably to other Greeks, presenting 
them, collectively, as a hero both in the past and the contemporary era. In each 
section, Herodotos makes a different point with similar objects: heroic corpses. If 
taken together, however, as the structural arrangement suggests, these points 
contribute to a larger argument: the heroic presentation of the Athenians and 
praise for their contribution to the Battle of Plataea. Herodotos strengthens this 
last point with the inclusion of the catalogue, in which he asserts that the 
Athenians supplied the greatest number of quality troops (i.e. hoplites) to the 
campaign. Thus, the corpses, while not present in every chapter of the logos, help 
to establish an epic setting in which Herodotos presents the Athenians in a 
positive and even heroic light.  
 This chapter will advance this argument in three parts. The first section 
will establish the status of a corpse as an object. A review of Herodotean corpses 
will demonstrate their unique presentation in the Masistios logos, which limits 
the scope of its argument. Not all corpses belong to heroes nor do heroic corpses 
elsewhere in the narrative contribute to a laudatory presentation of the 
Athenians. The second section of this chapter then presents the structural and 
argumentative components of the objects of the logos. First, it shows how 
 
136 
Herodotos uses corpses and combat (and the epic setting they produce) to frame 
and to link the different sections together. Next, it examines the secondary 
meaning of the corpses and of the sections themselves, showing how each section 
contributes to an overall praise of the Athenians. Herodotos combines the 
structural and interpretive functions of objects within the logos to advance an 
argument of a limited scope. 
 
Corpses in the Histories 
Corpses as Objects 
A corpse is at once a symbol of a former person and a thing to be 
manipulated by those around it. Friends and relatives of a person may view a 
corpse as the continuing representation of that character, but still treat it like an 
object. The corpse is mute, lifeless and motionless, neither acting nor 
communicating with the world around it. Instead, like any other object, it is the 
focus of human manipulation. Friends and relatives seek to conduct some form 
of burial rites, which involve manipulating the corpse (mummifying, anointing, 
burying, burning, or even eating). Like other objects, corpses may be adorned or 
decorated,2 moved,3 somehow diminished, such as by the removal of a fallen 
warrior's armor,4 damaged,5 stolen,6 or generally suffer from the effects of time.7 
In every instance, the corpse initiates no action, but endures these vagaries of fate 
                                                
2 i.140.1-2; ii.81.2; ii.86.2-87.3; ii.90.1-2; ii.129.3; iii.10.2; iii.24.2-3; iv.71.1-72.5. 
3 i.64.2; i.68.3-6; i.113.1-3; i.187.4-5; ii.121g1-2; iii.125.4; vi.73.1-2. 
4 i.82.5-6; viii.27.4; ix.22.2; ix.80.2. 
5 i.214.4; ii.121b2; iii.16.1-3; iii.79.1; iv.64.3; iv.103.3; v.114.2; vi.30.2; vii.39-40; vii.238.1-2; ix.78.79.1. 
6 ii.121e4-5; ix.24. 
7 iii.12.1; ix.83.2. 
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common to all objects in the Histories. The transition of a body/corpse from 
person to object immediately follows death. Those around the body cease to 
interact with the body as a person and instead treat it as an object. Only 
characters displaying aberrant behavior, such as Periander,8 continue to interact 
with a corpse as though with the living person. 
The distinct characteristics of a corpse, its human shape and status as a 
symbol of an entity, are not unique. Statues, both of gods and humans, share 
these traits and appear just as passive. Characters manipulate both these mortal 
and the divine objects in an equal fashion. Statues, like corpses, may also be 
clothed or adorned.9 They may be moved for proper purposes, such as to a 
temple,10 or away from danger,11 or even as part of a religious procession.12 
Similarly statues suffer over time. Herodotos notes their theft,13 insult, and 
desecration.14 Finally, like almost any object in the Histories, statues are 
susceptible to incidental or willful destruction over time.15 Like corpses, human 
statues serve as memorials, symbols of the deceased. Some focus on a certain 
aspect, deed or event,16 but others simply represent the person.17 Aside from 
                                                
8 v.92g. Sex appears to be the only treatment of a corpse as a living body. The Egyptians, for 
instance, delayed the mummification of a beautiful woman's corpse to prevent its sexual 
violation by the embalmers (ii.89.2). 
9 ii.42.6; iv.189.1. 
10 i.31.5; ii.181.4-5. 
11 i.164.3. 
12 ii.42.6; ii.63.1-2. 
13 i.183.3; v.83.2, v.85.1, v.86.3. 
14 ii.121; iii.37.2, 3; vii.129.3. 
15 ii.131.2 and iii.37.3; vii.140.1 or; vii.109.3; viii.143.2; viii.144.2 respectively. 
16 i.24.8; i.31.5; ii.141.6; vi.58.3. 
17 ii.110.3; ii.131.2; ii.143.2-3; viii.121.2. 
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unusual displays of divine action,18 then, statues resemble other objects. They are 
as fragile and as subject to manipulation as any other object in the Histories.  
The human form or the fact that a corpse, like a statue, represents an 
animate entity (e.g. god or spirit), then, does not privilege its treatment. Like 
statues, corpses remain passive foci of action and suffer fates common to all 
objects in the Histories. While corpses require certain ritual actions, they do so as 
objects, not as persons.   
 
The Meaning of a Herodotean Corpse 
Epic treatment of corpses in the Histories is unusual. For the most part, 
Herodotos treats dead bodies in a non-epic fashion. The majority of corpses serve 
as ethnographic markers to distinguish cultures and as behavioral gauges to 
judge individuals. Twenty-eight of the sixty-seven references to corpses in the 
Histories concern the customs and rites necessary for a “proper” burial outside of 
a military context.19 The few corpses treated in a heroic fashion outside of the 
Masistios logos are not part of extended presentations. Moreover, unlike 
Masistios, they only obtain heroic status after their burial.  
 Herodotos attributes what appear to be epic elements to the burial 
practices of some cultures, but these practices differ from the treatment of the 
dead in epic. Some cultures, such as the Thracians, held funeral games for their 
dead (v.8), but Herodotos does not link this practice to the burial of a warrior. 
                                                
18 vi.82.2; v.86.3. 
19 i.45.1-3; i.64.2; i.67.2-68.6; i.93.2-4; i.140.1-2; ii.81.2; ii.85.1; ii.86.2-7; ii.87.1-3; ii.89.2; ii.90.1-2; 
ii.121e1-4; ii.129.3; ii.1169.3; iii.10.2; iii.24.2-3; iii.38.4; iv.62.4; iv.71.1-72.5; iv.73.1-2; iv.190; iv.8; 
v.92g; v.114.2; vi.30.2; vi.58.2-3; iv.103; vii.117.1-2. 
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This difference makes a comparison to the distinctive burials of the Iliad and 
Odyssey problematic. Nor does the treatment of the dead during war resemble 
the practices displayed in the Homeric epics. Although Spartan kings killed in 
battle received special honors and a statue, Herodotos presents these practices as 
part of his ethnographic treatment of Sparta and does not link them to any heroic 
individual (vi.58.3). Moreover, while he expresses the desires of many societies to 
recover their war dead, he does not restrict their attentions to a single corpse 
(such as a leader); rather, he describes their efforts to bury all their soldiers. Thus, 
at Plataea the Greeks honored no individual with a notable burial (ix.85). The 
Cimmerians buried their nobles (who fought each other to the death) without 
singling anyone out for special treatment (iv.11.4). Not even the Greek practice of 
stripping the armor from the corpses of their enemies established a clear allusion 
to Homer. Epic heroes seized the armor from the corpses of other heroes during 
battle. The Greeks in the Histories, however, stripped their enemies en masse after 
the battle had ended.20 Thus, the historian attributes no regular burial rites and 
practices similar to the treatment of the dead in epic.  
Herodotos reserves this treatment, attributing heroic or quasi-heroic 
honors, to few individuals outside of the Masistios logos, casting them into an 
epic mould briefly and posthumously. At times, he records singular honors, such 
as for Tellus, whom the Athenians buried at public expense in a mound on the 
battlefield where he fell (i.30.5).21 In his description of the burial of a heroic 
                                                
20 i.82.5-6; viii.27.4; ix.80.2. 
21 Cf. iii.55.2. The Samians granted the Spartan Archias a public funeral, but Herodotos omits any 
details, precluding an association with funerals in Homer. 
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figure, the historian may recall some of the burial practices described in the Iliad, 
but rarely links the burial or the figure to a particular character or scene from 
epic. Only five other corpses, those of Orestes, Leonidas, Artachaees, Onesilaos, 
and Philippos, received heroic treatment. The first, Orestes, was an actual figure 
from the heroic age, but his corpse received recognition of its status only after its 
burial and later reburial in Sparta. Moreover, he was found in a setting foreign to 
epic: the courtyard of a smithy (i.68.3-6). While the body of the next, Leonidas, 
became the focal point of a battle, similar to Patroklos, Herodotos does not style 
the battle of Thermopylae overall as a heroic combat (vii.224). The final three, 
Artachaees, Onesilaos, and Philippos, possessed neither heroic lineage nor died 
in a heroic fashion. They only achieved heroic status after their burials and thus 
do not resemble heroic figures from epic.22 The historian treats Masistios alone, 
then, as a heroic figure and places him in a sustained epic setting. 
 
The Structure of the Masistios Logos (ix.20 – 31.1) 
Through this extended presentation of heroic death and heroic corpses, 
Herodotos unites his account of the battle on Cithaeron (ix.20 – 25.3), the 
Tegean/Athenian debate (ix.26.1 – 27.6), and the catalog of Greek forces (ix.28.1 – 
31.1). While part of the Plataea narrative, the epic tone of the Masistios logos 
distinguishes it from the sections immediately preceding and following it. 
                                                
22 The Amanthians at first dishonored Onesilaos' body, decapitating it. Only later, upon the 
advice of an oracle, did they rebury the corpse and treat Onesilaos as a hero (v.114.2). Artachaees’ 
fellow Persians did not regard him as a heroic figure, even though he was possessed the physical 
qualities common to many heroes (a large frame and loud voice); rather, the Acanthians later 
gave the Persian’s grave heroic honors in response to an oracle (vii.117.2). The Egestans honored 
Philippos with a hero-shrine after his death (v.47.1-2). 
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Herodotos provides a clear marker for the logos: Masistios. Alive, he begins the 
first skirmish and the logos (ix.20); dead, he appears one last time at its end in the 
thoughts of his fellow Persians (ix.31.1). Prior to his appearance, the narrative is 
not particularly epic. Mardonius' test of the Phocians bears no resemblance to 
heroic combat (ix.17-18). Immediately preceding the Persian attack at Cithaeron, 
Herodotos describes the slow advance of the Greeks from the Isthmus to Boeotia 
(ix.19). No heroic figures appear; neither does Herodotos interject any epic 
allusions. He uses the final reference to Masistios at ix.31.1 to divide the Greek 
and Persian catalogs and to shift the narrative's point of view from the former to 
the latter. The narrative further reflects this shift in the abandonment of epic 
themes (such as personal combat). 
Within the Masistios logos, Herodotos uses heroic corpses and other heroic 
elements to divide the passage into three major parts: 
I. The events at Cithaeron 
A. Persian cavalry assault 
1. Initial assault against the Megarian position (ix.21.1 – 21.2) 
2. Advance of the Athenian volunteers and the death of 
Masistios (ix.21.3 – 22.3) 
B. Battle for the body of Masistios. 
1. Struggle between the Athenians (later Greeks) and the 
Persian cavalry (ix.22.3 – ix.23.2) 
2. Persian and Greek mourning/admiring of Masistios' 
corpse (ix.24 – ix.25.1) 
C. Movement of the Greek camp from Cithaeron to the Asopus 
(ix.25.2 – ix.25.3) 
II. The debate between the … 
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A. Tegeans (ix.26.1 – 26. 7) 
B. Athenians 
1. Athens in the Age of Heroes (ix.27.1-4) 
2. Athens at Marathon (ix.27.4-6) 
III. The catalogue and conclusion 
A. Catalogue of the Greek forces at Plataea (ix.28.1 – ix.30)23 
B. Persian camp mourning Masistios (ix.31.1) 
 
In the first section, Herodotos utilizes Masistios (or his corpse) as a focal 
point of the narrative. He places the living Masistios, the Persian protagonist, at 
the center of the battle (IA). After the death of the cavalry commander, the 
historian makes him the focus of the struggle between the Greeks and Persians as 
each side attempted to gain possession of the corpse (IB). After the battle, 
Herodotos moves the Greek camp from where Masistios was killed to a spot 
along the Asopus River near the tomb of the hero Androkrates (IC). The literal 
presence of heroic corpses becomes figurative in the debate between the Tegeans 
and the Athenians. Using agonistic language appropriate to a description of a 
battle for a corpse, the debate includes accounts of heroic duels, death, and 
burial. The Tegean argument rests primarily upon the heroic combat between 
Echemos and Hyllos (IIA). The Athenian argument adduces further examples of 
epic combat and death both through their recollection of their deeds during the 
heroic age and more recently at Marathon (IIB). The catalogue at the end of the 
                                                
23 The catalogue of the Greek forces at Plataea (ix.28.2 to ix.30) does not make use of the heroic 




logos (IIIA) moves from the dead to the living, but Herodotos concludes the 
catalogue and the logos with a final consideration of the death of Masistios (IIIB).  
The remainder of this section is divided into four subsections. The first 
establishes the heroic credentials of Mastistios. The second subsection traces the 
use of Masistios, his trappings, and his corpse to organize the first part of the 
logos. Third, Herodotos' organization of the debate through references to heroic 
combat and death is examined. The final subsection demonstrates how the 
historian uses Masistios to bracket the catalog and include it within the logos. 
 
The Epic Nature of Masistios 
 Herodotos' presentation of Masistios as a heroic figure is essential to the 
creation of an epic setting. Unlike Leonidas, and the cult figures Onesilaos and 
Artachaees, the historian casts the living Masistios into a heroic mould. Scholars 
have long recognized the Persian's heroic appearance and death as well as the 
epic tone of the struggle for his corpse.24 Masistios himself cut a clear Homeric 
figure in his own person, his trappings, and even his double name - 
Masivstioß/Makivstion ("the tallest").25 Herodotos further emphasizes his size 
and beauty through the description of the Persian's corpse (oJ de; nekro;" h\n qevh" 
a[xio" megavqeo" ei{neka kai; kavlleo" / His corpse was worth seeing because of 
its great size and beauty - ix.25.1). The historian similarly attributes great size 
and beauty to other heroic and heroicized (cult-heroes) figures in the Histories. 
                                                
24 Aly. 1969 (1921), p. 274. Masaracchia. 1978, p. 162; Flower and Marincola. 2002, p. 143; 
Boedeker. 2003, p. 20. 
25 Boedeker. 2001, p. 122. She equates the punning of Masistios' name with Iliad vii.155. 
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He ascribes a large frame to Orestes, Perseus, Herakles, and the cult figure 
Artachaees.26 He describes the great beauty (kavlleoß) of Philippos, whom the 
Egestans honored with a hero-shrine after his death.27 In the Iliad, the Achaeans 
note these same characteristics when gazing upon the body of Hektor (oi} kai; 
qhhvsanto fuh;n kai; ei\doß ajghto;n | {Ektoroß: / They gazed upon the stature 
and impressive beauty of Hektor - Iliad xxii.373-4), the significance of which will 
be explored further below (pp. 167-169). Herodotos also clothes the heroic body 
in epic armor, a golden thorax (ejnto;" qwvrhka ei\ce cruvseon lepidwtovn) 
reminiscent of the golden armor that Glaukos wears in the Iliad.28 The unusual 
efficacy of his golden thorax, which withstood repeated blows (ix.22.2), resulted 
in Masistios dying a particularly Homeric death. An Athenian bypassed the 
armor and killed the Persian with a blow to the eye, like the hero Ilioneus (Iliad 
                                                
26 Although megavqeoß is not used to describe all the heroes, a larger than life stature is commonly 
associated with recognized heroic figures in the Histories. The bones of Orestes (i.68.3) are 
measured as equivalent in length to the seven cubit-long soros (sorw/§ eJptaphvcei) in which they 
were buried.  The immense statures of Perseus and Herakles are both indicated by the size of 
their feet. Like some overgrown teenager Perseus would leave one of his size two (cubit) sandals 
(sandavliovn … ejo;n to; mevgaqo" divphcu / a sandal two cubits in size) near the city of Chemmis 
(ii.91.3). The similarly-soled Herakles merely left his two-cubit long footprint (bhvmati … e[sti de; 
to; mevgaqoß divphcu / footprint two cubits in size) in the living rock in Scythia (iv.82). The 
Persian Artachaees, who was remarkable in part for his large size (megavqeiv te mevgiston ejovnta 
Persevwn (ajpo; ga;r pevnte phvcewn basilhivwn ajpevleipe tevsseraß daktuvlou") / in size he was 
the largest of the Persians (for he was four fingers short of five royal cubits in height), was 
worshipped by the people of Acanthus as a hero (touvtw/ de; tw/§ jArtacaivh/ quvousi jAkavnqioi ejk 
qeopropivou wJ" h{rwi / by oracular command the Acanthians sacrifice to Artachaees as if her 
were a hero - vii.117.2).  
27 Herodotos describes Philippos as the most handsome man of his time and that because of this 
beauty he won from Egestans a hero shrine (ejwvn te jOlumpionivkh" kai; kavvllisto" JEllhvnwn tw§n 
katæ eJwutovn. dia; de; to; eJwutou§ kavllo" hjneivkato para; jEgestaivwn ta; oujdei;" a[llo": ejpi; ga;r 
tou§ tavfou aujtou§ hJrwvion iJdrusavmenoi qusivh/si aujto;n iJlavskontai. / he was an Olympic victor 
and the most handsome of all the Greeks of his time. On account of his beauty he achieved from 
the Egestans that which no other man had: building a heroon above his tomb they propiate him 
with sacrifices - v.47.1-2). 
28 ix.22.2 and Iliad vi.232-5.  
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xiv.493).29 Masistios, then, through his physical attributes, armor, and even his 
death, casts an epic shadow. 
 
Cithaeron (ix.20 – 25.3) 
Herodotos centers the first part of the logos on this heroic figure. In the 
sequence of events that unfold upon the foothills of Cithaeron from ix.20 until 
the beginning of the debate at 25.3, Masistios plays a central role in each section: 
the battle between the Persians and the Megarians/Athenians (IA: ix.20-22.2); the 
battle for Masistios' corpse (IB: ix.22.3-ix.25.1); and the movement of the Greek 
camp to the bank of the Asopus river (IC: ix.25.2-ix.25.3).  
The presence of Masistios and his steed frames the initial attack (IA.1) in a 
ring structure, easing the transition from a conventional to an epic battle. Ingrid 
Beck argues that ix.21.1 and 21.3 constitute a simple frame formula, bound by the 
opening and closing lines that indicate the Megarian and Athenian positions.30 
But Herodotos creates a more complex ring structure, answering the three 
opening stages of the attack with three similar stages once the Athenians relieved 
the Megarians:  
(a): Masistios on his steed with the golden bridle (i{ppon e[cwn Nhsai§on 
crusocavlinovn te kai; a[llw\" kekosmhmevnon kalw§") leads the attack 
(ix.20) 
(b): The Megarians, by chance stationed in the most vulnerable 
position, resist the Persian cavalry assault (prosevballon 
kata; tevlea) but fare poorly and send messengers to the 
                                                
29 Boedeker. 2003. pp. 20-21. 
30 Beck. 1971, p. 11 n. 37. 
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Greek generals (kata; suntucivhn de; Megareveß e[tucon 
tacqevnte" th'/ te ejpimacwvtaton h\n tou§ cwvrou pantov", kai; 
hJ provsodo" mavlista tauvth/ ejgivneto th/§ i{ppw/. 
prosballouvsh" w\n th'" i{ppou oiJ Megareve" piezovmenoi… - 
ix.21.1) 
(c): The Megarian messenger warns Pausanias that, unless 
relieved, the Megarians will abandon the position (nu§n 
te eij mhv tina" a[llou" pevmyete diadovcou" th§" 
tavxio", i[ste hJmeva" ejkleivyonta" th;n tavxin. oJ me;n 
dh; sfi tau§ta ajphvggelle… - ix.21.2-3) 
(c'): The Athenian volunteers step forward to replace the 
Megarians (Pausanivh" de; ajpepeira'to tw'n  JEllhvnwn 
ei[ tine" ejqevloien a[lloi ejqelontai; ijevnai te ej" to;n 
cw'ron tou'ton kai; tavssesqai diavdocoi Megareu'si. 
ouj boulomevnwn de; tw§n a[llwn jAqhvai§oi uJpedevxanto - 
ix.21.3) 
(b'): The Athenians are stationed before the other Greeks (oiJ pro; 
tw'n a[llwn tw'n pareovntwn  JEllhvnwn ej"  jEruqra;" 
tacqevnte") and face the Persian cavalry assault 
(prosballouvsh" th'" i{ppou kata; tevlea - ix.22.1) 
(a'): Leading the charge Masistios' horse rears up and throws its rider (oJ 
Masistivou proevcwn tw§n a[llwn i{ppo" bavlletai toxeuvmati ta; 
pleurav, ajlghvsa" de; i{stataiv te ojrqo;" kai; ajposeivetai to;n 
Masivstion:). An Athenian then kills Masistios despite the 
protection of his golden armor (ejnto;" qwvrhka ei\ce cruvseon 
lepidwtovn - ix.22.1-2) 
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Herodotos uses the embedded sequence to move from one topic (the Megarians) 
to the next (the Athenians).31 The historian marks each step of the action with dev, 
highlighting the symmetry of the comparison. He omits the use of mevn until the 
center of the structure at ix.21.2-3. There, Herodotos concludes the Megarian 
speech and turns to Pausanias' request for help from the other Greeks (ix.23.1). 
He augments the transitional nature of the mevn-dev with dhv, frequently used to 
formulate transitions in Herodotos (and other historians),32 to mark the shift from 
the Megarian (c) to the Athenian (c') half of the ring structure. At the center of the 
structure he contrasts the Megarian threat to abandon the position with Athenian 
willingness to defend it (c/c'). This contrast rests within a further comparison of 
the Megarian and Athenian defensive positions. Whereas Herodotos depicts the 
Megarian position as accidental and vulnerable (kata; suntucivhn … tacqevnte" 
th'/ te ejpimacwvtaton), the Athenians intentionally manned the position before 
their fellow Greeks like some promachos (oiJ pro; tw'n a[llwn … JEllhvnwn … 
tacqevnte") against similar Persian assaults (prosevballon kata; tevlea / 
prosballouvsh" th'" i{ppou kata; tevlea) (b/b').  
As he develops this ring structure, Herodotos changes the character of the 
battle from conventional to epic. The historian frames the transformation of the 
battle with twin references to Masistios. He places both the Persian commander's 
horse, adorned with a golden bridle, and the commander himself, wearing a 
                                                
31 For a general study of Herodotos’ use of ring-composition in transitions see Slings. 2002, pp. 71-
72. 
32 Denniston. 1934, p. 258. 
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golden thorax (crusocavlinovn /qwvrhka … cruvseon lepidwtovn) at the head of 
the first assault and at its end (a/a'). The appearance of Masistios at the start of 
the Persian assault and at the forefront of the battle facing the Athenians 
facilitates what Beck characterizes as a Rückverweise.33 The correspondence of 
material (gold) and purpose (martial) between the bridle and the breastplate 
augments the connection between a and a'. The description of horse and rider in 
each instance, however, is incomplete. Although Herodotos names Masistios as 
the cavalry commander at the beginning, he lavishes descriptive detail upon his 
Nisean steed instead. The image of a large Persian, mounted upon a 
magnificently outfitted horse, provides an unfinished face for the Persian assault 
(to;n {Ellhne" Makivstion kalevousi, i{ppon e[cwn Nhsai§on crusocavlinovn te 
kai; a[llw" kekosmhmevnon kalw§" /whom the Greeks called Makistios, having a 
Nisean horse with a golden bridle and otherwise excellently outfitted - ix.20). 
Herodotos completes the picture at the moment of Masistios' death during the 
Persian withdrawal. He shifts from using the imperfect, used to narrate the bulk 
of the Persian attack, to the present tense, giving the death of Masistios greater 
animation and impact.34 At the same time the historian alters his description of 
the Persian protagonist, removing his Persian clothes from the view of the 
audience and unveiling Masistios' golden, heroic, armor (ejnto;" qwvrhka ei\ce 
cruvseon lepidwtovn, katuvperqe de; tou' qwvrhko" kiqw'na foinivkeon ejnededuvkee 
/underneath he had a thorax of golden scales, and over the thorax he had put on 
                                                
33 Beck. 1971, pp. 8-9. Beck argues that Herodotos can create an association between two passages 
by a similar (not repeated) appearance (or personality). 
34 Flower and Marincola 2002, p. 142. 
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a purple chiton - ix.22.2). The effect is dramatic. Herodotos transforms Masistios 
with his sudden change in appearance, his position before his men like a 
promachos (proevcwn tw'n a[llwn), and his death.35 This change in the aspect of the 
Persian protagonist alters the nature of the battle from conventional to epic. The 
historian begins the battle with a conventional Masistios attacking the timorous 
Megarians. He then replaces the latter with the Athenians, whom he locates 
before the Greeks like a promachos against the now-heroic Masistios. 
After Masistios has fallen, Herodotos continues the heroic characterization 
as an organizing principle of the logos. In an allusion to the fate of many fallen 
epic figures such as Patroklos, the historian strips Masistios' corpse of its armor 
and focuses the next section (IB) on the struggle for his corpse (ix.22.3 – ix.25.1). 
He rapidly transforms the Persian into a corpse (nekro;ß). Falling from his horse 
and dying (e[pese te kai; ajpevqane) at the end of ix.22.2, Masistios' body 
presumably ended up in Athenian hands. The historian arranges the subsequent 
narrative as a series of actions centered on (or aiming at) possession of this object. 
He claims that the discovery of their commander's loss (ou[te ga;r pesovnta min 
ei\don ajpo; tou' i{ppou ou[te ajpoqnhvskonta) drove the Persian attempt (IB.1) to 
recover his corpse: 
ou[te ga;r pesovnta min ei\don ajpo; tou' i{ppou ou[te ajpoqnh/vskonta 
… maqovnte" de; to; gegonov", diakeleusavmenoi h[launon tou;" 
i{ppou" pavnte", wJ" a]n to;n ge nekro;n ajneloivato. 
 
For they neither saw that he fell from his horse nor that he was 
killed … but learning what had happened, passing the word to one 
                                                
35 Boedeker. 2003, pp. 20-21. 
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another they all advanced, so that they might recover his body. 
(ix.22.3) 
 
Herodotos centers the battle upon the body (mavch ojxeva peri; tou§ nekrou§ 
givnetai / a fierce battle broke out over the body - ix.23.1), which the Athenians, 
fighting alone, had to abandon (eJssou§ntov te pollo;n kai; to;n nekro;n 
ajpevleipon / they were being soundly defeated and they lost possession of the 
body - ix.23.2). The arrival of the Greek army to the Athenians' aid, however, 
frustrated the Persian attempt to carry off the corpse (oujdev sfi ejxegevneto to;n 
nekro;n ajnelevsqai / but they were not able to carry away the body) and 
compelled their retreat (ix.23.2). Possession of Masistios' corpse remains the focal 
point as Herodotos transfers the narrative's focus from the Persian to the Greek 
camps in a mevn/dev structure. He contrasts the Persian reaction to their loss of the 
corpse (oiJ mevn nun bavrbaroi trovpw/ tw/§ sfetevrw/ ajpoqanovnta ejtivmwn 
Masivstion / On the one hand the barbarians honored the fallen Masistios 
according to their custom) with the Greek possession of it (oiJ de; {Ellhne" … 
ejqavrshsan pollw/§ ma§llon /On the other hand the Greeks … were greatly 
encouraged - IB.2 - ix. 25.1). Herodotos completes the transition with the Greek 
display of the corpse (kai; prw§ta me;n ejß a{maxan ejsqevnteß to;n nekro;n para; 
ta;ß tavxiß ejkovmizon: / Placing the body on a cart they paraded it through the 
ranks - ix.25.1). As with the initial Persian assault, Masistios occupies a central 
position in the battle, which, upon his death devolves into a general melee for his 
corpse that ends with the Greek capture of his remains. 
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Herodotos moves the focus from Masistios with the movement of the 
Greek camp. Crossing what has been previously identified as the end of the 
Masistios Logos at ix.25.1,36 he links the events at Cithaeron (I) to the 
Tegean/Athenian debate (II). The historian forms and breaks the ranks of the 
Greek army near one corpse at Cithaeron only to reform their ranks near the 
sanctuary of another heroic figure at the Asopus, framing the selection of and the 
movement to the new camp. The narrative structure also redirects the focus 
away from Masistios' corpse to other images of the heroic dead: 
a. The corpse of Masistios, borne on a cart, was carried through the ranks 
of the Greek army (kai; prw§ta me;n ej" a{maxan ejsqevnte" to;n 
nekro;n para; ta;" tavxi" ejkovmizon - 25.1). 
b. The Greek army broke ranks to view the heroic corpse (tw§n de; 
ei{neka kai; tau§ta ejpoiveun: ejklipovnte" ta;" tavxi" ejfoivtwn 
qehsovmenoi Masivstion - 25.1). 
c. The Greeks considered moving down from Cithaeron 
towards Plataea (meta; de; e[doxev sfi ejpikatabh'nai 
ej" Plataiav": - 25.2). 
c'. The spot near Gargaphia, seeming best, was chosen (ej" 
tou'ton dh; to;n cw'ron … e[doxev sfi creo;n ei\nai 
ajpikevsqai kai; diatacqevnta" stratopedeuvesqai - 
25.2) 
b'. Taking up their arms (ajnalabovnte" de; ta; o{pla) the Greeks 
moved from the foothills of Cithaeron to Plataea, taking up 
station near Gargaphia and the tomb of the hero 
Androkrates (ajpikovmenoi de; ejtavssonto kata; e[qnea 
                                                
36 Flower and Marincola, 2002, pp. 138-139. 
 
152 
plhsivon th'" te krhvnh" th'" Gargafivh" kai; tou' temevneo" 
tou' jAndrokravteo" tou' h{rwo" - 25.3). 
a'. There, in ranks, the Tegeans and Athenians began a debate (ejnqau'ta ejn 
th'/ diatavxi ejgevneto lovgwn pollw'n wjqismo;" Tegehtevwn te kai; 
jAqhnaivwn - 26.1) 
Herodotos organizes the passage with an extended mevn/dev structure. Beginning 
with the Greek review of Masistios' corpse (mevn), the narrative follows the Greeks 
as they broke ranks (dev), considered a change of camp (dev), selected the spot near 
Gargaphia (dhv), and finally took up their arms (dev) and arrived (dev) near the 
temenos of Androkrates. As with the previous ring-structure, Herodotos marks 
the central (transitional) point with dhv (c' – ix.25.2).  He divides the central 
portion into two halves: the consideration of well-watered sites and the selection 
of the spot near the spring of Gargaphia (c/c'). The historian uses the aorist form 
of dokevw (e[doxe/e[doxe) in these two sections to set them apart from the 
remainder of the structure, in which he uses the imperfect. 
Herodotos brackets the decision making process with the image of the 
Greek army breaking and then forming ranks near a heroic corpse (b/b'). He 
depicts the Greeks leaving their ranks (ejklipovnte" ta;ß tavxi") to visit (ejfoivtwn) 
Masistios’ heroic corpse (b – ix.25.1). He then reverses this sequence after the 
Greeks have selected a new location for their camp. Taking up their arms 
(ajnalabovnte" de; ta; o{pla), the Greeks arrived at the Asopus and formed ranks 
by nation (ejtavssonto kata; e[qnea) near the spring of Gargaphia and the temenos 
of the hero Androkrates (tou' temevneo" tou' jAndrokravteo" tou' h{rwo" - b' – 
 
153 
ix.25.3).  While Herodotos refers to the spring elsewhere,37 he mentions the 
temenos only here. The locations of both remain contested, but they do not appear 
to have been situated near one another.38 Admittedly, the historian may simply 
have included the double reference because of these locations' proximity to the 
battle;39 yet a structural argument should not be overlooked. The correspondence 
of movement out of and into ranks near the resting-place (honorable or not) of a 
heroic figure provides a strong connection between the interior frames of the 
ring-structure. 
Finally, Herodotos connects the outer frames of the ring structure (a/a'), 
while linking the movement of the camp to the battle at Cithaeron and the 
subsequent debate, through the proximity of the Greek army near the heroic 
dead. In the opening lines, the historian describes the Greeks as arranged in 
ranks (para; ta;ß tavxi") to view the consequence of the former conflict – the 
corpse of Masistios (a – ix.25.1). At the end, he again describes the Greeks in 
ranks (th'/ diatavxi - a' – ix.26.1). This time, however, they did not gaze upon the 
consequence of a skirmish, but ahead to the advent of another (lovgwn pollw'n 
wjqismo;"). Here wjqismo;" indicates a heated debate (as at Salamis – viii.78),40 but 
its fundamental meaning is the “battle-scrum,” the pushing of shields at the 
center of battle. Herodotos uses wjqismo;" in this sense in his narration of the 
                                                
37 ix.25.2, 49.2, 51.1, & 52. 
38 Masaracchia. 1978, p. 163 identifies Gargaphia as modern Apotripi and Androkrates' tomb near 
Plataea while Flower and Marincola 2002, pp. 146-7 identify Gargaphia as the spring now called 
Retsi and place the hero's tomb somewhere near the Greek left. The distances range from two to 
several kilometers apart. 
39 Flower and Marincola 2002, pp. 146-7 following Lazenby. 1985, pp. 223-7. Hignett. 1963, pp. 
301-11. A. R. Burn. 1962, pp. 519-22. 
40 Flower and Marincola 2002, pp. 147-8. 
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battle of Thermopylae to describe the struggle for the body of Leonidas 
(vii.225.1), a passage that scholars have compared to the fight for the corpse of 
Patroklos in Iliad xvii.41 The term, therefore, evokes associations not only with the 
Greek debate at Salamis, but also with other Greek struggles for possession of 
corpses of the heroic dead. While the historian describes a verbal rather than a 
martial contest, then, he retains the imagery of heroic combat and corpses. 
Thus, Herodotos centers the Cithaeron narrative upon Masistios. First as a 
living participant and then as a corpse, the Persian commander is the focal point 
of the action. Living, he led the Persian horsemen’s charge and appeared before 
their ranks as they retreated. In his description of the Persian withdrawal, 
Herodotos shifts the tone of the battle from conventional to heroic. He 
emphasizes the heroic features of Masistios and replaces the conventional 
Megarians with Athenians, who fought as promachoi. In a manner reminiscent of 
the Iliad, he describes the death of Masistios and the struggle for his body, which 
became the focus of the next phase of the battle. Finally, Herodotos moves the 
victorious Greeks, who, like their Achaean forebears, marveled at their dead foe, 
from the site of one heroic body to that of another, from the foothills of Cithaeron 
to the plains of Plataea. 
 
The Tegean/Athenian Debate (ix.26.1 – 27.6) 
                                                
41 Masaracchia 1978, p. 162. And Flower and Marincola. 2002, pp. 143-144. The fight between the 
Greeks and Persians for possession of the cavalry commander's corpse also follows the general 
description of heroic corpse battles throughout the Iliad (cf. the battle over the body of Sarpedon 
xvi.550-680 and the battle for Amphimachos xiii.180-212) see also Boedeker. 2001, p. 122. 
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Although the movement of the camp and the shift from a physical to 
verbal struggle appears to provide a break in the narrative, Herodotos 
perpetuates the theme of heroic death and corpses, and thereby maintains the 
unity of the logos, in the Tegean/Athenian debate (II). Engaged in a sharp 
struggle (wjqismov") for a new prize, a place of honor in the Greek battle line, the 
protagonists drew upon heroic deeds (and heroic death) to prove their worth. 
The Tegeans claimed the honored place in the battle line in consideration of 
deeds both ancient and recent, but focused the bulk of their argument upon the 
Heroic Age, citing their resistance to the Heraklid invasion as proof of their 
martial prowess (IIA). Herodotos arranges the argument in a ring structure, 
which includes allusions and references to heroic death. 42 
a) The Tegeans claim that they are worthy of the position in the battle line 
( JJHmei§ß aijeiv kote ajxieuvmeqa tauvthß th§ß tavxio" …- ix.26.2) 
(b) After the death of Eurystheus the Heraklids attempted to invade 
the Peloponnese (ejpeivte JHraklei§dai ejpeirw§nto meta; to;n 
Eujrusqevoß qavnaton katiovnteß ejß Pelopovnnhson. - ix.26.2) 
(c) Specific Tegean claim to the honor based upon this past deed 
(tovte euJrovmeqa tou'to dia; prh'gma toiovnde. - ix.26.3) 
                                                
42 Beck 1971, p. 83 identifies ix.26.1-7 as a double ring structure (see below), but only the first ring 
will be examined in this section. 
 First Ring 
(a) JJHmei§ß aijeiv kote ajxieuvmeqa tauvthß th§ß tavxioß. 
  (b) tovte euJrovmeqa tou'to dia; prh'gma toiovnde. 
   (c) ejpei; meta; jAcaiw'n … 
  (b') ejk touvtou tou' e[rgou euJrovmeqa … tou' kevreo" tou' eJtevrou aijei;  
hJgemoneuvein 
(a') tou' de; eJtevrou fame;n ej" hJmeva" iJknevesqai hJgemoneuvein 
Second Ring 
cwriv" te touvtou … e[rgou ajxionikovteroi eijmen jAqhnaivwn … e[cein 
 polloi; me;n ga;r kai; eu\ e[conte" 
ou{tw w\n divkaion hJmeva" e[cein to; e{teron kevra" h[ per jAqhnaivou": 
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(d) The Tegeans helped the Achaeans and Ionians defend the 
Isthmus of Corinth (ejpei; meta; jAcaiw'n kai; jIwvnwn … 
ej" to;n jIsqmo;n iJzovmeqa ajntivoi toi'si katiou'si - 
ix.26.3) 
(e) The Heraklids proposed a duel instead of a battle 
(tovte w\n lovgo" {Ullon ajgoreuvsasqai wJ" 
creo;n ei[h … tou'tovn oiJ mounomach'sai ejpi; 
diakeimevnoisi. - ix.26.3) 
(e') The Peloponnesians accepted the proposal (e[doxev 
te toi'si Peloponnhsivoisi tau'ta ei\nai 
poihteva … mh; zhth'sai kavtodon ej" 
Pelopovnnhson - ix.26.4) 
(d') The Tegean king Echemos volunteered to fight 
(proskrivqh … ejqelonth;" [Ecemo" oJ jHerovpou … 
ejw;n kai; basileu;" hJmevtero" - ix.26.5)  
(b') Echemos fought and defeated Hyllos (the Heraklid champion) 
(kai; ejmounomavchsev te kai; ajpevkteine {Ullon - ix.26.5) 
(c') Specific Tegean claim of the honor restated (ejk touvtou tou' 
e[rgou euJrovmeqa … tou' kevreo" tou' eJtevrou aijei; 
hJgemoneuvein - ix.26.5) 
(a') Tegean claim to the battle line restated (tou' de; eJtevrou fame;n ejß 
hJmeva" iJknevesqai hJgemoneuvein - ix.26.5). 
Framing the logos with general and specific Tegean claims, Herodotos begins, 
and ends the Tegean speech with the deaths of two figures of the Heroic Age: 
Eurystheus (b) and Hyllos (b'). Eurystheus recalls Herakles, the greatest Greek 
hero, and his death (b) immediately precedes the first specific Tegean claim of 
their worthy deeds (c). In a similar pairing, the reiterated claim (c') follows the 
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death of Hyllos (b'). The speech culminates in a proposed mounomacevw, a heroic 
duel that comes nearly at the end of the Heraklid proposal (e) and immediately 
precedes the Peloponnesian acceptance (e'). Centering both the invasion and 
Tegean argument upon the duel, Herodotos once again places a heroic corpse 
(Hyllos) at the center of his narrative. 
Heroic combat and death remains a central issue in the Athenian response 
(IIB). Once again Herodotos employs a ring structure, but it lacks a single focal 
point. Instead the question of who are crh§stoi frames a consideration of a series 
of heroic Athenian deeds first of the distant past and then of more recent 
memory:43 
(a) The Athenians have always been crh§stoi (ajnagkaivw" hJmi'n e[cei 
dhlw'sai pro;" uJmeva" o{qen hJmi'n patrwviovn ejsti ejou'si crhstoi'si 
aijei; prwvtoisi ei\nai ma'llon h] jArkavsi. - ix.27.1) 
(b) Athenian participation in the Heraklid invasion (ix.27.2) 
(b) Athenian recovery of the corpse of Polynikes (ix.27.3) 
(b) Athenian repulse of the Amazonian invasion (ix.27.4) 
(b) Athenian participation in the Trojan War (ix.27.4) 
(a) People change over time, thus there is little profit in recounting ancient 
deeds (ajllæ ouj gavr ti proevcei touvtwn ejpimemnh'sqai: kai; ga;r 
a]n crhstoi; tovte ejovnte" wJutoi; nu'n a]n ei\en flaurovteroi, kai; 
tovte ejovnte" flau'roi nu'n a]n ei\en ajmeivnone". palaiw'n mevn nun 
e[rgwn a{li" e[stw: - ix.27.4-5) 
(b) The Battle of Marathon (ix.27.5-6) 
                                                
43 Beck 1971, p. 60. 
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(a) Wherever the Athenians are positioned they will try to be crh§stoi 
(pavnth/ ga;r tetagmevnoi peirhsovmeqa ei\nai crhstoiv. ejxhgevesqe 
de; wJ" peisomevnwn. - ix.27.6) 
The speaker cited both Athenian participation in the Heraklid invasion and their 
repulse of the Amazons (ix.27.2 and 4). These heroic combats bracket a struggle 
akin to the battle for the corpse of Masistios. In ix.27.3 the speaker recalled the 
Athenian campaign against the Thebans to secure the proper burial of Polynikes 
and the Seven Against Thebes: 
tou§to de; jArgeivou" tou;" meta; Poluneivkeo" ejpi; Qhvba" 
ejlavsanta", teleuthvsanta" to;n aijw'na kai; ajtavfou" keimevnou", 
strateusavmenoi ejpi; tou;" Kadmeivou" ajnelevsqai te tou;" nekrou;" 
fame;n kai; qavyai th'" hJmetevrh" ejn jEleusi'ni.  
 
Next, we say that when the Argives with Polyneikes marched 
against Thebes and dying remained unburied, we campaigned 
against the Cadmeans to recover the bodies and buried them in our 
own land at Eleusis.  (ix.27.3)  
 
In this previously unrecorded version of the myth, the Athenians entered battle 
to "take up" (ajnairevw) the corpse of a fallen warrior similar to the Persian 
counter-attack at ix.22.3.44 Throughout all of these heroic exploits, the historian 
omits any reference to a specific Athenian hero such as Theseus or Menestheus. 
As Herodotos moves the speech from the Heroic to the Historic Age, he 
perpetuates the theme of heroic combat and death. Presenting the Battle of 
Marathon in a heroic light, he describes the battle as a duel (mounomachvsanteß tw/§ 
Pevrsh/), the same term used for the fight between Hyllos and Echemos (ix.27.5). 
Filling the two speeches with tales of heroic battles, then, Herodotos shifts the 
                                                
44 nekro;n ajneloivato (ix.22.3) and to;n nekro;n ajnelevsqai (ix.23.2) 
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narrative's focus from the corpse of Masistios to heroic combat in general, and in 
doing so maintains the theme of heroic death.  
 
Catalogue and Conclusion (ix.28.1 – 31.1) 
Herodotos does not mention corpses in the catalogue (IIIA) following the 
debate, but its epic quality45 maintains the heroic theme established with the 
death of Masistios. He also brackets the catalogue with references to Masistios. 
The narrative returns to the Persian camp (IIIB) still in a state of mourning for 
their lost cavalry commander (oiJ de; ajmfi; Mardovnion bavrbaroi wJ" 
ajpekhvdeusan Masivstion / The barbarians around Mardonius finished their 
mourning of Masistios  - ix.31.1). Absent from the previous five chapters, 
seemingly ignorant of Masistios' fate, the relocation of the Greek army, and the 
debate, the Persians at last reacted and moved up to the Asopus River. As 
Herodotos describes the mustering of the Persian troops opposite the Greek 
ranks, he begins a corresponding catalogue of the Persian forces. Although he 
groups the Persian and Greek catalogues together, Herodotos nevertheless 
establishes a division between the two with the final mention of Masistios' 
corpse. He uses the final mention of the Persian as a summation, an ending point 
of a unified section. Heroic combat and corpses fade from the narrative, marking 
a break from the theme of the Masistios logos.   
 
                                                
45 Flower and Marincola 2002, p. 158. 
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Thus, Herodotos uses Masistios and heroic corpses to organize the logos 
from ix.20 to 31.1. Heroic combat and death figure prominently in nearly every 
part: the battle, the movement of the Greek camp, and the Tegean/Athenian 
debate. The historian employs Masistios, his trappings, and his corpse, in ring 
structures and as the foci of the narrative to organize the battle sequence and the 
movement of the Greek camp. He then uses references to other heroic corpses to 
move the narrative from the events at Cithaeron to the Tegean/Athenian debate. 
The use of heroic precedent in the debate perpetuates the epic setting of the logos. 
When Herodotos returns to the main battle narrative of Plataea, he frames the 
end of the Masistios logos with a final reference to the Persian’s corpse. 
 
Heroic Corpses and the Athenian Phalanx  
Linking these sections together through the recurrent appearance of heroic 
corpses and combat, Herodotos also uses the objects to foster a laudable 
presentation of the Athenian contribution to the Battle of Plataea. Through heroic 
corpses in particular, the historian alludes to famous scenes from the Iliad. 
Herodotos commonly echoes the language (and to a lesser degree the imagery) of 
the epic poem in an effort to magnify the meaning of a passage with an economy 
of language.46 Whereas previous work has noted in particular the historian's 
echoing of Homeric speech or use of metaphor, the function of an object as a 
repository and transmitter of meaning must not be overlooked. Placing 
meaningful objects in an analogous setting, such as the struggle for a heroic 
                                                
46 Huber. 1965, pp. 32-33. 
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corpse on the battlefield, creates not merely an allusion to a passage in epic, but 
also evokes the values and roles for the attendant scene and characters.  Hence, 
when Herodotos places the Athenians over the body of the heroic Masistios, he 
creates an analogy between their actions and those of heroic figures seeking to 
despoil the body of a slain enemy. In doing so, the historian presents the 
Athenians in the role of a collective heroic figure. 
Herodotos advances this message in the first two sections of the logos. 
First, he recreates the oft-repeated Homeric episode of single combat and the 
struggle over the corpse of a fallen foe.47 In the ultimate viewing of Masistios' 
corpse, the historian emulates elements of the Achaean honoring of Patroklos 
and the examination and return of Hektor's corpse. Next, in the debate he 
replaces the traditional Athenian heroes Theseus and Menestheus with the 
Athenian troops, again placing them in the position of heroes. Finally, in the 
catalog, the historian completes the praise of Athens by emphasizing the number 
of Athenian hoplites present at the battle. He shows that they brought not only 
the best (heroic) troops, but the most as well.48 
 
Cithaeron 
 As previously discussed, Herodotos uses Masistios, his trappings, and his 
corpse to create allusions to the Iliad in the first section of this logos. In this 
context the historian presents the Athenians first as an epic promachos, fighting 
                                                
47 Cf. Fenik. 1968, passim. Fenik identifies the recurring elements in Homeric battle scenes that 
center upon corpses. 
48 Konstan. 1987, pp. 66-67. Herodotos makes a related point at the Battle of Thermopylae 
between people (a[nqrwpoi) and men (a[ndre"). 
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alone for their fellow Greeks at Cithaeron, then as a hero similar to Menelaos, 
struggling to retain control of Masistios' corpse. Finally, while he does not single 
them out at the viewing of the Persian's body, Herodotos' transformation of 
Masistios into Hektor implicitly places the Athenians into the role of Achilles. 
As shown in the previous section (pp. 140-142), Herodotos arranges the 
opening phases of the battle at Cithaeron in a ring structure, framed by the 
Persian cavalry commander, who transforms the nature of the battle from 
conventional to heroic.49 Herodotos uses this change to contrast the Megarians 
and Athenians and to characterize the latter as a collective epic hero. Initially, the 
Megarians bore the brunt of the conventional Persian cavalry charges “since by 
change they held the most vulnerable position” (kata; suntucivhn de; Megareve" 
e[tucon tacqevnte" th'/ te ejpimacwvtaton h\n tou' cwvrou pantov" - ix.21.1). 
“Alone the Megarians were unable to withstand the Persians” (ouj dunatoiv eijmen 
th;n Persevwn i{ppon devkesqai mou'noi) and threatened to abandon their position 
(ix.21.2). Herodotos changes the battle from conventional to an epic mounomachia, 
when he states that of all the Greeks only the Athenians volunteered to take the 
Megarians’ place: 
… Pausanivh" de; ajpepeira§to tw§n JEllhvnwn ei[ tine" ejqevloien 
a[lloi ejqelontai; ijevnai te ej" to;n cw'ron tou'ton kai; tavssesqai 
                                                
49 Ring structure of initial Cithaeron engagement: 
(a): Masistios leads the cavalry attack (ix.20). 
(b): The Megarians stationed in the most vulnerable position resist the Persian cavalry assault 
but fare poorly (ix.21.1). 
(c): The Megarian speech threatening to abandon the position (ix.21.2). 
(c'): The Athenian volunteers step forward to replace the Megarians (ix.21.3). 
(b'): The Athenians are stationed before the other Greeks and face the Persian cavalry assault 
(ix.22.1). 
(a'): Masistios is unhorsed and killed by the Athenians (ix.22.1-2). 
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diavdocoi Megareu'si. ouj boulomevnwn de; tw'n a[llwn  jAqhnai'oi 
uJpedevxanto kai;  jAqhnaivwn oiJ trihkovsioi logavde"…  
 
Pausanias asked if any other Greeks would be willing to volunteer 
and to go to that position and to relieve the Megarians. While the 
others were not willing the Athenians accepted and three hundred 
picked men … (ix.21.3) 
 
They took up their position before the Greek army like an epic promachos (oiJ pro; 
tw'n a[llwn tw'n pareovntwn  JEllhvnwn ej"  jEruqra;" tacqevnte" / They were 
stationed at Erythrai in front of the other Greeks - ix.22.1).50  Moreover, like many 
epic promachoi, an archer, or here rather a set of archers (tou;" toxovta"), 
accompanied the heroic spearmen into battle (ix.22.1).51 Herodotos confirms the 
Athenian heroic stance through their opponent Masistios, who appeared at the 
forefront of the Persian attack (prosballouvsh" th'" i{ppou kata; tevlea, oJ 
Masistivou proevcwn tw'n a[llwn i{ppo" / While the cavalry attacked in 
squadrons, the horse of Masistios was keeping in front of the others – ix.22.1). 
The confrontation of two champions, standing before their respective hosts, 
recalls the mounomachic combats of the Iliad. 
 Presenting the Athenians as acting collectively, like an individual warrior, 
Herodotos enhances this heroic characterization. The historian describes the 
Megarians, whom the Athenians replaced, in a collective fashion as mounoi 
(ix.21.2). In the logos, Herodotos never applies the term mounos to a single person, 
but rather to groups cast into the role of an individual. Thus, as the Athenians 
relieved the Megarians, they implicitly manned the position of a collective acting 
                                                
50 Flower and Marincola 2002, p. 142. 
51 The most notable pair in the Iliad is Telemonian Aias and Teucros, who repeatedly fight 
together as spearman and archer (viii.266f; xii.378ff; xv.442ff; et al.). 
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as one. Although the historian identifies the Athenian commander as 
Olympiodorus (ix.21.3), he otherwise does not single out any individual. He 
credits an unnamed Athenian with striking Masistios in the eye and killing him, 
even though he normally records the man’s name for such exploits.52 This 
anonymity contributes to the collective nature of the Athenians; for, as fitting for 
a democracy, the man could have been any one of them. The historian further 
blurs the distinction between individual and collective in his description of the 
Athenian phalanx’s actions. He predominantly uses verbs in the third person 
plural and plural participles to describe the Athenians even when the action 
cannot rightly be attributed to all of them. They seized Masistios' horse and killed 
him (tovn te dh; i{ppon aujtou' lambavnousi kai; aujto;n ajmunovmenon kteivnousi - 
ix.22.2). At first beating upon Masistios' thorax, they accomplished nothing 
(tuvptonte" de; ej" to;n qwvrhka ejpoiveun oujdevn - ix.22.2). When the Athenians 
saw the mass charge of the Persian cavalry, they summoned aid from the rest of 
the Greek army (ijdovnteß … th;n a[llhn stratih;n ejpebwvsanto - ix.23.1). The last 
is in sharp contrast to the Megarians, who dispatched a single messenger 
(khvruka - ix.21.1). While awaiting the help of the Greek army, the three hundred 
alone were defeated and abandoned the corpse (mou§noi h\san oiJ trihkovsioi, 
eJssou§ntov te pollo;n kai; to;n nekro;n ajpevleipon - ix.23.2). As the battle with 
                                                
52 Herodotos displays considerable knowledge about the exploits of individual Athenians at 
Marathon. He describes the death of Cynegirus, whose hands were cut off as he grabbed hold of 




Masistios develops the reader no longer perceives the Athenians as a divisible 
entity. The three hundred are presented as a single warrior. 
In the battle between the Persian and Greek promachoi, Herodotos follows 
an epic pattern. Finding a part of Masistios' body unprotected by his golden 
armor, the anonymous Athenian, a representative for them all, struck his eye and 
killed the Persian hero (ix.22.2). The historian describes Masistios' splendid 
golden thorax at the moment of his death, but afterwards makes no mention of it 
when he refers to the Persian's corpse. The appearance and then absence of the 
thorax implies that the armor had been stripped from Masistios' fallen body, an 
act typical of mounomachia.  
Herodotos continues the epic pattern of the battle through the subsequent 
struggle for Masistios' corpse. Scholars have typically noted this battle's 
resemblance to the battle for Patroklos' corpse,53 but such a specific correlation 
cannot be sustained. Instead, Herodotos models the battle upon the general four-
step pattern of epic combat over the heroic dead: hostile seizure, valiant defense, 
withdrawal, and counter-attack. For the battle over the corpse of Patroklos, the 
poet repeats the pattern of Trojan attack, Achaean defense, withdrawal and 
counter attack, four times.54 Herodotos replicates the pattern, omitting only the 
use of a rebuke to stir the heroes to action.55 Moreover, the Athenians held the 
corpse of an enemy, not a comrade, and their actions can be viewed less as an 
                                                
53 Masaracchia 1978, p. 162. Flower and Marincola 2002, pp. 143-144. and Boedeker 2003, pp. 20-
21. 
54 Fenik. 1968, pp. 159-160. 
55 In Fenik’s typology, the rebuke is an integral part of the pattern, but in three cases it is 
delivered by a god. Since Herodotos does not include the gods as characters within his narrative 
the omission of the rebuke is explicable.   
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attempt to rescue the body than as an attempt to capture the spoils of battle. In 
typical epic fashion, the Athenians initially possessed the corpse (ix.22.2). Next, 
the Persians attacked to retrieve the body (diakeleusavmenoi h[launon tou;" 
i{ppou" pavnte", wJ" a]n tovn ge nekro;n ajneloivato /Signaling to one another they 
all advanced on their horses so that they might recover the body - ix.22.3), which 
they did after a sharp struggle (ix.23.2). Despite the victory, however, the 
Persians were unable to carry off the corpse of their fallen leader. Although the 
act of retrieving a single body would have been simple for a large group of men 
such as the Persians, Herodotos maintains the passage's epic milieu and denies 
possession to either side until the Greeks completely routed the enemy. 
The Athenians, meanwhile, move to the third stage of this type of epic 
combat. Facing the Persian onslaught alone the Athenians withdrew (e{wß mevn 
nun mou§noi h\san oiJ trihkovsioi, eJssou§ntov te pollo;n kai; to;n nekro;n 
ajpevleipon /While the three hundred were alone they got the worst of it by far 
and lost the body - ix.23.2). Like many epic figures, when the action became too 
heated for the lone promachos between the battle lines, they moved back towards 
the safety of their own ranks.56 When Telemonian Aias and Teucer drive 
Sarpedon back from a breach in the Achaean wall, he calls to his fellow Lycians 
for help (Iliad xii.406f). Similarly, after repelling some Trojan assaults to seize 
Patroklos' body, Menelaos is forced to abandon his comrade's corpse and armor, 
believing that alone (mou§noß) he cannot fight Hektor and the Trojans (Iliad 17.91-
                                                
56 cf. Iliad iii.32f (Paris withdraws before Menelaos); iv.535f (after killing Peiros, Thoas of Aetolia 
withdraws before the advancing Thracians); xiii.164f (after failing to kill Deiphobus, Meriones 
shrinks back into the throng of his comrades); et al. 
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94). The hero's withdrawal recalls the Athenian inability to resist the full Persian 
onslaught while fighting alone (mou§noi - ix.23.2). Menelaos and the Athenians 
resolve the battle in the same manner as well. The hero calls to his fellow 
Achaeans for help (Iliad 17.656 and 665-6) and the Athenians summoned the rest 
of the Greek army: 
wJ" dev sfi to; plh§qo" ejpebohvqhse, ou{tw dh; oujkevti oiJ iJppovtai 
uJpevmenon, oujdev sfi ejxegevneto to;n nekro;n ajnelevsqai  
 
When the rest of the army came to their aid, then the enemy cavalry 
no longer held their ground, and they were unable to bear away the 
body. (ix.23.2) 
 
Admittedly the adversarial relationship between the Athenians and the Persian 
cavalry commander differs from that of the relationship between Menelaos and 
Patroklos. But the stages of the battle correspond to the general pattern of epic 
combat.  
After the battle, Herodotos maintains the epic tone through the Greek 
treatment of Masistios' corpse (ix.25f). At first, the mustering of the Greeks in 
ranks to review the Persian body seems to recall the Myrmidonian review of 
Patroklos' corpse:  
kai; prw§ta me;n ej" a{maxan ejsqevnte" to;n nekro;n para; ta;" tavxi" 
ejkovmizon:  
 
And first placing the body in a cart they carried it through the 
ranks; (ix.25.1) 
 
Murmidovne" tacuvpwloi, ejmoi; ejrivhre" eJtai'roi, 
mh; dev pw uJpæ o[cesfi luwvmeqa mwvnuca" i{ppou", 
ajllæ aujtoi'" i{ppoisi kai a{rmasin a\sson ijovnte"  




Myrmidons of the fast horses, my faithful companions, 
we must not yet lose our single-foot horses from our chariots, 
but driving close with these same horses and chariots let us 
mourn him… (Iliad xxiii.6-9) 
 
Such a reading, however, creates a sudden alteration of the corpse from a fallen 
foe to a fallen friend. Instead, the passage more closely recalls the aftermath of 
Hektor's death in Iliad xxiii and xxiv. Like the Trojans, the Persians mourned the 
loss of a hero whose body they had failed to recover (Iliad xxiii.1). In contrast, 
Herodotos presents the Greeks like the Achaeans, who possessed the corpse of 
their feared enemy (Hdt. ix.25.1; Iliad xxiii.2f respectively). When the timorous 
Achaeans approach the now dead Hektor they take heart in the sight and marvel 
at the size and beauty of his corpse:  
a[lloi de; perivdramon ui|e" jAcaiw'n, 
oi} kai; qhhvsanto fuh;n kai; ei\do" ajghto;n 
 {Ektoro": oujdæ a[ra oi{ ti" ajnouthtiv ge parevsth. 
w|de dev ti" ei[pesken ijdwvn ej" plhsivon a[llon: 
w] povpoi, h\ mavla dh; malakwvtero" ajmfafavasqai  
 {Ektwr, h] o{te nh§a" ejnevprhsen puri; khlevw/.  
 
And the other sons of the Achaians came running about him, 
and they gazed upon the stature and on the imposing beauty 
of Hektor; and no one was present without inflicting a wound; 
and looking at each other they would thus:  
“See now, Hektor is much softer to handle 
than when he burned the ships with the blazing fire. 
(Iliad xxii.369-374) 
 
At Cithaeron, the Greeks responded similarly. Like their forebears, they found 
encouragement in the death of the Persian (ejqavrshsan), whose race they 
regarded with considerable fear.57 This fear provides another link between 
                                                
57 In particular, Herodotos ascribes considerable fear of the Persians to the Spartans and 
Peloponnesians during the Salamis campaign. In the period leading up to the decision at Salamis 
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Masistios and Hektor. While the Greeks feared the Persians (not just one 
Persian), the death of Masistios greatly alleviated this fear. Similarly, Hektor 
consistently instills fear in the Achaeans and his death removes the great burden 
of this fear. The Greeks moved forward to view the corpse (ejfoivtwn qehsovmenoi 
Masivstion), whose size and beauty they admire (qevhß a[xioß megavqeoß ei{neka 
kai; kavlleoß: - ix.25.1). Advancing, they admired the same characteristics the 
Achaeans first note when they view Hektor's body. Finally, Herodotos places the 
body on a cart (a{maxan - ix.25.1), thereby strengthening the connection between 
the Persian corpse and the body of Hektor in Iliad twenty-four; for Priam uses the 
same type of vehicle to bear his son's body from the tent of Achilles back to Troy 
(Iliad xxiv.150, 179, 189, 263, 266, 711).  
 But if Herodotos casts the Persian cavalry commander as Hektor, who 
represents Patroklos? Whom did the Athenians avenge? The presentation of 
Masistios at ix.25.1, particularly the way in which the Greeks left their ranks to 
view the corpse, recalls the Persian viewing and treatment of Leonidas. Scholars 
have noted the similarities between the contests for Leonidas and the Achaian 
battle for Patroklos.58 Hence, the Athenians achieved revenge (tivsi") for the 
                                                                                                                                            
ajrrwdevw-words appear almost entirely in the context of the Spartans or expeditions under their 
command  (ajrrwdevw (viii.63, 70.2, 74.1), katarrwdevw (vii.207), uJperarrwdevw (viii.72)) or the 
Athenians (katarrwdevw (vii.139.2, 139.6, 140.3; viii.75.2)), although in the case of the latter the 
statements usually indicate a lack of fear on the part of the Athenians (see below). In the same 
period prior to Salamis, Herodotos uses fobevw, fobov" in the context of Greeks and Persians 
(vi.112.3; vii.149, 235.3; viii.12, 27.4, 38), devo" to describe the Peloponnesians (w/ ajrrwdevw 
viii.70.2), and dei'ma, deimaivnw, prodeimaivnw, uJperdeimaivnw  primarily with the Persians or other 
Greeks (vii.50.1; viii.15, 36.1, 68g, 86. 99.2), but also to indicate Spartan fear (viii.74.1) or the 
Athenian lack of fear (vii.139.6, 140.3 or). 
58 cf. n. 53. 
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Spartan defeat at Thermopylae. The historian associates a battle-scrum (wjqismo;") 
with the famous corpses of both battles. In the case of Leonidas the struggle 
erupted over his fallen body (uJpe;r tou' nekrou' tou' Lewnivdew Persevwn te kai; 
Lakedaimonivwn wjqismo;" ejgivneto pollov" / there was a great struggle between 
the Persians and the Lacedaemonians over the body of Leonidas - vii.225.1). 
Herodotos describes a similar struggle over the corpse of Masistios and uses the 
term at the end of the movement of the camp (ix.26.1). The historian creates a 
further connection through the Persian and Greek movement to view the bodies 
of the fallen leaders. Xerxes gave his men leave to break ranks and view the 
Greek dead (including Leonidas) at Thermopylae: 
[Andre" suvmmacoi, basileu;" Xevrxh" tw'/ boulomevnw/ uJmevwn 
paradivdwsi ejklipovnta th;n tavxin kai; ejlqovnta qehvsasqai o{kw" 
mavcetai pro;" tou;" ajnohvtou" tw'n ajnqrwvpwn... 
 
Allies, king Xerxes grants leave to whoever of you wishes to break 
ranks and to go and see how he fights against madmen… (viii.24.2)  
  
The Greek army at Cithaeron also broke ranks to see the body of Masistios 
(ejkleivponte" ta;" tavxi" ejfoivtwn qehsovmenoi Masivstion - ix.25.1). The 
correspondence of terms and their order is striking. The use of ejkleivpw with 
tavxi" to precede the viewing of corpses is unique to these two passages. 
Elsewhere in the Histories it indicates men breaking ranks in battle.59 Herodotos, 
then, correlates the aftermath of Thermopylae and Cithaeron, making the 
Athenian-led victory an answer to the Spartan defeat. The killing of the Hektor 
figure (Masistios) answers the death of the Patroklos figure (Leonidas) and 
                                                
59 v.75.3; vii.219.2; vii.220.1; ix.21.2; ix.48.1; ix.57.1; ix.71.3. 
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places the slayer of the Persian cavalry commander, the Athenians, in the role of 
Patroklos' avenger: Achilles. 
Herodotos' treatment of Masistios as Hektor also signals another parallel 
to the Iliad – the end to the desecration of enemy corpses. In the Iliad, the death of 
Hektor and the mistreatment of his corpse signal the high point of violence in the 
poem.60 The mutilation of corpses, which appears only in scattered instances in 
the first two-thirds of the Iliad, steadily rises from book sixteen onward. The 
threat of the decapitation of an enemy's body becomes a constant refrain in the 
Homeric battles that only diminishes with the return of Hektor's corpse.61 
Herodotos achieves a similar result with the treatment of Masistios' body. Actual 
(rather than threatened) decapitation figures prominently in Herodotos' 
depiction of the actions of the Persians, particularly Xerxes.62  
But after the Greeks captured Masistios' corpse, they, unlike the Achaeans 
(Iliad xxii.369-375), did not mistreat it.63  By this point in the narrative, Herodotos 
has provided an honorable burial for Leonidas (vii.228). In the Iliad, the burial of 
Patroklos, while reminding the audience of how far Hektor rests from similar 
honors, suggests a balancing of the Achaean funeral with the promise of a Trojan 
funeral.64 The Greek treatment of Masistios, while not explicitly a burial, 
                                                
60 Segal. 1971, pp. 38-39. 
61 Segal 1971, pp. 18, 20-22. Segal notes that the tenor of combat in the Iliad changes from the 
promise to return an enemy's corpse, as seen in the duel between Hektor and Aias (Iliad vii), to 
something more savage. He also notes the increased reference to wild animals feasting upon the 
flesh of the dead and the desire of antagonists to eat their enemy raw. Neither theme, however, 
figures prominently in the treatment of the dead in the Histories. 
62 Xerxes decapitated the builders of the first Hellspontine bridge after it was destroyed (vii.35.3), 
Leonidas (vii.238.1), some Phoenicians after Salamis (viii.90.3), and the ship captain who brought 
the king back to Asia (viii.118.4). 
63 Flower and Marincola. 2002, p. 145. 
64 Segal. 1971, p. 48. 
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substitutes Greek honor for Persian dishonor for the dead, an image Herodotos 
reinforces when he moves the camp from the viewing of Masistios to the heroon 
of Androkrates (ix.25.2). The historian explicitly demonstrates this change in 
behavior after the Battle of Plataea. When an Aeginetan urged Pausanias to 
behead the corpse of Mardonius as revenge for Xerxes’ beheading of Leonidas, 
the Spartan general refused (ix.78.1-79.1). Pausanias regarded such an insult to a 
corpse an act better suited to the barbarians (ix.79.2). The Spartan forbade the 
Aeginetan to suggest such a proposal again and cautioned him to be thankful 
that he was not punished (ix.79.3).  
 In several ways, then, Herodotos uses Masistios, his trappings, and his 
corpse to evoke images and scenes from the Iliad. Through the person and armor 
of Masistios, the historian transforms the hoplite battle into epic combat. Then, 
he uses the Persian's corpse to emulate the struggle for a fallen hero typical of the 
Homeric war-poem. Finally, after the battle he echoes the Achaean examination 
of the fallen Hektor. Recreating elements of Homer's famous battle scenes and 
culminating in an allusion to the martial climax of the epic, Herodotos does not 
simply allude to a scene, but also imports its significance, concisely adding it to 
his own narrative. Hence, by evoking the death of Hektor, the historian also fills 
his text with the meaning of the Trojan's death – the removal of an object of fear 
and an obstacle to the Achaean war aims. Although Masistios' death was not 
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nearly so profound for the Greek war effort,65 the Greeks did overcome their fear 
of the Persians and for the first time took up a position in open territory. 
  Moreover, the epic setting colors the representation of the Athenians, 
presenting them in the role of an epic hero. Emphasizing the actions of the unit 
rather than any particular individual, Herodotos depicts the Athenians as a 
collective individual. Setting them before the Greeks, he transforms the 
Athenians into an epic promachos, who faced the heroic Masistios, slew him, and 
then fought for his corpse. Although the historian begins with a battle-scrum 
reminiscent of the many struggles for heroic corpses in the Iliad, he creates a 
more specific equation between Masistios and Hektor, implicitly placing the 
Athenians into the role of Achilles, who has avenged the death of his comrade 
Patroklos (Leonidas).  
 
The Debate 
 Herodotos continues the presentation of the Athenians as a collective hero 
in the subsequent debate (ix.26.1 – 27.6) again through their association with 
heroic death and corpses. Seeking to win the honor of manning a wing of the 
Greek army, the Tegeans and Athenians produced résumés of notable deeds 
both ancient and recent (pavlai kai; to; nevon) as evidence of their worth. Whereas 
the Tegeans focused their argument upon a lone heroic figure, Echemos, the 
Athenians cast themselves in the role of a hero both in antiquity and at 
Marathon. 
                                                
65 The Persian cavalry, particularly the Greek elements (i.e., Theban) that fought beside the 
Persians, were the only units to achieve any appreciable success at the Battle of Plataea (ix.68-69).  
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Herodotos begins the debate with the Tegeans. While he cites their claim 
that their long-standing resistance to Sparta was proof of their worth, the figure 
of the lone hero Echemos occupies most of the argument. Recalling the events of 
the first Heraklid invasion that followed the death of Eurystheus, the historian 
describes the Peloponnesian attempt to check the invasion at the Isthmus of 
Corinth. Confronted with this stout defense, the Heraklid leader, Hyllos, offered 
to fight a duel against a Peloponnesian champion to settle the issue: 
tovte w\n lovgo" {Ullon ajgoreuvsasqai wJ" creo;n ei[h to;n me;n 
strato;n tw'/ stratw'/ mh; ajnakinduneuvein sumbavllonta, ejk de; tou' 
Peloponnhsivou stratomevdou to;n a[n sfevwn aujtw'n krivnwsi ei\nai 
a[riston, tou'tovn oiJ mounomach'sai ejpi; diakeimevnoisi.   
 
Then Hyllus made a speech that there was no need for one army to 
risk attacking the other, but that they should select whoever was 
the best in the Peloponnesian camp, and that this man would fight 
him in single combat upon agreed conditions. (ix.26.3)  
 
According to the Tegeans, their king Echemos volunteered, fought Hyllos in 
single combat, and killed him (ejmounomavchsev te kai; ajpevkteine {Ullon - ix.26.5). 
As a result of this single act, the invasion was delayed for one hundred years. 
Two relevant points can be drawn from this account: first, an individual hero 
acted for the whole; second, a duel (mounomacevw) settled the issue. 
In the Athenian counter-argument, Herodotos singles out no hero for 
mention, but instead stresses the collective Athenian action in heroic situations. 
The historian lists four events from the heroic age: the Heraklid invasion, the 
burial of Polynikes, the Amazon invasion, and the Trojan War. Rather than place 
the Athenians implicitly in the role of a hero as he does in the events at 
Cithaeron, Herodotos replaces the heroes traditionally linked to these deeds with 
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collective Athenian action. As with the volunteers in ix.23.2, the Athenians acted 
alone in a collective fashion in support of the Heraklids:  
…mou'noi uJpodexavmenoi th;n Eujrusqevo" u{brin kateivlomen, su;n 
ejkeivnoisi mavch/ nikhvsante" tou;" tovte e[conta" Pelopovnnhson.  
 
Welcoming them [the Heraklids] we alone destroyed the hubris of 
Eurystheus, fighting with them against those that held the 
Peloponnese at that time. (ix.27.2) 
 
This distinction persists in the telling of the other myths. As with the Athenian 
engagement against Masistios, Herodotos employs plural verbs and participles 
to describe Athenian action. “We” campaigned against the Thebans to recover 
and bury the corpses of Polynikes and his companions: 
…strateusavmenoi ejpi; tou;" Kadmeivou" ajnelevsqai te tou;" 
nekrouv" famen kai; qavyai th'" hJmetevrh" ejn jEleusi'ni.  
 
…campaigning against the Cadmeans we recovered their bodies [of 
the Argive heroes] and buried them in our own land in Eleusis. 
(ix.27.3)66  
 
Similarly the Athenians gloried in “our” victory over the invading Amazons 
(e[sti de; hJmi'n e[rgon eu\ e[con kai; ej" jAmazonivda"… / We performed another 
fine deed against the Amazons…) and claimed that “we” did not fall short in the 
toils of the Trojan War (…kai; ejn toi'si Trwikoi'si povnoisi oujdamw'n 
ejleipovmeqa. / … even in the toils of Troy we did not fall short - ix.27.4). The 
failure to mention heroes traditionally associated with these deeds makes this 
                                                
66 The ancient Athenians are presented as acting in a manner similar to their descendants, the 




stress upon collective action more pronounced.67 Although traditionally Theseus 
appears as a central figure in the defeat of the Amazons68 and the recovery of 
Polynikes' corpse,69 Herodotos omits the hero from these accounts. When 
contrasted with the Tegean focus upon a single hero, these omissions become 
marked and significant. The Athenian speaker adopted a stance identical to his 
Tegean counterpart, but reversed the underlying message. The Athenians did not 
bask in the reflected glory of the heroic deeds of individuals, but in the glory of 
their earlier incarnations, previous phalanxes. Hence, inverting the Tegean 
paradigm of the hero acting for the collective, the historian supplants the 
individual with the Athenian phalanx. 
Herodotos maintains this presentation of the collective playing the role of 
the hero as the Athenian argument turns to a more recent event: the Battle of 
Marathon. He models the battle on the duel between Hyllos and Echemos. At 
Marathon, as at the Isthmus, the Athenians sought to repel a foreign invasion at 
its inception. Employing the same verb (mounomacevw) to describe each 
engagement the historian strengthens this similarity.70 As Echemos fought a duel 
with Hyllos (…ejmounomavchsev te kai; ajpevkteine {Ullon / he dueled and killed 
Hyllos - ix.26.5) so the Athenians fought a duel with the Persians (oi{tine" mou'noi 
                                                
67 Although a minor figure in the Iliad, Menestheos, the major Athenian hero mentioned in the 
Trojan cycle (ii.552-556), is omitted here. 
68 Harrison. 1972, pp. 356-357. Flower and Marincola 2002, p. 155. The deed was recorded on 
metopes of the Parthenon as well as paintings and sculpture in the Hephaestium and the Painted 
Stoa, where the battle was depicted alongside the Battle of Marathon. 
69 Euripides Suppliants, passim. In the play Theseus, urged by the Argive king Adrastus, leads an 
Athenian army against Thebes to secure the recovery of Polynikes' corpse. Even in the traditions 
in which persuasion rather than force is used, Theseus remains a prominent figure in the legend 
(Aeschylus Eleusinii; Plutarch Theseus 29.4). 
70 Macan 1973 (1908), p. 643 doubts the reading of mounomachvsante" in the text, but no other 
reading is proposed by the manuscripts and this reading fits the epic tone of the passage. 
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JEllhvnwn dh; mounomachvsante" tw'/ Pevrsh/… / Who alone of the Greeks dueled 
with the Persians - ix.27.5). The use of the adjective mounos strengthens the 
impression of the Athenian phalanx acting as a lone hero.71 The speaker omits the 
leadership of Miltiades and no single Athenian assumes the role of the Tegean 
Echemos' counterpart. Rather the Athenian phalanx again plays the role of the 
hero mounos.  
While detailed descriptions of heroic corpses no longer occupy center 
stage of the narrative, Herodotos continues to focus on heroic combat and death, 
making explicit connections between the actions of the ancient and modern 
Greeks. Through this presentation he maintains the image of the Athenians as a 
collective hero. Siding with the Heraklids, they implicitly defeated Echemos. 
Next, they supplanted Theseus and Menestheus in their respective deeds. 
Finally, they defeated the Persians at Marathon in an epic-style duel.  
 
The Catalogue  
 In the final section of the Logos, Herodotos abandons heroic corpses and 
combat in favor of an epic-style catalog of forces, specifically hoplites. Although 
the transition may seem strange, he moves logically from the heroic presentation 
of the Athenian phalanx at Marathon to an accounting of the various hoplites 
that composed the Greek phalanxes at Plataea. Herodotos does not simply count 
the men supplied by each polis, but rather notes the type of soldiers as well. 
                                                
71 The omission of Plataean participation at Marathon supports the presentation of the Athenians 
as a unity.  An accurate recollection of history would undermine the collective presentation of the 
Athenian phalanx acting in the role of a hero.  
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Through this selective presentation of the number and types of troops of each 
polis, the historian undercuts the significance of the Spartan contribution to the 
battle while emphasizing Athenian participation. He limits his consideration of 
significant troops to hoplites, which collectively constitute the heroic figure of 
the Athenian phalanx. 
Herodotos undercuts the traditional view, which held that the Spartans 
supplied the most men to Plataea, with a repeatedly skeptical accounting of the 
Spartiates, helots, and perioikoi. He immediately corrects the initial statement that 
the Lacedaemonians supplied ten thousand hoplites, noting, “of these only five 
thousand were Spartiates” (touvtwn de; tou;" pentakiscilivou" ejovnta" 
Spartihvta" - ix.28.2). Additionally, while he catalogs all the light-armed troops 
of all the Greek states as a whole in ix.30, he singles out the light-armed troops of 
no other polis save for the Thespians, whose lack of o{pla relegated them to this 
status, and the Spartan helots. Repeatedly mentioning the thirty five thousand 
helots "guarding" the Spartiates, the historian undercuts the appearance of 
Spartan strength and numbers. The historian distinguishes the 5,000 Spartiates 
from 5,000 other Lacedaemonians (perioikoi), noting that seven helots "watched 
over" each of the former: 
… Spartihvta" ejfuvlasson yiloi; tw'n eiJlwvtwn pentakiscivlioi 
kai; trismuvrioi, peri; a[ndra e{kaston eJpta; tetagmevnoi.  
 
… thirty-five thousand lightly armed helots guarded the Spartiates, 




The use of fulavssw suggests an inversion of the typical Spartiate/helot 
relationship in which the former watched over or guarded against the latter. 
Herodotos places the Spartiates in a position of dependency, which he 
emphasizes through subsequent repetition of the ratio.72 
 In contrast, Herodotos praises Athens as the contributor of the greatest 
number of hoplites: 
teleutai'oi de; kai; prw'toi jAqhnai'oi ejtavssonto, kevra" e[conte" 
to; eujwvnumon, ojktakiscivlioi:  
 
Last and first were stationed the eight thousand Athenians, who 
held the left wing. (ix.28.6) 
 
Although Macan asserts that “teleutai'oi de; kai; prw'toi” indicates that the 
Athenians occupied the last position in the catalog, but the first in the order of 
march,73 it more likely refers to the Athenian position in the catalog and 
contribution of hoplites to the battle. Situated at the end of the hoplite catalogue, 
after the first qualification of Spartan participation in ix.28.2, and immediately 
preceding the repetition of helot involvement in ix.29.1, the greatest contrast 
between the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks is in their contribution of the 
all-important hoplite. Such an accounting may seem at odds with the previous 
heroic characterization of the Athenians, but the number of men the Achaean 
heroes led to Troy was one characteristic of their greatness. In particular, 
Agamemnon is called the greatest king precisely because of the size of his host 
(Iliad i.280f, Thuc. i.9, et al.). The poet even notes this quality for heroes more 
                                                
72 ix.29.1 bis. 
73 Contra Macan 1978 (1908). p. 655.  
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renowned for their prowess in battle such as Achilles (Iliad xvi.168f). Hence, 
through the catalog of hoplites, whose phalanx comprises the Athenian collective 
hero, Herodotos adds to the heroic depiction of the Athenians. The Athenian 
hero was not merely a skilled warrior, but also was composed of the greatest 
(number of) men. 
 
Conclusion 
 Through the creation of repeated epic allusions centered upon heroic 
combat and corpses, then, Herodotos links the three sections of the Masistios 
logos and glorifies the Athenian contribution to the opening stages of the Plataean 
campaign. Contrary to the tradition fostered by the elegy of Simonides,74 
Herodotos supplants the Spartans by presenting the Athenians in the role of an 
epic hero. The historian begins the extended heroic allusion with the figure of 
Masistios, his armor, and his corpse. Cast opposite the Persian promachos, the 
Athenians engaged in an epic-style battle as the Greek promachos, slaying 
Masistios and then fighting for possession of his corpse. Herodotos relies upon 
both epic language and epic setting, focused upon Masistios' heroic corpse, to 
echo similar battle scenes in the Iliad. Next, he creates a more specific allusion to 
the Achaean viewing and transportation of Hektor's corpse, implicitly placing 
the Athenians into the role of Achilles. He stages the Athenian act as reciprocity 
                                                
74 A recently discovered fragment of Simonides places greater emphasis on Spartan leadership 
and the Spartan contribution during the early stages of the land campaign in 479 BC. Subsequent 
authors (particularly tragedians) drew upon this poem to shape their own works on the Persian 
conflict. See Rutherford. 2001, pp. 33-54. and Boedeker. 2001, pp. 120-134, esp. 121-122. 
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for the Persian slaying and desecration of Leonidas, who resembles the figure of 
Patroklos.  
In the logos' second section, Herodotos maintains his heroic depiction of 
the Athenians as he moves from deeds to words. Expanding the scope of their 
activities, he effaces the deeds of specific Athenian heroic figures and replaces 
them with the collective action of the Athenians. Again, he creates this message 
primarily by focusing the action or the speeches on heroic combat and corpses. In 
his final example, the Athenian victory at Marathon, he depicts the battle as a 
heroic duel, equating the modern Athenians to a collective heroic figure. 
 He departs from the use of heroic corpses in the final section of the logos, 
but the catalog accords well with the epic settings of the previous sections. In his 
careful accounting he explores another aspect of the Athenian hero – the number 
of men he led to war. Bolstering his praise of the Athenian contribution, 
Herodotos minimizes the Spartan presence at Plataea by distinguishing the 
smaller number of Spartiates and their dependence upon vast numbers of helots 
for their security. In contrast, he emphasizes the presence of the Athenians, who 
provided the single largest group of hoplites to the campaign. Hence, he presents 
the Athenians as heroic in both prowess and number of men. 
While it is possible to read each of these sections independently, 
Herodotos' intense use of heroic corpses, in particular the corpse of Masistios, to 
shape the narrative and link the respective section indicates that the three units 
must be read as a whole. Setting the logos apart from the preceding and following 
chapters through its epic tone, Herodotos creates a series of ring structures 
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centered on heroic objects or persons (or both, in the case of corpses). He uses the 
theme of heroic death to link literally the first section to the second through the 
movement of the Greek camp from Masistios' corpse to Androkrates' tomb. 
Heroic combat and death provides and organizing principle of both the Tegean 
and Athenian arguments. The final mention of Masistios at ix.31.1 serves as a 
summation for the entire logos, marking the end of epic characterizations and a 
return to the description of a conventional conflict. Structurally, the objects 
indicate the logos’ unity. Thus, while the historian makes distinct statements 
about the Athenians at the Battle at Cithaeron (ix.20-25.3), the Tegean/Athenian 
Debate (ix.26.1-27.7), and the Greek Catalog (ix.28.1-31.1), he uses the structural 
relationship to link these messages together. As a result the Athenians appear as 
a collective heroic figure, equal in many ways to their Achaean forebears, and 




A New Connotation: The Fallacy of Fortifications 
 
 
As shown in the previous chapters, Herodotos manipulates objects in a 
variety of ways, but he mostly restricts their carefully crafted meanings to a finite 
portion of the narrative. For example, his treatment of the bows of the Ethiopian 
and Persian kings does not alter the meaning of all bows in the Histories. But 
Herodotos treats some objects consistently throughout his narrative, giving them 
an unchanging added meaning. One class of objects that the historian presents 
consistently is fortifications, which he presents in the unexpected light of failure. 
He employs this presentation for two purposes. First, he compares the Athenian 
strategy of aggression favorably to the Spartan strategy of defense through their 
respective teichea. The mobile wall of the fleet symbolizes Athenian initiative that 
rejects reliance upon traditional fortifications, such as the fixed defenses of the 
Isthmus that embody Spartan passivity and insularity. The fleet's victory at 
Salamis and the Isthmian Wall's abandonment support Herodotos' judgment in 
favor of Athens at vii.139. Second, the historian uses fortifications as an indicator 
of an empire's rising or declining fortunes. As their campaign against Greece 
waned, the Persians experienced difficulty with sieges and began to rely upon 
fortifications for their defense. At the same time, the Athenians became 
increasingly proficient at siege warfare, foreshadowing their rise to imperial 
power.  
Herodotos premises both points upon the view that fortifications are 
vulnerable, thus subverting their normal connotation of security. Such a total 
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revision of an object’s connotation is not unknown in antiquity. For example, 
while artists and writers of the Roman Empire used the image of a fish to 
symbolize the sea, early Christians appropriated the symbol to represent their 
religion.1 Objects could also have a more general connotation; medieval artists 
and writers used the skull to symbolize death or mortality.2 Hence, the simple 
appearance of the object (fish or skull) evokes profound significance. Herodotos 
uses teichea in a similar manner. Unlike singular objects, such as the lion statue 
that Croesus dedicated at Delphi (i.50), whose rich descriptive detail conveys 
hidden significance, Herodotos presents most teichea in a simple manner. He 
relies upon the teichos' negative connotation to imply vulnerability and 
impending failure.  
Herodotos establishes the negative connotation of teichea during his 
account of Cyrus' rise to power, depicting them as feeble constructs unable to 
check Persian aggression. He provides elaborate descriptions of the impressive 
fortifications of Sardis, Ecbatana, Phocaea, and Babylon and then recounts how 
the Persians overcame the four nations that relied upon these teichea for their 
protection. In three of the campaigns, Herodotos carefully describes the manner 
in which the Persians defeated the fortifications, using daring, skill, and patience. 
By the end of the last siege, he has made it clear that a teichos provides 
inadequate protection against assaults, particularly one launched by the Persians.  
Herodotos expands the negative depiction of fortifications beyond Persian 
sieges in the following books. Although he does not focus on a series of sieges, 
                                                
1 Elsner. 1995, pp. 8-9. 
2 Berger. 1972, p. 91. 
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like the Persian ones, he presents teichea in a consistently negative fashion. 
Overall, fortifications fail to protect their defenders 86.0% of the time. He also 
continues to portray the Persians as masters of siege-craft, who overcame teichea 
nearly 100% of the time.3 The historian depicts fortifications as vulnerable 
constructs susceptible to destruction, capture, or circumvention. Herodotos' 
depiction challenges the accepted view of his Greek audience, who relied upon 
teichea for their own protection. Together he uses the initial emphatic 
presentations of the fortifications in book I and the simple, yet consistent, 
presentations of subsequent fortifications to transform the connotation of teichos 
from security to vulnerability.   
Fortifications in Herodotos become a sign of imminent defeat. Whenever a 
king or a people turn to a teichos as their primary means of defense, the historian 
is indicating that they will soon suffer defeat. Naturally a rising imperial power 
will overcome defenses as it expands its territory, and thus Herodotos' 
triumphant depiction of Persian siege-craft may be nothing more than an 
emphasized presentation of real events. Hence the strategic discussions and 
choices of the defenders before a campaign begins or that occur at critical 
moments are more revealing. When a defender makes a conscious choice 
between an offensive strategy and a strategy reliant upon fortifications, the 
choice presages the outcome of the campaign. Hence, teichea become an indicator 
of fortune for the Persian Wars. As one side or another turns to fortifications 
                                                
3 For a full accounting of sieges in Herodotos see pp. 203-206 below.  
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rather than adopting an offensive policy, Herodotos indicates their prospects for 
success.  
This chapter examines the historian's treatment and employment of 
fortifications in three parts. First, an examination of the rise of Persia in book I 
reveals how the historian establishes a negative connotation for teichea. Early in 
his work, the historian establishes Persian mastery of siege-craft and so raises 
doubts about the efficacy of teichea. He builds upon these doubts by consistently 
associating teichea with military failure, altering the connotation of teichos from 
security to vulnerability. Second, this chapter examines how the historian uses 
this portrayal of fortifications to frame his presentation of Greek strategy during 
Xerxes' invasion of Greece. Herodotos associates the two main Greek strategies 
in these terms, linking the Spartans to fixed, traditional teichea and the Athenians 
to the new mobile teichos of the Athenian and Greek fleets. He validates his 
judgment in favor of the Athenians at vii.139 in part through this presentation, 
placing the two types of teichea side by side after the Greek naval victory that 
Themistokles orchestrated at Salamis. Finally, this chapter examines how 
Herodotos alters the Persian and Athenian relationships with teichea in 479 BC to 
signify the shift of imperial fortunes from the one to the other.  
 
A New Connotation 
The Rise of Persia 
The most famous teichos in Greek Literature was the Trojan Wall. Yet 
while the Achaean heroes eventually overcame this barrier, Homer presents this 
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and the fortification around the Achaean ships as secure structures. The former 
successfully protected the Trojans for ten years. The Achaeans only breached this 
defense after intense effort. The latter protected the majority of the Achaean 
ships and endured longer than the conflict with Troy until it was at last 
destroyed by the gods themselves in a tremendous flood (Iliad xii.1-33). 
Herodotos challenges this association between teichos and security, basing 
his arguments on the consistent depiction of traditional teichea as inadequate 
protection. He makes no explicit reference about the efficacy of fortifications 
until vii.139 when he equates teichea to the flimsy layers of a chiton, but his 
statement there should elicit no surprise. From early in his work, the historian 
proclaims his slight regard for this staple of fifth-century Greek warfare, 
presenting teichea consistently and methodically in a negative light and 
subverting their association with security.  
Herodotos initiates the new connotation during the Persian rise to power 
in book I. Although the Persians and other eastern empires possessed the wealth, 
manpower, and rudimentary siege technology4 to conduct prolonged sieges and 
were regarded as experts in this field of warfare,5 Herodotos does not assume 
that his Greek audience recognized this military reputation. At the time when the 
historian composed his works, the Greeks had successfully held the Persians at 
bay for fifty years. While they kept memories of the Persian sack of the Athenian 
Acropolis and other temples alive, their eventual reconstruction and the passage 
of time lessened the image of the once mighty Persian. Hence, the historian traces 
                                                
4 Garlan. 1974, pp. 139, 142-143. 
5 Aymard. 1959, p. 9. 
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the rise of Cyrus, the first Persian king, to re-establish the Persian military 
reputation as masters of siege warfare. As he describes Cyrus’ conquests of 
Media, Lydia, Ionia, and Babylon, Herodotos directs the audience's gaze to the 
elaborate fortifications of the defenders, which he highlights through emphatic 
presentations. He focuses more upon three sieges, describing Persian daring, 
skill, and patient siege-craft, than on the pitched land battles that preceded them. 
Hence, by the end of the first book, he lays the foundation for the negative 
connotation of teichea and restores the Persian reputation for siege-craft.  
Herodotos begins this process at Sardis, where the Persians displayed 
great daring in their capture of the Lydian citadel. After the inconclusive battle at 
Pteira, Cyrus pursued Croesus to Sardis, defeated the Lydian army before its 
gates, and besieged the citadel (i.80). Herodotos emphasizes the importance of 
the Lydian defenses and Croesus' reliance upon them through the repetition and 
elaborate description of the teichos. During the course of the siege (i.79-85), he 
refers to the teichos seven times,6 but mentions the defenders only once, 
describing a Lydian solider who inadvertently revealed an avenue of attack to 
the Persians (i.84.4). He even links the Lydian king to the walls of his citadel:  
Kroi'so" de; dokevwn oiJ crovnon ejpi; makro;n e[sesqai th;n 
poliorkivhn e[pempe ejk tou' teivceo" a[llou" ajggevlou" ej" ta;" 
summaciva".  
 
Croesus believing that the siege would take a great deal of time 
sent other messengers from his teichos to his allies. (i.81)  
 
                                                
6 i.80.6, 81, 83, 84.1, 84.3 bis, 85.3. 
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Through the addition of ejk tou' teivceo", the historian implicitly links Croesus’ 
confidence to the defenses of his acropolis.    
Although the Persians quickly captured this teichos, Herodotos magnifies 
their achievement further through an elaborate description of the citadel. 
Describing it as precipitous (ajpovtomo") and invincible (a[maco"), Herodotos 
recounts the tale of Meles, a Lydian monarch, who carried a lion cub around the 
acropolis to make it secure: 
ajpovtomov" te gavr ejsti tauvth/ hJ ajkrovpoli" kai; a[maco": th'/ oujde; 
Mhvlh" oJ provteron basileu;" Sardivwn mouvnh/ ouj perihvneike to;n 
levonta tovn oiJ hJ pallakh; e[teke, Telmhssevwn dikasavntwn wJ" 
perieneicqevnto" tou' levonto" to; tei'co" e[sontai Savrdie" 
ajnavlwtoi. 
 
For in this place the acropolis was precipitous and impregnable; 
but in this place alone a previous king of Sardis Meles did not take 
around the lion that his concubine bore to him, although the 
Telmessians proclaimed that if the lion were taken around the 
teichos then Sardis would be impregnable. (i.84.3) 
 
However, Meles neglected a portion that he considered unassailable: 
oJ de; Mhvlh" kata; to; a[llo tei'co" perieneivka", th'/ h\n ejpivmacon 
to; cwrivon  th'" ajkropovlio", kathlovghse tou'to wJ" ejo;n a[macovn 
te kai; ajpovtomon:  
 
Meles bore it around the rest of the teichos, where the acropolis was 
vulnerable, but he ignored this place since it was invincible and 
precipitious. (i.84.3)  
 
Against these divinely protected defenses, Cyrus relied upon the daring of his 
men rather than the siege-craft the Persians would later develop (i.84.1). Similar 
to their capture of the Athenian Acropolis, the Persians scaled the steep but 
unprotected section of the defenses and took the citadel by surprise (i.84.5-6). 
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Describing how the Persians overcame this strong teichos with surprising ease, 
the historian begins to cast doubt upon the security of fortifications. 
Herodotos builds upon this doubt at Ecbatana. He describes the citadel, 
which Deioces built upon attaining power, as a series of concentric teichea and 
bastions: 
oijkodomevei teivcea megavla te kai; karterav … memhcavnhtai de; 
ou{tw tou'to to; tei'co" w{ste oJ e{tero" tou' eJtevrou kuvklo" toi'si 
promacew'si mouvnoisi ejsti uJyhlovtero".  
 
He built great and strong fortifications … This teichos is contrived 
so that the one circuit is higher than the next by its battlements 
alone.  (i.98.4) 
 
He then elaborates further, describing the color of each bastion and teichos (i.98.5-
6). Through the length and the detail of his description, Herodotos creates an 
image of an impressive fortified edifice, upon which Deioces and his descendents 
relied for protection. Furthermore, although Cyrus did not besiege Ecbatana, 
Herodotos associates the citadel with Persian siege-craft by noting the similar 
length of its exterior circuit to the walls of Athens, linking the first Persian 
conquest to one of the final Persian sieges (to; dæ aujtw'n mevgistovn ejsti tei'co" 
kata; to;n  jAqhnevwn kuvklon mavlistav kh/ to; mevgaqo". / The extent of this 
teichos is approximately the same as the circuit around Athens - i.98.5). As at 
Sardis, Herodotos uses the Median teichos to recall Persia's later victories against 
the Greeks and their teichea.  
 Herodotos describes the technical aspects of Persian siege-craft when he 
narrates the Persian conquest of Ionia. Ignoring the lesson of Sardis, the Ionians 
erected defenses around their poleis (teivceav te periebavlonto e{kastoi / Each 
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erected a wall around [their polis]) for protection (i.141.4). But the Persian general 
Harpagus systematically overcame these teichea with siege mounds: 
ai{ree ta;" povlia" cwvmasi: o{kw" ga;r teichvrea" poihvseie, to; 
ejnqeu'ten cwvmata cw'n pro;" ta; teivcea ejpovrqee.  
 
He seized the poleis with siege mounds; for investing a polis, he then 
heaped a mound beside the walls and captured the city. (i.162.2)  
 
The magnitude of this achievement illustrates the growing siege-craft of the 
Persians, but Herodotos further magnifies this reputation through his description 
of the teichos and siege of Phocaea. Rather than mud-brick walls typical of most 
poleis,7 the Phocaeans used money given to them by Arganthonius, king of 
Tartessus (i.163.3), to build a circuit wall of large, fitted stones:  
kai; ga;r kai; hJ perivodo" tou' teivceo" oujk ojlivgoi stavdioiv eijsi, 
tou'to de; pa'n livqwn megavlwn kai; eu\ sunarmosmevnwn.  
 
The circuit wall is not merely a few stades long, and the whole wall 
is built of large and well-fit together stones. (i.163.4) 
 
The expense and uncommon composition emphasize the strength of the teichos, 
which coupled with a fleet (i.163.2) should have allowed Phocaea to withstand 
investment (i.163.2). But the city fell quickly to the Persians. Instead of the typical 
fifth-century Greek tactics of investment and blockade,8 the Persian general, 
Harpagus, constructed a siege mound beside the Phocaean teichos (i.168). 
Overcoming the defenses, he displayed an added technical element to the 
Persian siege-craft. 
 The Persians fully realized their ability against fortifications, coupling 
daring and technical proficiency, in their siege against Babylon. Although eastern 
                                                
7 Lawrence. 1972, p. 35. 
8 Lawrence. 1972, p. 41. 
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sources indicate that Cyrus took the city without a siege,9 Herodotos singles out 
the conquest of Babylon from among Cyrus' eastern conquests (i.177). His 
description of the city, like his claim of a Persian siege, though, does not 
correspond to other sources.10 Whether derived from unreliable sources or 
invention, Herodotos' Babylon is largely his own construction. As in the cases of 
Sardis, Ecbataba, and Phocaea, he uses the repetition of the term teichos and a 
memorable description11 of the Babylonian defenses to magnify the Persian 
achievement. He refers to the teichos and related defenses eighteen times,12 
erecting the wall before the eyes of his audience and describing each component 
of its impressive construction. Beginning with the dimensions, he outlines a four 
hundred eighty stade-long circuit around the city (i.178.2). Next, he describes a 
moat and a large teichos:  
tavfro" me;n prw'tav min baqeva te kai; eujreva kai; plevh u{dato" 
periqevei, meta; de; tei'co" penthvkonta me;n phvcewn basilhivwn 
ejo;n to; eu\ro", u{yo" de; dihkosivwn phvcewn:  
 
First a deep and broad trench full of water runs around it [the 
teichos], next there is teichos fifty royal cubits wide and two hundred 
royal cubits high; (i.178.3) 
 
The historian lays out a fortress more impressive in size than any previously 
captured by the Persians. 
                                                
9 Both the Nabonidus Chronicle (BM 35382) and Cyrus Cylinder (BM 90920) state that Cyrus 
entered Babylon without a battle. 
10 Rollinger. 1993, pp. 74-75. 
11 Fornara. 1971, pp. 28-29. He notes that Aristophanes' description of the city in the Birds (1124-
1138) is a parody of or an allusion to Herodotos' description of Babylon. 
12 Main teichos: 178.3; 179.1; 179.2; 179.3 bis; 179.4; 180.2; 181.1 bis. Moat: 178.3; 180.1; 180.2. 
Secondary teichos: 181.1. River walls (aiJmasih): 180.2; 180.4. The fortification of Babylon in 
general: 180.1 (ejteteivcisto); 181.2 (ejteteivcisto); 184 (teivcea). This does not include his 
references to gates (179.3; 180.4) and his description of interior citadels (181.2-3). 
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Like a Babylonian mason, Herodotos then fills these massive dimensions 
brick by brick. Excavating the moat he bakes the dirt into bricks (ojruvssonte" a{ma 
th;n tavfron ejplivnqeuon th;n gh'n th;n ejk tou' ojruvgmato" ejkferomevnhn – 
i.179.1), which he uses to line each side of the ditch and build the wall (e[deiman 
prw'ta me;n th'" tavfrou ta; ceivlea, deutevra de; aujto; to; tei'co" … - i.179.2). As 
in the case of Phocaea, the type of brick is stronger than the unbaked mud brick 
typically found in fifth-century Greek walls. Emphasizing each detail, he next fits 
thirty courses of bricks together with mortar and rush mats (i.179.2). Atop this 
massive battlement he places a row of continuous buildings separated by the 
width of a four-horse chariot (i.179.3), like some sort of cyclopean crenellation. 
Finally he girds the one hundred city gateways with gates, thresholds, and lintels 
made entirely of bronze (puvlai de; ejnesta'si pevrix tou' teivceo" eJkatovn, 
cavlkeai pa'sai, kai; staqmoiv te kai; uJpevrqura wJsauvtw". – i.179.3). Herodotos 
shapes a teichos of unparalleled dimension and strength. Each element – the 
bricks, the mortar, the top of the wall, and the gates – contributes to an image of 
an immensely strong teichos.  
 He does not stop with the thorax or breastplate (as he calls the teichos) of 
the city, but he adds layers of interior defenses:  
tou'to me;n dh; to; tei'co" qwvrhx ejstiv, e{teron de; e[swqen tei'co" 
periqevei, ouj pollw'/ tew/ ajsqenevsteron tou' eJtevrou teivceo", 
steinovteron dev.  
 
This teichos is the city’s thorax, but another teichos runs around 




Next, he minimizes the weakness that the Euphrates River, which ran through 
the city, posed to the defenses. He constructs low walls of baked bricks (aiJmasih; 
plivnqwn ojptevwn) along the banks of the Euphrates as the river passes through 
the city (i.180.2). He guards each road and alleyway, which intersect the river, 
with bronze postern gates (pulivde" … cavlkeai), leaving no gap in the defense 
(i.180.4). Within the heart of both quarters of the city he locates two citadels 
(i.181.2). The first is a royal palace surrounded by a large, strong ring wall (ejn tw'/ 
me;n ta; basilhvia peribovlw/ megavlw/ te kai; ijscurw'/, /in one [quarter] is the 
king’s palace with a large and strong circuit wall - i.181.2). The second is the 
bronze-gated temple of Bel (ejn de; tw'/ eJtevrw/ Dio;" Bhvlou iJro;n calkovpulon /in 
the other [quarter] is the bronze-gated temple of Zeus Belos – i.181.2), which the 
historian places atop eight solid towers built to guard the sacred space: 
ejn mevsw/ de; tou' iJrou' puvrgo" stereo;" oijkodovmhtai, stadivou kai; 
to; mh'ko" kai; to; eu\ro", kai; ejpi; touvtw/ tw'/ puvrgw/ a[llo" puvrgo" 
ejpibevbhke, kai; e{tero" mavla ejpi; touvtw/, mevcri ou| ojktw; puvrgwn.  
 
In the middle of the temple a solid tower was built, a stade in 
length and breadth, and on this tower stood another tower, and 
another tower on this one, and so up to eight towers. (i.181.3) 
 
Like the concentric walls of Ecbatana, Herodotos' Babylon has layer upon layer 
of fortifications protecting the city from assault. 
 Herodotos focuses his Babylonian portrait almost completely on the city's 
defenses. Even his accounts of the River Is and Queen Nitocris contribute to his 
description of the Babylonian fortifications.13 The River Is provided the mortar 
                                                
13 Bloomer, W. Martin. 1993, pp. 37-38. 
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used in the city's teichos (i.179.4) and Nitocris strengthened the city's defenses 
before Cyrus' attack.14 Fearful of the growing power of the Medes “she increased 
her security as far as she was able” (proefulavxato o{sa ejduvnato mavlista – 
i.185.1). First, she lined the banks of the Euphrates with stone, diverting the 
river's course in order to reduce the speed of the current (i.185.2-6). Second, 
within the city she lined the embankments of the river and the approaches to the 
river gates “with baked brick similar to the type used in the city walls” 
(plivnqoisi ojpth'/si kata; to;n aujto;n lovgon tw'/ teivcei – i.186.2). Herodotos 
regards this queen's legacy to be the additional defenses she provided for the 
city15 and further associates her with the Babylonian fortifications by placing her 
tomb atop one of the city's bronze gates (i.187). He relates every aspect of his 
Babylon to its defenses, creating an image of a nearly unassailable set of 
fortifications. 
  None of it makes a difference. Although the defenses initially frustrated 
the Persians, Cyrus captured the city in spite of the massive wall, the bronze 
gates, the interior walls, its citadels, and even a large supply of grain that the 
Babylonians had gathered to withstand a siege (i.190.2). He defeated the city’s 
defenses at the point of Queen Nitocris' reinforcement. Utilizing the basin into 
which she formerly drained the Euphrates, Cyrus diverted the river again 
(i.191.3), allowing the Persians to launch a daring attack along the riverbed, 
passing through the exterior teichos and breaching the interior walls and gates 
                                                
14 Although Nitocris built her defenses before Cyrus came to power, Herodotos minimizes the 
appearance of the passage of time in the narrative by placing her actions immediately before his 
description of the Persian attack. 
15 Munson. 2001, p. 9. 
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that fronted the river within the city (i.191.4). As the historian makes clear, luck 
clearly favored the Persians; the attack would have failed but for the element of 
surprise (i.191.5).16 Once again Persian daring proved decisive, but only because 
they also possessed the necessary engineering skill, or siege-craft, to discern and 
take advantage of a weakness in the Babylonian defenses. The capture of 
Babylon signals the full realization of Persian siege-craft. 
Together with the teichos of Ecbatana and the sieges of Sardis and Phocaea, 
Herodotos uses the siege of Babylon to challenge the connotation of fortifications 
with security. Using the repetition of the term teichos and elaborate descriptions 
of the fortifications, he creates portraits of four impressive structures, protected 
either by advantageous location or careful design, to convey to the audience an 
image of great strength and security. He protects Sardis with sheer heights and 
divine prophecy, Ecbatana with eight circuits of teichea and bastions, Phocaea 
with a long stone wall, and Babylon with massive (even cyclopean) layers of 
teichea, gates, and citadels. Alone, each represents a considerable challenge to an 
attacker; together they are a series of escalating challenges. Yet as each teichos 
became more challenging, the Persians rose to meet it. They used daring to 
capture Sardis, but then acquired simple engineering skills (e.g. siege mounds) to 
capture Phocaea and the other Ionian poleis. At last against Babylon, the Persians 
coupled daring with siege-craft to match the Babylonian defenses. Herodotos 
uses these sieges, however, not only to provide a résumé of Persian siege-craft, 
but also to call into question the security of teichea in general. He devotes more 
                                                
16 Avery. 1972, pp. 545-546. 
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descriptive detail to these four fortifications than he does on all of the other 
remaining teichea in the Histories combined. He highlights the imposing strength 
of these four teichea so that, as he describes their falls, he is able to drive a wedge 
between teichea and their association with security. 
 
The Failure of Fortifications 
 Herodotos widens this wedge into a full breach through his continual 
depiction of teichea as objects that fail to protect their owners. Using the term 
"teichos" almost exclusively in a military context (particularly sieges), he portrays 
fortifications as extremely vulnerable to assault. Attackers in the Histories 
succeed in capturing fortifications at a high rate (86.0%). The Persians, in 
particular, enjoy even greater success, capturing fortified positions nearly every 
time (96.7%). They storm or defeat teichea efficiently and only rarely rely upon 
deception or betrayal, important tools prior to the development of advanced 
siege tactics in the fourth century.17 Herodotos depicts fortifications in an 
intentionally negative light, magnifying their flaws and overlooking their 
strengths and the inherent difficulties of a siege.  
This negative depiction, however, belies the Greek reliance upon teichea 
for protection and the difficulties they had in conducting sieges. Greeks may 
have regarded walls as an integral part of a polis' defense as early as the Archaic 
Period.18 Most early Greek settlements were either situated on a defensible 
                                                
17 Ducrey. 1986, p. 141. 
18 Morgan and Coulton. 1997, pp. 105-106 and Hansen. 1997, p. 52. Morgan and Coulton argue 
that the archaeological record does not support a relationship between teichea and the formation 
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eminence or included some form of an acropolis.19 The Greeks in Asia Minor 
relied upon teichea and sought to enhance these defenses in the face of Persian 
expansion in the sixth century.20 The European Greeks increasingly used teichea 
to protect their communities in the fifth century and by the beginning of the 
fourth century "… almost every polis had a town wall (teichos), or at least a walled 
akropolis."21  
 The Greeks gained real security from fortifications. In the late sixth and 
fifth centuries they employed these increasingly common defenses as effective 
barriers against assaults.22 They advanced little in the art of siege-craft prior to 
the height of the Peloponnesian War and even simple defenses provided 
adequate protection.23 Pierre Ducrey's survey of sieges during the Classical and 
Hellenistic Periods shows that the presence of fortifications mitigated the 
suffering of the victim population 60% of the time. Furthermore, he regards 
fortifications as under-appreciated since his survey cannot reflect instances when 
the attacker, noting the presence of fortifications, refused to confront the dangers 
and difficulties inherent in a siege.24    
During the fifth century, the Greeks only reluctantly assaulted 
fortifications even under favorable circumstances.25 They preferred traditional 
hoplite warfare that did require assaulting teichea. Hoplite battles required level 
                                                                                                                                            
of poleis. Hansen, however, maintains that the defense circuit "…is one of the most common 
characteristics of a polis…" in Archaic literature (e.g. Homer and Ps. Hesiod Aspis 270).   
19 Hansen. 2000, p. 162. 
20 Kern. 1999, p. 92. 
21 Hansen. 2000, p. 164. see also Ducrey.  1995, pp. 253-255. 
22 Lawrence. 1972, pp. 208-220 and Ober. 1991, p. 180. 
23 Garlan. 1974, pp. 152-153. 
24 Ducrey. 1986, pp. 141-142. see also Ducrey. 1985, p. 167. 
25 Garlan. 1974, p. 147. 
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ground and the willing participation of the defenders, who could deny battle by 
remaining within their stronghold.26 Confronted with the prospect of negotiating 
or accepting combat,27 the defender could use a fortified position as a secure 
location from which to decide. In the case of a siege, the very nature of hoplite 
warfare28 and the limited siege-craft of the late Archaic and early Classical 
Periods29 exacerbated the attacker's difficulties. Although siege-craft advanced 
marginally during the Peloponnesian War,30 most attackers needed to surround a 
polis and starve out the defenders to achieve success,31 but few could afford the 
expenditure of time and treasure.32 Thus, during the period of the composition of 
the Histories (440s-420s), fortifications provided Herodotos’ Greek audience with 
                                                
26 Ober. 1991, pp. 187-188. A desire to protect the chora of the polis and to limit the damage an 
invading army could do to crops also drove the defenders to march out and oppose the invaders 
in the field. See Garlan. 1974, pp. 30-33 and Hanson. 1998, pp. 32-34. see also Ober. 1985b, pp. 43-
44. 
27 Garlan. 1974, pp. 26-27. 
28 Garlan. 1974, p. 135. Ober. 1991, pp. 185-186. In most cases before the Peloponnesian War, both 
attackers and defenders wore the hoplite panoply, which ill-suited siege operations. While it 
protected a man in a phalanx where the threat came mainly from the front, it would have 
hampered an attacker in a siege where death could come from any direction. The hoplite would 
have been unable to shift his chief defense, the bulky hoplon, to meet threats from different 
directions and would have had difficulty climbing siege ladders while carrying it. His helmet, 
while offering valuable protection, would have limited his visibility in the chaotic conflict. 
29 Lawrence. 1972, pp. 201-205. Garlan. 1974, p. 139. Ober. 1991, pp. 181-184, 185. An attacker 
wishing to take a fortified position by assault had three options: over, through, or under. For the 
first, they relied upon ladders, but these flimsy constructs provided no protection for the attacker, 
who needed both hands to climb in speedy fashion, and a defender could easily break, ignite, or 
dislodge them. Going through a wall required siege engines, which Garlan argues first appeared 
between the 8th and 5th centuries in the east. But Ober notes that while eastern powers may have 
used some simple engines, the Greeks concentrated their attacks upon the well-protected gate 
because the rudimentary nature of their rams precluded their use against walls. Finally, going 
under a wall (e.g. the use of saps) required tremendous work to cut through the bedrock, upon 
which most Greek walls were set, and while the Persians displayed this ability at the beginning 
of the fifth century (against Soli – Hdt. v.115), there is no evidence of its use by the Greeks in the 
early Classical Period. 
30 Garlan. 1974, pp. 152-153. 
31 Ober. 1985b, pp. 43-44. 
32 Kern. 1999, pp. 20-21, 89-90. Thucydides (i.11) also notes that the early Greeks lacked the 
resources necessary to conduct sieges. 
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considerable protection against aggression and could be overcome only with 
great effort and difficulty. 
 In the Histories, however, teichea frequently fail to offer adequate 
protection in a military context. Herodotos uses the term "teichos" one hundred 
thirty-eight times, applying it mostly to defensive works such as city walls, 
towers, forts, and walls across passes:33  
total # of teichea defensive (fortifications, forts, 
city walls) 





(Table 4.1 – Teichea in the Histories) 
 
Like most early Greek writers, Herodotos reserves "teichos" for walls with a 
defensive function and distinguishes them from simple structural walls (toichea). 
He refers to one hundred seven teichea (77.6%) in the context of a siege or other 
military action (a war, invasion, et al.): 
 # of teichea in the 
context of a siege 
# of teichea in other 
military actions 
total 
failure of teichos out of 







success of teichos out 








failure of teichos out of 








success of teichos out 








(Table 4.2 – The Success and Failure of Teichea) 
Overall teichea fail to protect defenders nearly 74.0% of the time, a rate that 
climbs to over 90.0% when only teichea from martial actions are considered. In 
some cases, Herodotos uses the word "teichos" multiple times for a single siege, 
                                                




such as Darius' siege of Babylon, in which he mentions the teichos nine times 
(iii.151.1, 153.2, 155.4, 5, 6, 158.1 ter, & 159.1). As discussed in the previous 
section, however, Herodotos uses this sort of repetition to emphasize the 
importance of the fortifications and heighten the attacker’s achievement. The 
repetition, then, does not mitigate the association of fortifications with failure 
(pp. 188-197).  
 As grim a picture as Herodotos paints of teichea, he depicts siege warfare 
in an even darker light. Teichea comprise only one type, albeit the most 
numerous, of fortifications in the Histories.34 At times, Herodotos simply 
describes a siege (or multiple sieges) without mentioning any specific defenses. 
For example, during the lengthy Persian siege of the Pedasi on Mt. Lida, the 
historian makes no mention of a teichos or other kind of fortification (i.176). While 
Herodotos varies the terminology, he does not vary the results. Defenders that 
depend upon some sort of defensive works to repel an attacker suffer defeat a 
majority of the time. The historian mentions ninety-three sieges within his work, 
of which a significant majority succeed:35 
 # of sieges success failure 




Persians (prior to the 











                                                
34 Herodotos does use a few other terms such as e{rko", e[ruma, and krhsfuvgeton to describe 
fortifications, but only rarely (e{rko": the temporary fortification of the shipwrecked Persians 
(vii.191.1), the Persian fortifications at Mycale (ix.96.3, 97 bis, 99.3); e[ruma: the old Phocian wall at 
Thermopylae (vii.223.2 and 225.3) and the Persian fortifications at Plataea (ix.15.2) and Mycale 
(ix.96.3); krhsfuvgeton: the proposed Ionian refuge (v.124.2), the Athenian Acropolis (viii.51.2); 
the Persian fortifications at Plataea (ix.15.2) and Mycale (ix.96.3)). These examples will be dealt 
with in detail below. 
35 A detailed list of all sieges in the Histories may be found in Appendix B. 
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(Table 4.3 – The Success Rate of Sieges) 
Overall attackers succeed 86.0% of the time, but the Persians surpass even this 
impressive achievement (96.7%). Herodotos may base this presentation upon the 
reputation that the Persians had for expertise in siege warfare,36 but in doing so 
he presents an incomplete picture of Persian teichomachia. Whether intentionally 
or not, he overlooks the difficulties that the Persians had subduing fortified 
places in the east.37 In the more familiar Aegean, he offers an explanation for the 
lone failure prior to their defeat at Salamis, the turning point of Persian imperial 
expansion. When the Naxians and their teichos withstood a Persian siege, 
Herodotos attributes it to the treachery of the Persian commander, Megabates, 
rather than any inability of Persian siege-craft. Megabates warned the Naxians of 
the impending assault, giving the islanders time to stock supplies and prepare 
themselves for a prolonged siege that the Persians had not anticipated (v.33.4 – 
34.1). Naxos aside, the Persians capture every teichos that they attack before the 
reversal of their fortunes at the Battle of Salamis. Even including the failure at 
Naxos and later at Potidaea, the Persian rate of success of 96.7% is impressive. 
Against such an overwhelming achievement, fortifications appear as ineffective 
protection.  
Since Herodotos describes a period of intense warfare, it is possible his 
subject matter may distort his view of fortifications. He describes the rise and fall 
                                                
36 Aymard. 1959, p. 9. Garlan. 1974, pp. 139, 142-143. 
37 He omits mention of Cyrus' failure to capture Larisa early in his reign (Xen. Anabasis iii.4.6) and 
the Persian inability to subdue completely the Carduccians because of the fortified nature of their 
homes (Xen. Anabasis iii.5.15). The Persians even had difficulties near Ecbatana, paying tribute, 
for safe passage, to the mountain-dwelling Uxians (Arrian iii.17). 
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of empires, a subject that requires the capture of many poleis and their attendant 
fortifications. Yet, a comparison to his contemporary Thucydides, whose account 
covers a similar subject in a period of more advanced siege-craft,38 shows that 
Herodotos presents teichea more negatively: 
Thucydidean Sieges Successful siege Failed siege 












(Table 4.4 – Sieges in Thucydides) 
 
Whereas attackers in the Histories succeed 86.0% of the time, they succeed 64.0% 
of the time in the pages of Thucydides, a reduction of nearly 25.0%. Not even the 
Athenians, whom Thucydides describes as skillful at sieges (Thuc. i.102), came 
close to matching the overall rate of success in the Histories or the success of the 
Persians (96.7%) in particular.  
Herodotos attributes the capture of most of these fortifications to military 
force. While attackers relied upon no single method, using direct military 
assaults,39 prolonged sieges, or betrayals – the three traditional methods of 
capture – Herodotos grants a preponderance of success to the military assault:  









Persians (prior to the 





















                                                
38 Garlan. 1974, p. 147 and Ober. 1985b, pp. 43-44. 
39 For this study the threat of military force, which occurs only 7.4% of the time has been 
incorporated into the category of military force. 
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(Table 4.5 – Methods of Capture) 
Military action against a fortified position entailed many risks and exposed 
attackers to countless dangers when conducting operations against a well-
protected enemy.40 Accordingly most attackers often regarded the use of betrayal 
or some form of deception necessary.41 Yet in the Histories, Herodotos attributes 
the fall of most fortified positions (97.8%) to the force of arms, either to 
unspecified military force or a prolonged siege.  
 
Herodotos, then, firmly links the defensive teichos with failure, 
particularly in the face of military force, altering its connotation from security to 
vulnerability. After his description of the rise of Persia through its conquest of a 
series of strong fortified positions in book I, he continues to present teichea in a 
consistently negative light, underplaying the tangible protection that a teichos 
provided and the difficulties inherent in a siege.  
 
The Fleet vs. the Wall 
  Herodotos uses this connotation of teichos to critique the strategic 
responses of the two most important Greek powers during Xerxes' invasion of 
480 BC. He symbolizes the two strategies in terms of teichea, one traditional and 
the other innovative. Whereas the Spartans advocated a defensive stance reliant 
upon the type of teichos that failed to check previous Persian aggression, the 
Athenians, led by Themistokles, proposed a more aggressive strategy based 
                                                
40 Kern. 1999, p. 20. 
41 Ducrey 1986, p. 141. 
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chiefly upon a new type of teichos - a fleet. The association of teichea with 
vulnerability previously in the Histories informs the audience of the vulnerability 
of the Spartan position and validates the historian's judgment that without the 
Athenian fleet Greece would have been lost.  
 
vii.139 and the Oracle of the Wooden Wall 
Beginning at vii.139, Herodotos establishes the link between the Spartans 
and traditional teichea and the Athenians and a naval teichos. After a lengthy 
description of the Persian preparation for the war and the opening stages of 
Xerxes' invasion, the historian shifts the focus of his narrative to the defensive 
efforts of the Greeks. Examining their respective strategic outlooks, he celebrates 
the Athenians as the saviors of Greece, who played a pivotal role in the war: 
nu'n de; jAqhnaivou" a[n ti" levgwn swth'ra" genevsqai th'" JEllavdo" 
oujk a]n aJmartavnoi tajlhqeov".  
 
Now someone saying that the Athenians were the saviors of Greece 
would not miss the truth. (vii.139.5) 
 
Scholars have responded to the self-proclaimed controversial nature (gnwvmhn …  
ejpivfqonon) of the historian's assessment by examining the style of his 
argument,42 or determining if he was an Athenian partisan,43 or identifying 
                                                
42 Kleinknecht. 1940, p. 241. Demand. 1987, pp. 746-758, esp. pp. 747-8 and 755. Thomas. 2000, pp. 
189-190. Kleinknecht and Thomas both favor an association between Herodotos' reasoning and 
the counterfactual argumentation of the Ionian scientific and medical writers, but Demand notes 
the historian's less rigorous application of this argumentation and instead views it as a rhetorical 
flourish. 
43 Jacoby RE Suppl II.359.43-7. Fornara. 1971, pp. 45-46. Lewis. 1977, pp. 178-180. Munson. 2001, 
pp. 174-175. Fornara and Munson argue against Jacoby's claim that Herodotos was a partisan of 
Periclean Athens. Instead, they maintain, the historian's views remain ambiguous in this passage 
that is essentially a truthful assessment of events. Lewis argues that Herodotos really favored the 
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loyalty, rather than strategy, as the key element of the passage,44 or even claiming 
the historian projected later views concerning sea-power back in time.45 While 
useful studies, few consider the role of teichea, whose negative connotation 
assures failure.46 The closer Herodotos weds the Spartans to these frail structures, 
the more critical becomes his assessment of their strategy. Similarly, the farther 
he divorces the Athenians from traditional teichea, the more favorable becomes 
his assessment of their strategy. 
Herodotos uses the Spartan reliance upon teichea to cast the 
Lacedaemonians into a passive, almost effeminate, role. He limits Spartan action 
to their attempt to drive a fortification wall across the Isthmus, which he presents 
in a ring structure47 to emphasize the foolishness of this endeavor: 
a) eij kai; polloi; teicevwn kiqw'ne" h\san ejlhlamevnoi dia; tou' jIsqmou' 
Peloponnhsivoisi / Even if many layers of teichea had been driven 
across the Isthmus by the Peloponnesians… (vii.139.3) 
b) prodoqevnte" a]n Lakedaimovnioi uJpo; tw'n summavcwn … uJpo; tw'n 
summavcwn oujk eJkovntwn … ejmounwvqhsan, mounwqevnte" de; a]n kai; 
ajpodexavmenoi e[rga megavla ajpevqanon gennaivw". h] tau'ta a]n 
e[paqon, h] pro; tou' oJrw'nte" a]n kai; tou;" a[llou" {Ellhna" 
                                                                                                                                            
Spartans and detects a touch of regret that the Lacedaemonian heroism was not a decisive factor 
in the victory over Persia.  
44 Immerwahr. 1966. pp. 204-206. Fornara. 1971, p. 50. Hart. 1982, pp. 169-170. Raaflaub. 1987, pp. 
239-240. Lateiner. 1989, p. 201. Immerwahr and Raaflaub regard Herodotos' judgment as a 
reflection upon the insular nature of Sparta. Fornara, Hart, and Lateiner argue that Herodotos 
disregards the strategic questions and concentrates upon Athenian and Spartan loyalty to Greece. 
They note that while the historian states that the Athenians could have wavered, such an option 
never occurred to the Spartans. Lateiner stresses the Athenian freedom of political choice and 
praises them for exercising that freedom on behalf of Greece.  
45 Evans. 1979, p. 116. Grant. 1983, pp. 288-289. Ostwald. 1991, p. 141. Marincola. 1996, p. 591, n. 
38. Evans and Ostwald argue that Herodotos developed his argument from an appreciation and 
recognition of sea power that only arose in the years after the Persian War. Grant and Marincola 
suggest that the historian is simply including or responding to prevailing attitudes of his day, 
namely that Athens or Sparta played the role of savior of Greece. 
46 Solmsen. 1944, p. 247. Solmsen notes some of the emphasis Herodotos places upon the Isthmian 
wall between vii.139 and Chileus' speech at ix.9, but does not consider the historian's general 
approach to teichea.  
47 Beck. 1971, pp. 25, 68-69. 
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mhdivzonta" oJmologivh/ a]n ejcrhvsanto pro;" Xevrxhn. / Betrayed by their 
allies the Lacedaemonians … would have not willingly been 
abandoned by their allies, but abandoned and performing great deeds 
would have died honorably. Either they would have suffered these 
things, or before this point seeing that the other Greeks had medized 
would have come to terms with Xerxes. (vii.139.3-4) 
a') th;n ga;r wjfelivhn th;n tw'n teicevwn tw'n dia; tou' jIsqmou' ejlhlamevnwn 
ouj duvnamai puqevsqai / For I am not able to perceive the benefit of 
driving teichea across the Isthmus. (vii.139.4) 
 
Herodotos compares the fortification to the layers of a kiqwvn, a term he typically 
uses elsewhere to refer to female or eastern undergarments,48 as a slight to 
Peloponnesian masculinity.49 Within this extended conditional statement, the 
historian links the range of Spartan actions to the construction of the wall. No 
matter how many layers of walls they might have laid across the Isthmus, the 
Spartans would have been betrayed by their allies (prodoqevnte"), abandoned 
(ejmounwvqhsan), compelled to suffer (e[paqon), watching (oJrw'nte") the other 
Greeks medize (vii.139.3-4). Unlike the performances of Leonidas and Pausanias 
later in the work, here Herodotos presents the Spartans as passive, incapable of 
seizing the initiative, and subject to the actions of others. He only attributes one 
action to them: the construction of the wall, which would have led to defeat or 
death. But even the prospect of a noble death appears tainted when the historian 
asserts that instead of a noble death the Spartans might have medized 
                                                
48 Powell. 1960. p. 195. Female undergarments: i.8.3 (Lydian); v.87.3 (Athenian). Male 
undergarments: vii.61.1, viii.99.2, ix.22.2 (Persian); vii.75.1, vii.90, vii.91.1 (Thracians, Cyprians, 
Cilicians); i.195.1 bis (Babylonians); ii.81.1 (Egyptians); i.50.1, i.155.4 (Lydian). The only two 
Greeks who wear this garment are Histiaeus (v.106.6) and Alcmaeon (vi.125.3). Histiaeus had 
been a resident in Susa for some time and thus his chiton may be a reference to eastern dress. 
Alcmeon donned a particularly baggy chiton to cart gold out of Croesus’ treasury in Sardis. 
Powell regards Alcmeon’s use of the chiton as particularly effeminate and non-Greek. 
49 The comparison of a fortification to a lady’s attire is not unique to Herodotos. Homer uses the 




(vii.139.4).50 The historian, then, not only renders a judgment against the Spartan 
strategy at vii.139, but also tarnishes them through an association with teichea, 
depicting them as weak and passive. 
 In contrast, he represents the Athenians as an active and capable naval 
power. They had two options: 
eij jAqhnai'oi katarrwdhvsante" to;n ejpiovnta kivndunon ejxevlipon 
th;n sfetevrhn, h] kai; mh; ejklipovnte" ajlla; meivnante" e[dosan 
sfeva" aujtou;" Xevrxh/, kata; th;n qavlassan oujdamoi; a]n 
ejpeirw'ntao ajntiouvmenoi basilevi. 
 
If the Athenians afraid of the coming danger abandoned their land, 
or if they stayed and gave themselves to Xerxes, no one would have 
tried to oppose the king on the sea. (vii.139.2) 
 
Although they possess choices similar to the Spartans, the historian's use of 
active verbs and participles implies that the Athenians had greater control over 
their fate. He also places the Greeks into a position of dependence upon 
Athenian resistance and initiative, claiming that no place would have tried to 
resist Xerxes without Athenian participation (oujdamoi; a]n ejpeirw'nto 
ajntiouvmenoi basilevi – vii.139.2). He continues, stating that: 
ou|toi ga;r ejpi; oJkovtera tw'n prhgmavtwn ejtravponto, tau'ta 
rJevyein e[melle: eJlovmenoi de; th;n JEllavda periei'nai ejleuqevrhn, 
tou'to to; JEllhniko;n pa'n to; loipovn, o{son mh; ejmhvdise, aujtoi; 
ou|toi h\san oiJ ejpegeivrante" kai; basileva metav ge qeou;" 
ajnwsavmenoi. oujde; sfeva" crhsthvria fobera; ejlqovnta ejk Delfw'n 
kai; ej" dei'ma balovnta e[peise ejklipei'n th;n JEllavda, ajlla; 
katameivnante" ajnevsconto to;n ejpiovnta ejpi; th;n cwvrhn devxasqai. 
 
For to whichever side these men turned, that one would have 
prevailed; but choosing to preserve the freedom of Greece, these 
men were the ones who roused all of Greece, as much as did not go 
                                                
50 Lateiner. 1989, p. 277, n.43. 
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over to the Persians, and after the gods repelled the king. Not even 
terrifying oracles coming from Delphi and throwing them into fear 
persuaded them to abandon Greece, but remaining they endured to 
receive the invader of their land. (vii.139.5) 51 
 
The Athenians had it in their power to grant victory to whichever side they 
turned (ejtravponto). Choosing freedom (eJlovmenoi), they were the ones that roused 
Greece to action (aujtoi; ou|toi h\san oiJ ejpegeivrante"). Unmoved by fearful 
oracles, they remained and received the invader (katameivnante" ajnevsconto). In 
Herodotos' judgment, then, the Athenians were energetic masters of fate; they 
acted, they were not acted upon. 
The historian links this active resistance to naval power symbolized by the 
"wooden wall" of the Athenian fleet. Although he uses a series of counterfactuals 
to equate Athenian resistance against the Persian navy to a check on Xerxes' 
power both on the sea and on the land (vii.139.2),52 the historian makes no 
explicit reference to the Athenian (or Greek) fleet during the encomium. 
Avoiding terms such as naus and trireme, he does not classify the nature of the 
Athenian resistance until the oracle of the wooden wall. Fearful of the Persian 
threat, the Athenians consulted the Pythia for advice. Initially the oracle advised 
them to flee, but when asked again offered one form of salvation - a wooden 
wall: 
tw'n a[llwn ga;r aJliskomevnwn o{sa Kevkropo" ou\ro" 
ejnto;" e[cei keuqmwvn te Kiqairw'no" zaqevoio, 
tei'co" Tritogenei' xuvlinon didoi' eujruvopa Zeuv" 
                                                
51 The Athenians acted like epic heroes. Homer frequently uses the non-compound form of the 
verb (ejgeivrw) in the Iliad to signify characters roused to action by the gods or other mortals: Iliad 
xv.232, 242, 567, 594, 603; v.208, 510; xiii.58, 357; xvii.552. 
52 Demand. 1987, pp. 748, 755. 
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mou'non ajpovrqhton televqein, to; se; tevkna tæ 
ojnhvsei.  
 
When all other things are taken as much as the 
boundary of Cecrops holds and the vale of divine 
Cithaeron, far-seeing Zeus gives to Tritogeneia the 
wooden wall alone to be untaken, which will benefit 
you and your children.  (vii.141.3) 
 
Herodotos reduces the many opinions of the oracle's meaning (gnw'mai kai; 
a[llai pollaiv) to two opposing lines of thought (ai{de sunesthkui'ai mavlista), 
which viewed the teichos as a defensive position or the Athenian fleet: 
tw'n presbutevrwn e[legon metexevteroi dokevein sfivsi to;n qeo;n 
th;n ajkrovpolin crh'sai perievsesqai. hJ ga;r ajkrovpoli" to; pavlai 
tw'n jAqhnaivwn rJhcw'/ ejpevfrakto. oi} me;n dh; kata; to;n fragmo;n 
sunebavllonto tou'to to; xuvlinon tei'co" ei\nai, oi} dæ au\ e[legon 
ta;" neva" shmaivnein to;n qeovn … 
 
Some of the older men supposed that the god prophesied the 
Acropolis would survive, for in antiquity the Athenian Acropolis 
was fenced in by a thorn-hedge. They supposed this wooden wall 
to be the fence, but others said that the god meant the ships… 
(vii.142.1-2)  
 
Themistokles settled the debate and defined the active Athenian resistance to 
Persia as a mobile fleet of ships, the antithesis of an immobile teichos (vii.143). 
Herodotos, then, distinguishes the Athenians from the Spartans as active to 
passive, naval to land.   
 Unlike the passivity of the Spartan fortification, the historian presents the 
Athenian fleet at its inception as an offensive tool. Although ultimately used for 
the defense of Greece, Themistokles originally intended the fleet for an offensive 
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war against Aegina (vii.144.1).53 A series of raids sparked by the Aeginetan theft 
of the statues of Damia and Auxesia from Epidaurus escalated to full-scale war 
(v.85f). Consulting the oracle at Delphi, the Athenians learned that they would 
eventually conquer (tevlo" mevntoi katastrevyesqai) the island (v.89.2). 
Herodotos uses the verb katastrevfomai numerous times in the Histories to 
describe the expansion of imperialistic power54 and may have retrojected the 
events of the 440s, when Athens at the height of its power reduced Aegina to 
tributary status, back to the earlier conflict.55 After events reached a point of 
offensive (perhaps even imperialistic) action, the Athenians created a tool suited 
to these aims: a fleet of two hundred ships (vii.144.1). Thus, years later when the 
Athenians acted in the defense of Greece, they employed an offensive device that 
accords well with the dynamism and initiative described in vii.139.  
 Herodotos, then, contrasts the Spartan and Athenian strategies in terms of 
teichea, condemning the former and praising the latter. The negative connotation 
of traditional teichea reinforces his condemnation of the Spartan strategy to fortify 
the Isthmus of Corinth and assists his depiction of them as passive victims of 
fate. He casts the Athenians, however, in an opposite mould, presenting them as 
dynamic masters of fate and linking them to a new type of teichos – the fleet. 
Unlike the immobile teichos suited only for defense, the mobile teichos is an 
                                                
53 After a silver strike at the Laurion mines in Attica, Themistokles defeated a plan to distribute 
the money and instead convinced his fellow citizens to use their new-found wealth to build a 
fleet of two hundred triremes. 
54 The campaigns of Croesus against the Asiatic Greeks (i.6.2, 28, 71.4, 73.2, 75.1, 78.3) and Xerxes' 
own campaign against Greece (vii.7, 8g1, 9.2, 9a1, 10a2, 11.4, 157.3, 209.4; ix.2.3). 
55 Jeffery. 1962, p. 50. 
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offensive weapon and the historian uses these walls to reify the opposing 
temperaments of the Spartans and the Athenians.56 
 
Thermopylae and Salamis 
Herodotos' account of the events of 480 up to the victory at Salamis begins 
with the Spartan defensive strategy until Themistokles proposed the offensive 
use of the Greek fleet at Salamis. The historian consistently depicts the Spartans 
as reliant upon a traditional teichos for their security, thus allowing the Persians 
to take the initiative. In contrast, the Athenians under Themistokles eschewed the 
old teichos and its associations with passivity and defense, in favor of the new 
type of naval teichos, conceived of and constructed by Themistokles for one 
purpose: attack.  
Prior to Themistokles' bold naval stroke at Salamis, the Greeks followed 
the Spartan defensive strategy on land that relied significantly upon 
fortifications. They used the Isthmus as a staging area for defensive operations 
elsewhere or as a fallback position when these efforts failed. The Isthmus of 
Corinth first appears in the Histories when the historian describes the extensive 
fortification built there by the Spartans (vii.139.3-4). He emphasizes the 
association of the Isthmus and the fortifications by linking thirty-five of thirty-
seven references to the Isthmus of Corinth with fortifications and defensive 
efforts there or elsewhere.57 At the urging of the Thessalians, a Greek force set out 
                                                
56 Cf. Thuc. i.68-72, et al. 
57 References associated with fortification: vii.139.3; vii.139.4; vii.172.1 bis; vii.173.4; vii.175.1; 
vii.177; vii.207; vii.235.4; viii.40.2; viii.49.2 bis; viii.56; viii.57.1; viii.60a bis; viii.60b; viii.60g; viii.63; 
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from the Isthmus to the Vale of Tempe early in 480 BC (vii.172.1). While they did 
not fortify the position, the Greeks adopted a defensive stance, intending to 
guard the pass (pezo;n strato;n fulavxonta th;n ejsbolhvn - vii.173.1). When 
warned of the position’s vulnerability to circumvention, the Greeks withdrew 
and returned to the Isthmus (ejporeuvonto ej" to;n jIsqmovn - vii.173.4). From this 
place they soon set out once again to defend Thermopylae and Artemisium: 
wJ" de; ejpuvqonto to;n Pevrshn ejovnta ejn Pierivh/, dialuqevnte" ejk 
tou'  jIsqmou' ejstrateuvonto aujtw'n oi} me;n ej" Qermopuvla" pezh'/, 
a[lloi de; kata; qavlassan ejpæ  jArtemivsion. 
 
When they learned that the Persians were in Pieria, breaking up 
from the Isthmus some set went to campaign on land at 
Thermopylae, others went to campaign on sea at Artemisium. 
(vii.177) 
 
But they considered withdrawing to guard the Isthmus when the Persians first 
appeared (to;n jIsqmo;n e[cein ejn fulakh/§ - vii.207).58 After the Greek defeat at 
Thermopylae, the exiled Spartan king Demaratos warned Xerxes that his 
countrymen would next defend the Isthmus (vii.235.4). Retreating from 
Artemisium, the Peloponnesians did indeed set a course for the Isthmus to fortify 
it (to;n jIsqmo;n aujtou;" teicevonta" - viii.40.2). The Spartan-led Greek defenders 
moved like a pendulum between the Isthmus and other defensive positions, 
revealing their passive, insular approach to the war. 
                                                                                                                                            
viii.71.1; viii.71.2 bis; viii.72; viii.74.1; viii.79.2; viii.121.1; viii.123.1; ix.7.1; ix.7b1; ix.8.1; ix.8.2; 
ix.9.2; ix.10.2; ix.10.3. Oblique references to the defense of the Isthmus: vii.235.4. References not 
associated with fortification: vii.195; viii.123. 
58 Immerwahr. 1966, pp. 205-206. Immerwahr notes the general refrain of the Greeks to return to 
the Isthmus, but limits himself to the study of the location as the symbol of Spartan insularity, 
overlooking the Spartan predilection for fortifications. 
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One such position was Thermopylae, where the Greeks made a stand 
against Xerxes' army. Overlooking Simonides' tradition of the Spartan night 
attack upon the Persian camp,59 Herodotos focuses his account upon the Spartan 
defense of a teichos. The Greeks chose Thermopylae in part because of the 
presence of an old Phocian wall (to; mevn nun tei'co" to; ajrcai'on), which they 
intended to rebuild to bar Xerxes' entry into Greece: 
toi'si de; au\ti" ojrqwvsasi e[doxe tauvth/ ajpamuvnein ajpo; th'"  
JEllavdo" to;n bavrbaron. 
  
It seemed best to those re-erecting the wall to keep the barbarian 
away from Greece in that place. (vii.176.5) 
 
Although the Greek contingent included Tegeans, Mantineans, Arcadians, 
Corinthians, Phlians, Myceneans, and Boeotians, Herodotos limits references to 
the wall to the context of the Spartans and Spartan action. When a Persian spy 
approached the Greek position, he did not see the bulk of the Greek force, which 
the newly rebuilt Phocian wall concealed, but observed only the Spartans 
stationed on the outside of the wall: 
wJ" de; proshvlase oJ iJppeu;" pro;" to; stratovpedon, ejqhei'tov te 
kai; katwvra pa'n me;n ou] to; stratovpedon: tou;" ga;r e[sw 
tetagmevnou" tou' teivceo", to; ajnorqwvsante" ei\con ejn fulakh'/, 
oujk oi|av te h\n katidevsqai: oJ de; tou;" e[xw ejmavnqane, toi'si pro; 
                                                
59 Flower. 1988, pp. 373-375. Herodotos omits any mention of the night attack on Xerxes' tent, 
which the poet Simonides recounts (Diodorus xi.10). According to Flower (p. 373), Herodotos 
probably knew of Simonides' poem, but chose to omit the attack on Xerxes' tent for some literary 
reason or because he regarded it as unhistorical. Flower (pp. 374-375) suggests that the historian 
and poet, drawing upon different portions of the Iliad for inspiration, shaped their accounts 
accordingly. Herodotos, wishing to emulate the struggle for Patroklos, uses book 17 as his 
inspiration whereas Simonides bases his account upon Odysseus and Diomedes' night excursion 
in book 10. While the Homeric allusion is attractive, a simpler explanation can be found within 
the context of Herodotos' argument on teichea. Had he included the attack upon Xerxes' tent he 
would have undermined his depiction of the Spartans as passive defenders of teichea. 
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tou' teivceo" ta; o{pla e[keito: e[tucon de; tou'ton to;n crovnon 
Lakedaimovnioi e[xw tetagmevnoi.  
 
When the horseman approached the camp, he looked and did not 
indeed see the whole camp; for he was not able to see those men 
stationed within the fortification, which having repaired they were 
guarding; but he observed those outside, whose arms were 
grounded before the wall; at this time the Lacedaemonians 
happened to be stationed outside. (vii.208.2-3) 
 
After noting everything precisely, the spy reported back to Xerxes, who, 
although incredulous, accepted that the Spartans (and the wall) represented the 
entire defense of Thermopylae (vii.209.1). During the first two days of the battle, 
however, Herodotos omits any reference to the wall as the Greeks defend the 
pass in turns (vii.212.1-2). He reintroduces the teichos on the third day, after the 
bulk of the Greek force withdrew and only the Spartans and a few Greeks 
remained. The historian notes that these men now moved out into the wider part 
of the pass whereas during the previous days' fighting they had held the wall 
and made sorties out from it:  
… kai; oiJ ajmfi; Lewnivdhn  {Ellhne", wJ" th;n ejpi; qanavtw/ e[xodon 
poieuvmenoi, h[dh pollw/' ma'llon h] katæ ajrca;" ejpexhvisan ej" to; 
eujruvteron tou' aujcevno". to; me;n ga;r e[ruma tou' teivceo" 
ejfulavsseto, oiJ de; ajna; ta;" protevra" hJmevra" uJpexiovnte" ej" ta; 
steinovpora ejmavconto.  
 
… and the Greeks around Leonidas, as they were going forth to 
death, now advanced farther than before to the wider part of the 
pass. When the defensive work of the teichos was being guarded, on 
the previous days they fought withdrawing to the narrower part of 
the pass. (vii.223.2)  
 
Although all the Greeks clearly relied upon the teichos during the previous two 
days, Herodotos more closely identifies its defense with the Spartans.   
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 The Persians defeated the Spartans only by overcoming their teichos. After 
two days of bloody stalemate, Xerxes accepted the Malian Ephialtes' offer to 
guide Persian troops on a mountain path that circumvented the pass at 
Thermopylae (vii.215.1). The Malians first discovered the track and once used it 
to guide the Thessalians around the precursor to the Spartan wall (vii.215.2). 
Although the Spartans initially responded to the Persian maneuver by moving 
away from the wall (vii.223.2), after Leonidas was struck down they retreated 
back towards the teichos: 
e[" te ga;r to; steino;n th'" oJdou' ajnecwvreon ojpivsw, kai; 
parameiyavmenoi to; tei'co" ejlqovnte" i{zonto ejpi; to;n kolwno;n … 
 
Then they withdrew back to the narrow part of the pass, and 
passing by the teichos they went and took up a position on the hill 
… (vii.225.2) 
 
There the Persians pursued and killed the Spartans to a man: 
ejn touvtw/ sfeva" tw'/ cwvrw/ ajlexomevnou" macaivrh/si, toi'si aujtw'n 
ejtuvgcanon e[ti perieou'sai, kai; cersi; kai; stovmasi katevcwsan 
oiJ bavrbaroi bavllonte", oi} me;n ejx ejnantivh" ejpispovmenoi kai; to; 
e[ruma tou' teivceo" sugcwvsante", oi} de; perielqovnte" pavntoqen 
peristadovn. 
 
In that spot the barbarians shooting arrows buried those still 
resisting with daggers, for those to whom daggers still remained, 
and hands and teeth, some following directly and demolishing the 
defensive work of the teichos, others going around stood on all 
sides. (vii.225.3) 
 
While Herodotos portrays the Spartan resistance in terms of their courage and 
the number of Persians they killed, he presents the Spartan defeat as the defeat of 
the old Phocian teichos. At Thermopylae, the Persians first encountered the 
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Spartans at the teichos, used a path designed to circumvent it, and finally killed 
the Spartans amid its ruins.60 
Herodotos moves from a Spartan strategic perspective to an Athenian one 
at Salamis where Themistokles challenged the Greek withdrawal to the Isthmus. 
Previously, the Athenian had quietly accepted Spartan leadership at Tempe and 
Artemisium, where he commanded the Athenian land and naval contingents 
(vii.173.2 and viii.4.2 respectively). Once in Attic waters, however, Themistokles 
balked at another iteration of the Spartan strategy, and instead urged the Greeks 
to adopt a more offensive posture. He and his fellow Greek admirals focused 
their debate on teichea. The Spartans and Peloponnesians favored withdrawing 
the fleet to support the fortifications at the Isthmus. They gave the fleet (the new 
teichos) secondary importance and retained the traditional (and vulnerable) 
teichos-wall as the focus of their defense. Challenging this strategy, Themistokles 
proposed using the naval teichos offensively, to attack the Persians where he 
chose rather than to await the Persian blow from behind a frail wall. 
The historian broadens the Spartan reliance upon the Isthmian wall to 
include all Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesian admirals intended to sail to the 
Isthmus and fortify the position (to;n jIsqmo;n aujtou;" teicevonta" - viii.40.2). The 
                                                
60 The events on the last day at Thermopylae resembled Herodotos' prediction of the outcome of a 
Spartan defense of the Isthmus. The Spartans relied upon a teichos in both cases only to see the 
Persians bypass the position. Herodotos predicts that if the Spartans had defended the Isthmus, 
their allies would have abandoned them when the Persians circumvented the fortification wall (eij 
kai; polloi; teicevwn kiqw'ne" h\san ejlhlamevnoi dia; tou' jIsqmou' Peloponnhsivoisi, 
prodoqevnte" a]n Lakedaimovnioi uJpo; tw'n summavcwn oujk eJkovntwn ajllæ uJpæ ajnagkaivh", kata; 
povli" aJliskomevnwn uJpo; tou' nautikou' stratou' tou' barbavrou, ejmounwvqhsan - vii.139.3). The 
Greeks at Thermopylae adopted a similar course, returning to their own cities after the Persians 
bypassed the old Phocian wall (meta; de; tou'to diakriqevnte" oi} me;n ajpallavssonto kai; 
diaskedasqevnte" kata; povli" e{kastoi ejtravponto - vii.219.2).  As Herodotos predicts (vii.139.4), 
their departure left the Spartans only with the option of dying nobly. 
 
218 
historian delays any mention of the work done by the Peloponnesians at home 
until viii.71.2-73 and instead gives the impression that the sailors' alone would 
build the wall.61 He implies that the Peloponnesian sailors would abandon (if 
only temporarily) their ships in favor of the creation of a teichos on land. Their 
admirals also favored fighting at the Isthmus and advocated moving the fleet to 
fight in its defense (pro; tou§ jIsqmou naumacevein - viii.56). The Peloponnesian 
admirals in effect proposed fighting a naval action in support of a traditional 
teichos. Only Themistokles' threat to withdraw the Athenian naval contingent to 
Italy compelled the Spartan admiral Eurybiades to alter these plans temporarily 
and remain at Salamis (viii.63). When the Persians approached, however, the 
Peloponnesians anticipated defeat (nikhqevnte") and feared lest their homeland 
be undefended (ajfuvlakton - viii.70.2). 
 Herodotos follows the Peloponnesian gaze and moves his narrative to 
events at the Isthmus. There, the Spartan Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas, led a 
Peloponnesian effort to erect a teichos (viii.71.2). Herodotos' catalog of the 
peoples involved in the project (viii.72) recalls the earlier catalog of the Greek 
fleet at Salamis (viii.42.2-48), while emphasizing the Peloponnesian reliance upon 
teichea. When the Peloponnesians at Salamis learned of this construction, they 
once again advocated moving the fleet to the Isthmus where it would serve a 
supporting role (… oiJ ajpo; Peloponnhvsou ajnavgein ta;ß nevaß pro;ß to;n jIsqmovn. 
- viii.79.2). Until Themistokles committed the Greeks to a battle with Xerxes' fleet, 
                                                
61 Later, at viii.71, Herodotos reveals that when news of the defeat at Thermopylae reached the 
Peloponnese, the inhabitants rushed to the Isthmus and began fortifying the narrows. 
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the Peloponnesians focused on the defense and fortification of the Isthmus: they 
planned it, they feared for it, and they built a teichos for it. 
Not even the news of the Acropolis' fall, which reached the Greeks in the 
midst of the Salamis debate, dissuaded the Peloponnesian admirals from their 
preference for the Isthmian teichos. Herodotos uses the sack to illustrate once 
again the inferiority of fortifications. As previously discussed (pp. 209-210), he 
reduces the Athenian interpretations of the 'Wooden Wall' oracle to the teichos-
wall of the Acropolis and the new teichos-fleet, a strategic divide akin to the one 
separating Sparta and Athens. In both debates, Herodotos describes the 
viewpoints or participants as at loggerheads (sunesthkui'ai / sunesthkovtwn – 
vii.142.1 and viii.79.1).62 Presented with the same two strategic options as the 
Greeks, the Athenians chose both. While the majority took ship and abandoned 
Attica (viii.41.1), a few sought refuge behind the wooden wall of the Acropolis 
(to; xuvlinon tei'co" - viii.51.2). Initially these holdouts successfully repelled 
Xerxes' attacks, but the Persians soon turned the wall into a liability (o{kw" 
stuppei'on peri; tou;" ojistou;" periqevnte" a{yeian, ejtovxeuon ej" to; fravgma / 
placing tow around their arrows they ignited them and shot the arrows into the 
barrier - viii.52.1). Next, the besiegers circumvented the barrier, climbing a 
precipitous, but unguarded, section behind gates, and captured the Acropolis 
                                                
62 After dismissing the majority of Athenian viewpoints, Herodotos places the views of the 
Acropolis and fleet in direct opposition (gnw'mai kai; a[llai pollai; givnontai dizhmevnwn to; 
manthvion kai; ai{de sunesthkui'ai mavlista / there were many other opinions of those trying to 
discern the meaning of the oracle and these two came to grips - vii.142.1). At the height of the 
Salamis debate, the historian describes the Greek admirals as implacably opposed as ever 
(sunesthkovtwn de; tw'n strathgw'n / the generals were at loggerheads – viii.79.1).   
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(viii.53.1). In despair, some Athenians transformed the wall from a means of 
protection to one of destruction by leaping from the teichos to their deaths: 
wJ" de; ei\don aujtou;" ajnabebhkovta" oiJ jAqhnai'oi ejpi; th;n 
ajkrovpolin, oi} me;n ejrrivpteon eJwutou;" kata; tou' teivceo" kavtw 
kai; diefqeivronto …  
 
When the Athenians saw them climbing up the Acropolis, some 
hurled themselves down from the teichos and perished … (viii.53.2) 
 
With the fall of the Acropolis, the Athenians would find no traditional teichos to 
protect them and henceforth had to rely upon the new teichos. Yet, the 
Peloponnesians at Salamis failed to perceive the significance of this event. 
Terrified at the news of the Acropolis' fall some immediately manned their ships 
while the remainder reconvened and resolved to fight in the defense of Isthmus, 
choosing the traditional teichos over their ships (pro; tou' jIsqmou' naumacevein - 
viii.56). 
The Athenian admirals, however, favored using the fleet, which 
Herodotos presents as "Athenian."63 The Athenians supplied the most and fastest 
ships (viii.42.2) and without them, as Themistokles stated, “the remainder were 
not battle worthy” (oujkevti ejgivnonto ajxiovmacoi oiJ loipoiv - viii.63). Focusing 
upon the use of the fleet, Themistokles regarded the strategies of fighting at 
Salamis and retreating to the Isthmus as mutually exclusive (ajntivqe" ga;r 
                                                
63 Herodotos (viii.42-48) states that the Greek fleet at Salamis was comprised of 378 triremes 
(excluding penteconters), and exceeded the size of the fleet used at Artemisium. The Athenians 
made up about half the fleet (one hundred eighty triremes), “supplying the best and fastest 
ships” (neva" de; pollw'/ pleivsta" te kai; a[rista pleouvsa" pareivconto  jAqhnai'oi. - viii.42.2). 
The rest of the fleet was comprised of Spartans (sixteen), Corinthians (forty), Sicyonians (fifteen), 
Epidaurians (ten), Troezenians (five), Hermionians (three), Megarians (twenty), Ambracians 
(seven), Leucadians (three), Aeginetans (thirty), Chalcidians (twenty), Eretrians (seven), Ceans 
(two), and Naxians (four). 
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eJkavteron / offsetting them against each other - viii.60a). Whereas he 
characterized the former as a simple naval engagement (naumacivhn), the work of 
the fleet, he portrayed the latter as subordinating or literally “yoking the fleet to 
the Isthmian wall” (ajnazeuvxh/" pro;" to;n  jIsqmo;n ta;" neva"), which he claimed 
would put all of Greece at risk (viii.60a). He based his arguments upon the best 
conditions for the navy: the narrows of Salamis rather than the open sea near the 
Isthmus (viii.60b). 
As Herodotos contrasts the fleet with the Isthmian teichos, so too he 
characterizes Themistokles in terms opposite to the Peloponnesians. The 
Peloponnesian strategoi feared the consequences of defeat at Salamis:  
… ejpilevgonte" to;n lovgon tovnde, wJ" eij nikhqevwsi th'/ naumacivh/, 
ejn Salami'ni me;n ejovnte" poliorkhvsontai ejn nhvsw/,  
 
… arguing that if they were defeated in a naval battle, they being 
on Salamis would be besieged on an island (viii.49.2) 
 
Themistokles, however, expressed his expectation of victory at sea, a belief he 
reiterated immediately before the battle:64 
h]n dev ge kai; ta; ejgw; ejlpivzw gevnhtai kai; nikhvswmen th'/si 
nhusiv… 
 
If events turn out as I expect and we are victorious with our ships… 
(viii.60g) 
 
He also countered the oft-stated desire “to fight at the Isthmus in the defense of 
the Peloponnese” (pro;" to;n  jIsqmo;n kai; pro; th'" Peloponnhvsou naumacevein 
                                                
64 Graham. 1996, p. 325. Graham translates "the troublesome passage": " …at which Themistocles 
alone of them all, on the one hand foretold victory. On the other hand his words were all nobler 
things set against the base, so far as these things arise in the nature and condition of man…" 
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– viii.57.1) with the argument that fighting a naval battle at Salamis would 
accomplish the same goal (aujtou' te mevnwn pronaumachvsei" Peloponnhvsou kai; 
pro;" tw'/  jIsqmw'/ /…remaining here you will be fighting for the Peloponnese and 
the Isthmus - viii.60b). Opposing the Peloponnesian admirals in both strategy 
and location, Themistokles advocated the aggressive use of the teichos-fleet and 
resisted its subordination to the defenses at the Isthmus. 
According to Herodotos, Themistokles never wavered in his advocacy of 
naval action, but took control of the situation and orchestrated a battle at 
Salamis. Failing to persuade Eurybiades to keep the fleet at Salamis, he 
threatened that a withdrawal would cost the support of the Athenian fleet 
(viii.62-63) and twice at night reversed the daytime decision to retreat.65 When 
the Persian army moved towards the Isthmus, though, Themistokles' fellow 
Greeks cursed Eurybiades' "bad counsel" (ajboulivh) and resolved to withdraw 
(viii.74.1-2).66 Instead of the Peloponnesian absence of a plan, Themistokles 
adopted a proactive and offensive stratagem. Sending a message to Xerxes, he 
sought to provoke a battle with the Persians, who quickly blockaded the Greeks 
and cut off their avenue of retreat (vii.75-78). When Aristides reported that they 
were trapped (viii.79), Themistokles claimed responsibility and compelled his 
unwilling allies to act: 
                                                
65 Immerwahr. 1966, p. 272. 
66 Powell. 1960, p. 1. Powell translates ajboulivh here as "(suicidal) folly", a translation he gives for 
its use at vii.9g and vii.210.1. He uses the translation "bad counsel" for ajboulivh at viii.57.2 for 
Mnesiphilos' judgment of the Peloponnesian plan to withdraw to the Isthmus. As ajboulivh 
appears twice in close proximity to one another and in the context of the movement of the fleet to 
the Isthmus, it seems likely that Herodotos is using the term in an identical fashion (“bad 
counsel”) to contrast the two strategic viewpoints. 
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i[sqi ga;r ejx ejmevo ta; poieuvmena uJpo; Mhvdwn. e[dee gavr, o{te oujk 
eJkovnte" h[qelon ej" mavchn kativstasqai oiJ  {Ellhne", ajevkonta" 
parasthvsasqai. 
 
Know that I am responsible for the things done by the Medes. For it 
was necessary, since the Greeks were not willing to engage in 
battle, that they unwillingly be convinced. (viii.80.1) 
 
In the historian’s account, the architect of the fleet becomes the architect of the 
battle. Although the Persians ostensibly launched the attack, Herodotos shows 
that Athenian (Themistoklean) initiative was the real cause. 
After the battle, the Greeks dedicated three captured Phoenician triremes 
as offerings to the gods at Sounion, Salamis, and the Isthmus of Corinth:  
prw'ta mevn nun toi'si qeoi'si ejxei'lon ajkroqivnia a[lla te kai; 
trihvrea" trei'" Foinivssa", th;n me;n ej"  jIsqmo;n ajnaqei'nai, h{ 
per e[ti kai; ej" ejme; h\n, th;n de; ejpi; Souvnion, th;n de; tw'/ Ai[anti 
aujtou' ej" Salami'na.  
 
First they selected other things and three Phoenician triremes as 
victory offerings to the gods, they placed one at the Isthmus, where 
it remained even in my time, the second at Sounion, and the third 
there at Salamis to Ajax. (viii.121.1) 
 
As Reginald Macan notes, the placement of the dedication here does not signify 
that the Greeks erected the monuments immediately after Salamis. Indeed the 
Persians remained a threat to both Attica and the Isthmus for some time to 
come.67 Rather, Herodotos describes the monuments here primarily to emphasize 
the naval victory and the superiority of the Athenian strategy. He draws his 
audience's attention to the Isthmian trireme by noting its survival until his own 
day,68 while curiously displaying no such similar knowledge about the fate of the 
                                                
67 Macan. 1973 (1908), p. 548. 
68 Naiden. 1999, pp. 139-140. 
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two triremes placed on Attic soil.69 The location is the key. By placing the trireme, 
a symbol of the Athenian offensive strategy, at the Isthmus (ej" jIsqmo;n), the site 
of the Spartan-built defensive strategy, Herodotos proclaims not only the Greek 
victory, but also the triumph of the teichos-fleet over the teichos-wall. 
Consistently associating the Spartans and Athenians with two different 
types of teichea, then, the historian frames the Greek campaign of 480 to support 
his judgment in favor of Athens and against fortifications. He links the Spartans 
and the Peloponnesians to the Isthmus, which they used as a launching point for 
their defense of Greece at Tempe, Thermopylae, and the Isthmus itself. After 
Thermopylae, though, Themistokles challenged this flawed strategy in favor of 
the offensive deployment of the fleet at Salamis. Mastering the situation, he 
provoked a battle that vindicated his teichos and his strategy, which Herodotos 
then reifies in the Greek victory monument at the Isthmus.  
 
The Road to Plataea 
 Even after the Athenian-led naval victory at Salamis, Herodotos continues 
to portray the Spartans as wedded to the Isthmian teichos and the Athenians, 
although no longer linked to a fleet, as opposed to such a defensive posture. 
According to the historian, teichea came to dominate Spartan thinking to such an 
degree that only arguments expressed in terms of a teichos finally convinced the 
Lacedaemonians to yield to Athenian initiative and march out against the 
Persian army in Boeotia.  
                                                
69 Macan. 1973 (1908), p. 548. 
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 As Xerxes and a portion of the Persian army withdrew from Greece, the 
Spartans did not turn their thoughts towards counterattack, but instead 
continued to dwell upon defense. Under Spartan leadership the Peloponnesians 
carried on their efforts to fortify the Isthmus, a project that Herodotos portrays as 
almost endless. During the Salamis debate in the fall of 480, the historian leaves 
the audience with the image of the endeavor at its hasty and hurried beginning 
(viii.71.1). He resumes his description of the fortifications in the spring of 479 BC, 
stating that the workers had almost completed the teichos (ix.7.1), giving the 
impression that the Peloponnesians had continued the construction through the 
winter. But in fact they had stopped in mid-October of 480 BC (ix.10.3). 
Furthermore, in 479 BC while the Athenians requested that the Spartans march 
out against the Persians, the Lacedaemonians were continuing to fortify the 
Isthmus and adding a parapet to the wall (a{ma de; to; tei'cov" sfi, to; ejn tw'/ 
jIsqmw/' ejteivceon, kai; h[dh ejpavlxi" ejlavmbane / At this time their wall, which 
was constructed in the Isthmus, now also received a parapet- ix.7.1). The Spartan 
ephors resisted the Athenian requests while the Peloponnesians rushed to 
complete their work (ejn de; touvtw/ tw'/ crovnw/ to;n jIsqmo;n ejteivceon spoudh;n 
e[conte" pollh;n pavnte" Peloponnhvsioi / At this same time all the 
Peloponnesians were hastily completing the Isthmian fortification - ix.8.1).70 
Herodotos criticizes these efforts by equating the Isthmian wall to the 
nadir of the siege of Troy: the wall constructed around the Achaean ships. He 
                                                
70 Although he does not draw upon Herodotos' language, Thucydides seems to model his 
description of Themistokles' delay and deception of the Spartans in 479, while the Athenians 
hurriedly rebuilt their city walls, on this earlier passage (Thuc. i.93).  
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lays the groundwork for this allusion in the initial Athenian demand for help 
from Sparta. When Mardonius began his march southward in 479 BC, the 
Athenians threatened to seek some other refuge (ajlewrh;n) unless the Spartans 
came to their aid (ix.6.2). This term is the same one that Homer uses to describe 
the Achaean redoubt around their ships (Iliad xii.57). While the Spartans delayed 
their response, the Peloponnesians augmented the Isthmian wall with a parapet 
(ejpavlxi" - ix.7.1), to which Homer frequently refers when describing a Trojan 
assault on a particular part of the Achaean defenses.71 The Spartans set out to 
oppose the Persians after they had built (deivmasan) the wall (ix.10.2), a verb 
Homer uses five times to describe the construction of the Achaean Wall.72 
Through this similar language, Herodotos colors the Spartan teichos in Homeric 
terms to evoke an image of the Achaean heroes at bay behind their hastily 
reconstructed defenses, the victims of Hektor's initiative. 
The Spartans abandoned the Isthmian defenses only when the ephor 
Chileos used the language of teichea to illustrate the short-sighted nature of their 
strategy. He equated the Athenian fleet to large gates cut through the teichos: 
 jAqhnaivwn hJmi'n ejovntwn mh; ajrqmivwn, tw'/ de; barbavrw/ summavcwn, 
kaivper teivceo" dia; tou'  jIsqmou' ejlhlamevnou karterou', megavlai 
klisiavde" ajnapeptevatai ej" th;n Pelopovnnhson tw'/ Pevrsh/.  
 
If the Athenians are no longer our friends, but allies of the Persians, 
although a strong teichos has been driving across the Isthmus, great 
gates to the Peloponnese will be flung open to the Persians. (ix.9.2) 
 
                                                
71 Iliad xii.258, 263, 308, 375, 381, 397, 406, 424, 430. 
72 Iliad vii.337, 436, ix.349, xii.683, xiv.32. 
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Invoking the essentials of Herodotos' argument in vii.139, Chileos at last 
convinced the Spartans to adopt a more offensive posture in the only language 
they seem to understand: the language of fortifications. Lest any doubt lingers, 
Herodotos records the Persians second sack of Athens on the eve of Pausanias' 
departure from the Isthmus (ix.13.2). The historian places the sack, like the 
destruction of the Acropolis, amid discussions of Greek strategy, to emphasize 
the folly of relying upon fortifications against the Persians.  
 In contrast, Herodotos continually portrays the Athenians as favoring an 
aggressive strategy. When the Greeks pursued the retreating Persian fleet as far 
as Andros, Themistokles used the Greek fleet to extort money from Carystos and 
Paros (viii.112). In the absence of the Persian fleet in 479, however, the Athenians 
began to agitate for aggressive action on land. They resisted relying upon 
fortifications, abandoning Athens a second time (ix.13.2), and repeatedly pressed 
the Spartans to forsake their defenses and lead the army out against the Persians 
(viii.144; ix.6 – ix.11). At Plataea, Herodotos again reminds his audience of the 
divergence of strategic thought between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians 
during the Tegean/Athenian debate. He includes the invasion of the Heraklids 
in both speeches, describing the Tegean defense of the Isthmus (ej" to;n jIsqmo;n – 
ix.26.3) and the Athenian aid to the aggressors (ix.27.2). Since both sides claimed 
victory, Herodotos offers no insight into the superiority of each strategy, but 
merely reinforces his association of the Peloponnesians (and Spartans) with 




 Herodotos, then, uses the negative connotation of traditional teichea to 
define the strategic debate between Sparta and Athens during the Persian War. 
Beginning at vii.139, Herodotos identifies each side with a different type of 
teichos that symbolizes their natures. The Spartans continually worked on 
defensive positions, bolstered by traditional teichea, from which to oppose 
Xerxes' advance. Contrary to the ethos of hoplite combat, the Spartans withdrew 
behind these walls to withstand the invasion of Greece. The Athenians, on the 
other hand, stood before the walls and went out to meet the enemy in the field. 
Beginning at Salamis, they fought against Spartan reticence and urged the 
Greeks to seize the initiative. For this action they employ a new type of teichos, a 
fleet, which its architect Themistokles built and intended for offensive action. The 
historian clearly favors this new Athenian teichos, first proclaiming its 
importance at vii.139, then displaying the folly of traditional teichea against the 
Persians, and ultimately noting the placement of a captured Phoenician trireme 
before the ramparts of the untested Isthmian wall. After his account of Salamis, 
Herodotos equates this teichos with the wall around the Achaean ships at Troy, 
comparing the Spartan strategy to the Achaean low-point of the Iliad. 
Throughout his account of the war in 480 and 479 BC, the historian’s negative 
impression of teichea shapes his criticism of the Spartan policy of defense and his 
praise of Athenian aggression (particularly at sea). 
 
Teichea and the Rise and Fall of Empire 
Herodotos not only uses teichea to reify strategies, but also to illustrate an 
empire's rise or fall. As his presentation of Greek strategy of 480/79 BC makes 
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clear, the historian associates fortifications with a flawed policy of passive 
defense, which is hardly a characteristic of a successful imperial power. Indeed 
he establishes the negative connotation of teichea in part through the Persian 
siege-craft displayed during the rise of Cyrus (pp 188-199). Thus, as the fortunes 
of Persia wane and those of Athens rise during the account of Xerxes' invasion of 
Greece, Herodotos represents the transfer of power in the language of teichea. 
The old empire of Persia that overcame fortifications prior to and during the 
invasion in 480 BC, faltered after the triumphant sack of Athens. Reeling from 
the defeat at Salamis, the Persians had difficulty conducting subsequent sieges. 
Moreover, as they lost the initiative, they began to rely on fortifications for their 
own protection; a transformation similar to the fateful reversal experienced by 
Darius during the Scythian campaign. Meanwhile the nascent imperial power of 
Athens, which eschewed reliance upon teichea to combat Xerxes' invasion, 
became increasingly proficient against fortifications. The Athenians displayed 
the siege-craft and patience at siege operations for which the Persians were once 
well known, signaling the rise of their imperial star. Herodotos emphasizes this 
transfer of power by making the Athenians the key agents for the overthrow of 
the Persian fortifications at Plataea, Mycale, and Sestos, indicating another turn 
in the cycle of history.  
The Persians operated outside of teichea for the majority of the Histories. 
They enjoyed remarkable success against fortifications during their conquests 
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(and re-conquests) of Babylon, Egypt, Libya, Cyprus, and Western Asia Minor,73 
while never relying on fortifications for their own protection. Herodotos reverses 
the Persian relationship with teichea only twice: during Darius' invasion against 
Scythia and Xerxes' invasion against Greece. In both campaigns the Persians 
turned to teichea for protection, lost the initiative, and went down in defeat.  
Scholars have noted the strong parallels in both campaigns, paying particular 
attention to the similarities between Scythian and Athenian strategies.74 These 
studies overlook, however, the additional parallels of fortifications and sieges 
that also exist. In Scythia, for the first time the Persians lost the initiative in a 
campaign.75 Driving into Europe, Darius and his army met no appreciable 
resistance since the Scythians withdrew before the Persian advance. The nomadic 
existence of the Scythians and their lack of poleis prevented the Persians from 
utilizing one of their best military weapons: the siege. Only when Darius reached 
the abandoned wooden fortified town of Gelonus did he find a normal campaign 
element,76 a fortification, which he promptly burned:  
ejpeivte de; ej" th;n tw'n Boudivnwn cwvrhn ejsevballon, ejnqau'ta dh; 
ejntucovnte" tw'/ xulivnw/ teivcei>, ejkleloipovtwn tw'n Boudivnwn kai; 
kekenwmevnou tou' teivceo" pavntwn, ejnevprhsan aujtov.  
 
When they [the Persians] advanced to the land of the Budini, then 
encountering a wooden wall, the Budini having fled and the wall 
being unoccupied, they burned it. (iv.123.1) 
 
The destruction of the wooden wall marked the highpoint of Darius' campaign. 
                                                
73 Cyrus conquered Babylon (i.178-186); Darius re-conquered Babylon (iii.151-159); Egypt (iii.13); 
Libya [Barca] (iv.200f); Cyprus (v.115); Harpagus conquered Western Asia Minor (i.163-176); 
Western Asia Minor after the Ionian Revolt (vi.18-35). 
74 Immerwahr. 1954, pp. 25-26. Hartog. 1988, pp. 36-7, 41. 
75 Hartog. 1988, p. 41. 
76 Hartog. 1988, p. 48. 
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After this first sign of success, though, the Persians shifted to a defensive 
policy based upon teichea. They constructed field fortifications for the first time, 
perhaps seeking to secure their hold on the territory.77 They apparently adopted 
the strategy of epiteichismos, the creation of a stronghold in enemy territory 
permanently manned by a garrison,78 when Darius ordered the construction of 
eight large forts (ojktw; teivcea ejteivcee megavla) near the banks of the Oarus river 
(iv.124.1).79 Herodotos, however, immediately dispels any sense of gain or 
security. Presenting the forts diachronically, he reduces them to ruins before the 
audience's eyes (tw'n e[ti ej" ejme; ta; ejreivpia sova h\n / the ruins of these 
survived to my own time - iv.124.1). He shows that no Persian soldiers would 
man these ramparts, thus implying an impending Persian withdrawal and shift 
in the campaign. 
According to Herodotos, the Scythians seized the initiative at this point. 
They enacted their plan to draw Darius into the territory of neighboring peoples 
who had refused to aid them (iv.125). The Persian advance continued but under 
the direction of the Scythians,80 who lured the Persians ever onward and 
prolonged the campaign until the would-be conquers began to run short of 
supplies. Unable to live off the land Darius at last withdrew, sacrificed a portion 
of his army, and retired across the Danube into safety (iv.134-142).81 In his 
account of the campaign, then, the historian uses the teichea to indicate the shift 
                                                
77 Hart. 1982, p. 76. 
78 Garlan. 1974, p. 24. 
79 Hartog. 1988, p. 48.  
80 Hartog. 1988, p. 41. 
81 Cf. Cambyses’ unsuccessful invasion of Ethiopia (iii.25). See chp. 1, pp. 17-24. 
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in initiative from the Persians to the Scythians. The Persians enjoyed moderate 
success in Scythia that culminated in the destruction of a wooden teichos and then 
quickly dissipated as they built forts along the Oarus to secure their position. 
Although Herodotos alludes to a similar future inversion of Persian and 
Athenian fortunes at the beginning of Xerxes’ invasion of Europe,82 he does not 
immediately alter the invaders’ and defenders’ previously established 
relationships with teichea. Whereas the Persians enjoyed continued success 
against fortifications, the Athenians, like most non-Persians, struggled against 
teichea. Prior to the European invasion, the Athenians only conducted (or 
participated in) four sieges: Sardis, the Athenian Acropolis, Myrina, and Paros. 
They achieved only partial success at Sardis during the Ionian Revolt, failing to 
take the central acropolis (v.100-102). They successfully captured their own 
acropolis (held by the Spartan king Cleomenes) and Myrina (v.64-65; vi.140), but 
failed completely against Paros (vi.133-136).  
Herodotos provides the greatest detail for the last siege, showing that 
teichea still presented a stumbling block to Athenian ambitions. Anticipating their 
imperial future,83 the Athenians, under the command of the victor of Marathon, 
Miltiades, threatened to blockade the island unless the Parians give them one 
hundred talents (vi.133.2). The Parians, however, effectively countered Miltiades' 
                                                
82 vii.106-107: After Xerxes reviewed his troops at Doriskos, the historian looks ahead to the years 
immediately following the invasion when the Greeks besieged both Doriskos and Eion. Whereas 
he notes that the Greek ( JEllhvnwn) attempts to seize the fortress failed (vii.106), he highlights the 
successful Athenian capture of Eion (vii.107.1-2). After a prolonged siege they overcame the 
determined resistance of the governor, Boges, who committed suicide when his position became 
untenable (vii.107.2). Looking ahead, the historian shows that the Athenians would expand their 
imperial fortunes in the same manner as the Persians: through the defeat of teichea. 
83 Raaflaub. 1987, p. 239. 
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assaults and doubled the height of their teichos anywhere it appeared vulnerable 
(vi.133.3). While the Persians successfully overcame similar enhancements to 
Ionian teichea (i.141.4, 164f), Miltiades and the Athenians could not, their failure 
illustrating that they had not yet reached the status of an imperial power. 
Herodotos further symbolizes the barrier teichea still presented to Athenian 
imperial ambitions by noting that Miltiades' injury, which ended the siege, came 
as the general attempted to leap over a small wall (aiJmasih;n) that was part of a 
larger temple wall in front of the city (to;n pro; th'" povlio" ejovnta e{rko" - 
vi.134.2).  
The Persians continued to dominate teichea. Aside from their failure at 
Naxos (v.34), they never failed to capture a fortified position. Herodotos 
continues this victorious association during Xerxes' invasion of Europe, which he 
begins at the Persian fortress (tei'co") of Doriskos (vii.59.1). After reviewing his 
troops, Xerxes led his army through Thrace, which had fallen under Persian 
control a few years prior (iv.93f). The Persians passed near the Samothracian 
forts (teivcea) at Mesembria and Styme (vii.108.2) and afterwards marched close 
to the walls of the Pierian forts (teivcea) at Phagres and Pergamus (vii.112). It is 
unclear whether these fortifications had been abandoned in the face of the 
Persian advance or defeated in prior years. Regardless, the image of the Persians 
marching past these teichea illustrates the point that no teichos presented an 
obstacle to the Persians. Herodotos ends the Perisan march through Thrace at the 
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Persian fortress at Eion (vii.113),84 marking each stage of Xerxes' march through 
Europe with teichea.  
When the Persians moved south into Greece, they continued to march 
through fortified (or defended) positions. Entering Thessaly, Xerxes chose a route 
that skirted the position that the Greeks had intended to guard at Tempe 
(vii.173.4). At Thermopylae, they overcame a Spartan-led position that largely 
relied upon a teichos (pp. 214-217). Finally, they invaded Attica and besieged the 
wooden wall (xuvlinon tei§co") of the Acropolis, which the Persians first ignited 
(viii.52.1) and later captured (viii.53.1). The historian highlights this conquest 
through the calculation of the distance that the Persians marched to Athens 
(viii.51.1) and through his extended description of the Persian sack (viii.53-54). 
Hence, he culminates the Persian campaign in the same manner that he used to 
note its progress, through the capture of teichea. 
As with the burning of the xuvlinon tei'co" at Gelonus, Xerxes' destruction 
of the Acropolis, marked a turning point for the Persians, who soon would lose 
the Battle of Salamis. Herodotos indicates this change in fortune in part through 
allusions to the fall of Croesus in his narration of the Athenian defeat (Acropolis) 
and victory (Salamis). Both the Lydian king and the Athenian holdouts believed 
their teichea would remain impregnable (ajnavlwton) against a Persian assault, an 
adjective that the historian uses in the context of these two sieges alone.85 
                                                
84 Herodotos describes the fortifications (teivcei> … teivceo") of Eion earlier at vii.107. 
85 i.84.3: Telmhssevwn dikasavntwn wJ" perieneicqevnto" tou' levonto" to; tei'co" e[sontai Savrdie" 
ajnavlwtoi / The Telmessians proclaimed that if the lion were taken around the teichos then Sardis 
would be impregnable. viii.51.2: pro;" de; kai; aujtoi; dokevonte" ejxeurhkevnai to; manthvion to; hJ 
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Moreover, the Persians captured both citadels in a similar fashion: they scaled a 
precipitous (and hence unguarded) section of the fortifications and took the 
defenders by surprise (i.84 and viii.53). The victory at Salamis, though, saved the 
Athenians from total subjugation. The historian highlights this difference 
through the differing victory dedications (ajkroqivnia) made after the falls of 
Sardis and Athens. He only uses this term four times in his narrative: twice after 
the fall of Croesus, and twice after the battle of Salamis. In the first case, Cyrus 
placed Croesus on a pyre as a victory dedication (ajkroqivnia - i.86.2). But after 
Apollo rescued the former-Lydian king, Croesus sent the chains of his new 
servitude to Delphi as an ironic victory dedication (ajkroqivnia … pevda" - i.90.4). 
After the sack of Athens, however, Xerxes made no victory dedication. Instead, 
the historian reserves the term for the Greek victory dedications after Salamis, 
including the dedication of three captured Phoenician triremes (ajkroqivnia a[lla 
te kai; trihvrea" trei'" Foinivssa" - viii.121.1). Herodotos uses these allusions to 
the fall of Croesus to show that the capture of the Acropolis did not defeat the 
Athenians. 
In the wake of the Greek naval victory, the historian begins to alter the 
relationships of Athens and Persia with teichea. Convincing the Greeks not to 
pursue the retreating Xerxes in 480 BC, Themistokles invested Andros and 
demanded payment (viii.111.1). The Andrians successfully resisted the attempt 
at extortion, but the Carystians and Parians, fearing similar treatment, supplied 
                                                                                                                                            
Puqivh sfi e[crhse, to; xuvlinon tei'co" ajnavlwton e[sesqai / Next, they thought that they had 




the Athenians with money (viii.112.2). Themistokles failed to capture Andros, 
but his ability to extort money from the Parians where Miltiades had previously 
failed indicates a change in Athenian siege-craft and fortunes. 
As Athens rose, Persia fell. After escorting Xerxes to Abdera, the Persian 
general Artabazus returned to Greece to rejoin Mardonius. During the march he 
learned that the Olynthians, Potidaeans, and the rest of the inhabitants of the 
Pallene peninsula had thrown off the Persian yoke (viii.126). Leading an army of 
60,000 picked troops, Artabazus quickly reduced Olynthos (viii.127), but failed to 
take Potidaea. He first tried to capture the polis by treachery, but the Potidaeans 
uncovered the plot (viii.128.2-3). Next, he settled down for a prolonged siege, 
investing the city for three months during the winter of 480/79 BC without 
result. Finally he attempted to exploit a weakness in the Potidaean defenses, 
much as the Persians had done at Sardis and the Athenian Acropolis. At low tide 
he sent his troops through the shallow water to cross to Pallene, but the 
resurgent tide surprised the Persians, drowning some, while the Potidaeans 
slaughtered the remainder (viii.129.2). Recognizing his defeat, Artabazus 
withdrew and resumed his march to rejoin Mardonius. Such a failure is 
unparalleled in the Histories. Herodotos does not blame the Persian commander, 
as at Naxos (v.33-34), but uses the defeat to display the breakdown in Persian 
teichomachia. 
After this defeat, the Persians succeeded in capturing only one final 
teichos: Athens for a second time. When Mardonius moved south in the spring of 
479 BC, he captured the completely abandoned city (ix.3.2). The Persian general 
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demolished any standing wall (teicevwn), house, or temple (ix.13.2), but his 
victory was a "weak copy" of Xerxes, who had avenged the Athenian sack of 
Sardis in the previous year.86 While the historian depicts the Persians as still 
capable of defeating teichea, he indicates a significant reduction in their once 
nearly infallible siege-craft. 
Herodotos couples this reduction with an increasing Persian reliance upon 
teichea for protection. Aside from two cases of unused fortifications,87 the Persians 
never relied on fortifications during a campaign until their defeat at Salamis. 
When Xerxes realized the extent of the disaster, he resolved to withdraw to 
protect the bridge at the Hellespont, but desired to give the illusion of continued 
offensive action. Thus, he constructed a mole towards Salamis:  
qevlwn de; mh; ejpivdhlo" ei\nai mhvte toi'si {Ellhsi mhvte toi'si 
eJwutou' ej" th;n Salami'na cw'ma ejpeira'to diacou'n, gauvlou" te 
Foinikhivou" sunevdee, i{na ajntiv te scedivh" e[wsi kai; teivceo", 
ajrtevetov te ej" povlemon wJ" naumacivhn a[llhn poihsovmeno".  
 
Wishing not to be detected either by the Greeks or his own men he 
he tried to build a mole to Salamis, and he tied together 
Phoenicians merchant ships so that they might serve both as a 
bridge and a teichos, and he made preparations for war as though 
he was going to fight another naval battle. (viii.97.1) 
 
Although Xerxes convinced the Greeks that he intended to continue the 
offensive, the teichos reveals the king's defensive mindset to the audience. The 
barrier of bound ships does not represent a mobile teichos like the Greek fleet, but 
rather a purely defensive measure. According to Powell, the historian uses this 
                                                
86 Immerwahr. 1966, p. 287. 
87 iv.124 and vii.191. The Persians began construction on forts along the Oarus River in Scythia 
during Darius' campaign, but abandoned them to pursue the Scythians. During Xerxes' invasion 
of Greece, some shipwrecked Persian sailors hastily constructed a wall from their wreckage to 
protect themselves from possible Thessalian attacks, which never materialized. 
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teichos to mean "a wall across a pass" akin to the use of teichos to describe the 
Isthmian wall and the old Phokian wall at Thermopylae.88 Herodotos uses this 
teichos to indicate an immediate sea change in Persian strategy after their defeat. 
Defensive thinking and reliance upon teichea spread from Xerxes to his 
troops. During the spring of 479 BC, Mardonius and his fellow generals, 
anticipating defeat, gave unprecedented attention to paths of retreat and relied 
increasingly upon teichea and other defenses to bolster their position both on and 
off the battlefield. After sacking Athens, Mardonius withdrew the Persian army 
to Boeotia for two reasons (ix.13). First, he regarded Attica as poor ground for his 
cavalry, one of his chief assets, and second he feared that a small force of Greeks 
could easily block his path of retreat if the battle should go against the Persians 
(ix.13.3). The trend continued at Plataea. When the Persian generals discussed 
strategy for the upcoming battle, Artabazus suggested that Mardonius withdraw 
the army to the fortified city of Thebes:  
bouleuomevnwn de; ai{de h\san aiJ gnw'mai, hJ me;n jArtabavzou wJ" 
creo;n ei[h ajnazeuvxanta" th;n tacivsthn pavnta to;n strato;n ijevnai 
ej" to; tei'co" to; Qhbaivwn, e[nqa si'tovn tev sfi ejsenhnei'cqai 
pollo;n kai; covrton toi'si uJpozugivoisi … 
 
These were the opinions of the ones taking counsel, the view of 
Artabazus was that it would be best if striking camp as quickly as 
possible the whole army went to the teichos of Thebes, where great 
stores of grain had been brought in for them and fodder for their 
draught animals … (ix.41.2) 
 
The general favored using bribes rather than battle to deprive the Greeks of their 
freedom (ix.41.3). His choice of refuge, a walled city (tei'co"), and reference to 
                                                
88 For other uses of teichos to describe a fortification across a pass or narrows see: vii.139.3, 4; 
viii.71.2; ix.7.1, b1, 9.2, 10.2 and vi.176.3, 4, 5, 208.2, 215, 223.2, 225.2, 3 respectively. 
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supplies, however, recalls the preparations for a siege, as Mardonius later 
indicated: 
jArtabavzou de; qw'ma kai; ma'llon ejpoieuvmhn to; katarrwdh'sai 
Lakedaimonivou" katarrwdhvsantav te ajpodevxasqai gnwvmhn 
deilotavthn, wJ" creo;n ei[h ajnazeuvxanta" to; stratovpedon ijevnai 
ej" to; Qhbaivwn a[stu poliorkhsomevnou":  
 
I rather marveled at Artabazus that he should fear the 
Lacedaemonians and fearing them that he should propose the most 
cowardly opinion that it would be best striking camp to go to the 
city of Thebes and be besieged – (ix.58.3)  
 
Yet while Mardonius rejected Artabazus' strategy, he had adopted some of its 
features, establishing a defensive position along the Asopus and constructing a 
refuge (krhsfuvgeton) for his army should the upcoming battle go badly:  
ejnqau'ta de; tw'n Qhbaivwn kaivper mhdizovntwn e[keire tou;" 
cwvrou", ou[ti kata; e[cqo" aujtw'n ajllæ uJpæ ajnagkaivh" megavlh" 
ejcovmeno", boulovmeno" e[rumav te tw'/ stratw'/ poihvsasqai, kai; h]n 
sumbalovnti oiJ mh; ejkbaivnh/ oJkoi'ovn ti ejqevloi, krhsfuvgeton 
tou'to ejpoieveto.  
 
Then although the Thebans had gone over to the Medes, he cleared 
the land, moved not out of enmity towards them but great 
necessity, and wanting to build a defensive work for his army. He 
also built it as a refuge for the army when it went into battle if 
events turned out not as he would wish. (ix.15.2)  
 
The anticipation of a Persian defeat and rout has no precedent in the Histories. 
The Persians completely abandoned their previous boldness and sought to 
augment their strength through teichea. 
 Herodotos uses the Plataean refuge to highlight the reversal of Persian 
and Greek fortunes. The historian calls the defensive work an e[ruma, the same 
term he applies to the old Phokian wall to which the Spartans retreated on the 
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last day of Thermopylae (vii.223.2, 225.3). When the Spartans arrived at the 
Asopus and took up a position opposite the Persians (ix.25, 31), they saw the 
same thing Xerxes' army had seen when it confronted Leonidas’ force: an army 
using a defensive work to increase the security of its position. The Persian 
redoubt also recalls the Athenian defenses on the Acropolis. During the first 
invasion of Attica in 480 the Persians burned (purpolevesqai) the land of their 
enemies as part of an offensive operation (viii.50) and assaulted the wooden wall 
protecting the Acropolis, the refuge of a few Athenians: 
pro;" de; kai; aujtoi; dokevonte" ejxeurhkevnai to; manthvion to; hJ 
Puqivh sfi e[crhse, to; xuvlinon tei'co" ajnavlwton e[sesqai: aujto; 
dh; tou'to ei\nai to; krhsfuvgeton kata; to; manthvion kai; ouj ta;" 
neva".  
 
Next, they thought that they had discovered the meaning of the 
oracle, which the Pythia gave, that the wooden wall would remain 
impregnable; that according to the oracle this itself would be the 
refuge and not the ships. (viii.51.2) 
 
In Boeotia, Mardonius instead ravaged the territory of his ally (e[keire tou;" 
cwvrou") to create a similar refuge (krhsfuvgeton) for his own men (ix.15.2). Later, 
when the battle went against the Persians, they retreated to this refuge, now 
described as a wooden teichos (xuvlinon tei§coß), which the Athenians successfully 
besieged (ix.70.1-5). The redoubt symbolizes the inversion of the Persian 
relationship with fortifications from offensive to defensive. 
 During the battle itself the Persians even fought defensively and 
depended upon barricades formed from their wicker shields (gerra) for 
protection, a tactic that they had never before employ in the Histories. After the 
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Greek commander Pausanias decided to withdraw the Greek army from its camp 
along the Asopus, Mardonius ordered his men to attack (ix.59.1). Although 
acting offensively in the pursuit, the Persians adopted an implicitly defensive 
posture with their wicker shields (gerra) when they encountered the retreating 
Spartans: 
fravxante" ga;r ta; gevrra oiJ Pevrsai ajpivesan tw'n toxeumavtwn 
polla; ajfeidevw" … 
 
Making a barricade of their wicker shields the Persians unstintingly 
fired many arrows … (ix.61.3) 
 
While the barrier stood the Persians acquitted themselves well, but the battle 
turned when the gerra fell: 
ejgivneto de; prw'ton peri; ta; gevrra mavch. wJ" de; tau'ta 
ejpeptwvkee, h[dh ejgivneto hJ mavch ijscurh; paræ aujto; to; 
Dhmhvtrion kai; crovnon ejpi; pollovn, ej" o} ajpivkonto ej" wjqismovn:  
 
At first the battle was around the gerra-barricade. But when these 
had fallen, then the fighting was fierce around the temple of 
Demeter and continued for a long time, until they came into a 
battle-scrum; (ix.62.2)  
 
At this point, Herodotos suddenly describes the Persians as “unarmed” (a[noploi 
– ix.62.3), as though they had possessed no other significant arms.89 The Spartans 
soon killed Mardonius, routed the Persians (ix.63.1-2), and pursued them to the 
Persian refuge (ix.65.1). Thus, while the Persians began the battle of Plataea on 
the offensive, they fought the battle defensively, relying upon the gerra 
barricades and the teichos of their camp for protection. 
                                                
89 Hartog. 1988, p. 45. 
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 Herodotos deepens the Persian commitment to a defensive strategy and 
measures at Mycale. The Persian fleet, believing themselves to be no match for 
the Greek fleet, withdrew towards the coast of Ionia (ix.96.1-2). Beaching their 
ships at Mycale, they took refuge (katafugovnte") with the Persian army under 
Tigranes (ix.96.2-3). Once there the Persians constructed a palisade and defensive 
work around their ships and a refuge for themselves:  
uJpo; tou'ton me;n dh; to;n strato;n ejbouleuvsanto katafugovnte" oiJ 
tou' nautikou' strathgoi; ajneiruvsai ta;" neva" kai; peribalevsqai 
e{rko" e[ruma te tw'n new'n kai; sfevwn aujtw'n krhsfuvgeton.  
 
The admirals decided to take refuge under the protection of the 
army, to draw the ships ashore, and to erect a palisade and 
defensive works around the ships and a redoubt for themselves. 
(ix.96.3) 
 
Herodotos accentuates the fortified nature of the Persian position and the 
reversal of Persian fortunes by the repetition of three terms of fortification 
(e{rko", e[ruma, and krhsfuvgeton), which he uses earlier in the narrative to 
describe Greek defenses.90 The Persians conducted the battle in a defensive 
manner as well. Like Mardonius, Tigranes selected and protected his line of 
retreat before the battle (ix.99.3). During the battle, the Persians again erected a 
barricade of wicker shields (gerra):  
e{w" mevn nun toi'si Pevrsh/si o[rqia h\n ta; gevrra, hjmuvnontov te 
kai; oujde;n e[lasson ei\con th'/ mavch/: ejpeivte de; tw'n jAqhnaivwn 
kai; tw'n prosecevwn oJ stratov", o{kw" eJwutw'n gevnhtai to; e[rgon 
kai; mh; Lakedaimonivwn, parakeleusavmenoi e[rgou ei[conto 
proqumovteron, ejnqeu'ten h[dh eJteroiou'to to; prh'gma. diwsavmenoi 
ga;r ta; gevrra ou|toi ferovmenoi ejsevpeson aJleve" ej" tou;" Pevrsa", 
                                                




oi} de; dexavmenoi kai; crovnon sucno;n ajmunovmenoi tevlo" e[feugon 
ej" to; tei'co". 
 
While the Persian gerra-barricade stood, they defended themselves 
and had no disadvantage in the battle; but when the army of the 
Athenians and those adjacent to them urging one another on, so 
that the achievement would be theirs and not the Lacedaemonians’, 
worked more keenly, thereafter the battled turned. For charging 
and thrusting aside the gerra-barricade they fell en masse on the 
Persians, who receiving the attack and defending themselves for 
some time finally fled to the teichos. (ix.102.2-3) 
 
Herodotos links Persian fortunes on the battlefield to their gerra-barricade. Once 
it collapsed, they were lost. As at Plataea, Herodotos uses teichea to illustrate the 
defensive (and hence doomed) strategy of the Persians. For the second time the 
Persians anticipated defeat and prepared for it, ensured secure routes for retreat, 
and built defensive works for protection. 
  In both battles Herodotos gives the Athenians a critical role, attributing to 
them an increasing mastery of siege-craft. At Plataea, when the Persians 
retreated to the wooden wall of Mardonius' redoubt, the pursuing Spartans 
attempted to break through these defenses, but failed:  
oiJ de; Persai kai; oJ a[llo" o{milo", wJ" katevfugon ej" to; xuvlinon 
tei'co", e[fqhsan ejpi; tou;" puvrgou" ajnabavnte" pri;n h] tou;" 
Lakedaimonivou" ajpikevsqai, ajnabavnte" de; ejfravxanto wJ" 
hjdunevato a[rista to; tei'co": proselqovntwn de; tw'n 
Lakedaimonivwn katesthvkeev sfi teicomacivh ejrrwmenestevrh.  
 
The Persians and the rest of the host, when they fled to the wooden 
teichos, reaching it first climbed up into the towers before the 
Lacedaemonians arrived, and having climbed up they strengthened 
the teichos and so defended themselves well; when the 
Lacedaemonians came a rather fierce battle for the wall developed 




The Persians mounted a credible defense until the arrival of the Athenians, who 
tore down sections of the teichos:  
e{w" me;n ga;r ajph'san oiJ jAqhnai'oi, oi} dæ hjmuvnonto kai; pollw'/ 
plevon ei\con tw'n Lakedaimonivwn w{ste oujk ejpistamevnwn 
teicomacevein: wJ" dev sfi jAqhnai'oi prosh'lqon, ou{tw dh; ijscurh; 
ejgivneto teicomacivh kai; crovnon ejpi; pollovn. tevlo" de; ajreth'/ te 
kai; liparivh/ ejpevbhsan jAqhnai'oi tou' teivceo" kai; h[ripon:  
 
Until the Athenians arrived, they [the Persians] defended 
themselves and had the better of the Lacedaemonians since they 
did not understand siege-warfare; but when the Athenians 
attacked, there was a fierce battle for the wall for a long time. But 
finally by valor and perseverance the Athenians mounted and 
breached the wall; (ix.70.2)  
 
According to Herodotos, the Athenians succeeded because they possessed the 
knowledge needed to besiege a wall, which the Spartans lacked (ix.70.2); they 
displayed this talent again at the battle of Mycale. When the Persians fell back to 
their redoubt (e[feugon ej" to; tei'co"), the Athenians led the Corinthians, 
Sicyonians, and the men of Troezen through the teichos (ix.102.3). Herodotos does 
not mention the use of any particular siege-craft, but the capture of the Persian 
camp was largely an Athenian military success.91 The historian, then, attributes 
the formerly Persian talent for siege-craft and storming fortifications to the 
Athenians, who put it to use against the Persians themselves in 479 BC. 
 Herodotos also ascribes the ability to conduct a protracted siege to the 
Athenians, a skill they lacked in the time of Miltiades. After the Greeks found the 
bridge across the Hellespont destroyed, the majority returned home, but the 
                                                
91 Immerwahr. 1966, p. 302. He notes the similarities in the Athenian participation in defeating the 




Athenians under Xanthippos laid siege to Persian-held Sestos (ix.114.1). 
Protected by the very strong walls of the city (wJ" ejovnto" ijscurotavtou teivceo" - 
ix.115), the Persians held out for several months, beyond the normal 
campaigning season (ix.117). Nevertheless the Athenians endured the hardship 
(ix.117) and continued the siege through the winter months of 479/78 BC until 
they at last took the town (ix.118.2). They displayed the patience of the Persians 
of old to carry out a lengthy siege. Unlike the account of Thucydides (Thuc. 
i.89.2), Herodotos omits the Asiatic Greeks from his account. While this may 
merely be a case where Herodotos has chosen to focus upon the Athenians,92 it 
alters the audience's perception of the siege. The omission emphasizes the 
Athenian role and their ability to conduct a prolonged siege. 
By the end of the Histories, then, with respect to teichea, Herodotos 
presents the Athenians as the new Persians.93 He ascribes to them the siege-craft 
necessary for the establishment of an empire. As the Persians began to rely 
increasingly upon teichea for their own protection, the Athenians discovered a 
newfound and previously Persian talent with teichomachia. The historian gauges 
the state of an imperial power through this relationship with teichea, whether 
reliant upon them or attacking them. He depicts a teichos as a flawed construct 
that most attackers easily overcome. A thriving empire acts offensively and 
expands its influence by conducting successful sieges. When an empire adopts a 
                                                
92 Flower and Marincola. 2002, p. 300. 
93 Raaflaub. 1987, p. 229. Raaflaub notes that the Persians (both at the crown council at the 
beginning of the Persica and Artabanus' discussion with Xerxes) deal with issues of imperial 
power that would have been familiar to the Athenians of the fifth century. The fifth-century 
Athenian audience, then, would be able to see themselves in the Persians and come to identify 
the Athenians as the new Persians.   
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more defensive stance and begins to rely upon teichea for its own protection, it 
has entered a state of decline (albeit not necessarily collapse). Herodotos traces 
such a transition of imperial fortune from Persia to Athens. He depicts the 
decline of the Persian Empire after Salamis through their new reliance upon 
teichea. At the same time, the historian foreshadows the growing imperial power 
of Athens through a growing Athenian ability to conduct successful sieges. 
Herodotos links these changes in imperial fortune by reversing the roles of 
besieger and besieged. Whereas the Persians began the campaign on the 
offensive, besieging and sacking the Athenian Acropolis, after Salamis the 
Athenians were responsible for assaulting and overcoming the Persian 
fortifications at Plataea, Mycale, and Sestos. The Persian skill and patience with 
teichomachia and with it their imperial status passed steadily and inexorably to 
the Athenians.  
 
Conclusion 
The Athenian victory at Sestos was merely the last defeat in a long series 
of failed fortifications. Throughout the Histories, teichea have a consistently 
negative connotation. They fail. Defenders cannot ensure their security through 
teichea, no matter how formidable or reinforced. Herodotos builds this 
connotation through his description of the rise of Persia under Cyrus and his 
consistent association of teichea with failure. He uses the emphatic presentation of 
four teichea in book I (Sardis, Ecbatana, Phocaea, and Babylon) to highlight a 
growing Persian mastery of teichomachia.  He perpetuates this initially negative 
depiction throughout the Histories. In general attackers use treachery, patience, 
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and military force, to capture fortified positions 86.0% of the time and the 
Persians succeed nearly every time (96.7%). This rate of failure does not 
accurately reflect the real protection defenders derived from teichea in fifth-
century warfare. But the Herodotean bias against teichea, which is designed to 
invert their expected connotation with security, makes all attempts at a fortified 
defense seem suspect and even foolish. 
Unlike other charged objects within the Histories, then, Herodotos does 
not limit the additional meaning of teichea to one portion of his work. Rather, he 
uses them as thematic objects, expanding the scope of the object's manipulation 
to embrace every instance of its use.94 These objects come to symbolize military 
failure in whatever context they appear. As the historian expands the scope of his 
manipulation, so also he expands the ability of an object to convey additional 
meaning. The audience readily recognizes the object's meaning and allows 
Herodotos to build an argument immediately upon its foundations.  
 The historian uses this thematic object as a concrete indicator of strategy 
and imperial fortune. First, he defines the opposing Greek strategies during the 
Persian War in terms of teichea, praising an offensive strategy independent of 
fortifications versus a defensive strategy reliant upon them. He links traditional 
teichea, particularly the fortifications at the Isthmus of Corinth, with the Spartan 
efforts to defend Greece. Since the historian regards teichea as ultimately flawed, 
he judges that the Spartan reliance upon fortifications was foolish and 
                                                
94 As a result of this Herodotean bias, a reassessment of fifth-century Greek siege warfare is 
needed. Based in part upon Herodotos’ account, previous studies have perhaps over-estimated 
the efficacy of Greek siege-craft.  
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foredoomed to failure. Opposed to the Spartan teichos, Herodotos places the 
Athenians and a new type of teichos: the Greek fleet. He uses the fleet's intrinsic 
mobility, opposite to the static nature of a traditional teichos, to symbolize the 
offensive strategy of the Athenians. Agency matters as much as the object. 
According to Herodotos, the Peloponnesians would have used the fleet merely to 
bolster the strength of the Isthmian fortifications, subordinating the fleet to a 
traditional teichos. In the hands of the Athenian admiral Themistokles, however, 
the fleet seized the initiative and achieved victory. After the battle of Salamis, the 
Athenians remained advocates for an offensive strategy, which Herodotos now 
defines not through the fleet, but by Athenian opposition to the continuing 
Spartan effort to fortify the Isthmus. The Greek victory, in the view of Herodotos, 
stemmed from the Athenian advocacy of an aggressive strategy divorced from 
teichea. 
Second, the historian uses teichea as an indicator of imperial fortune. He 
establishes a relationship between fortifications and imperial power: thriving or 
ascendant empires conduct successful sieges and do not rely upon teichea for 
their own protection. He casts the Persians in the role of the aggressors for most 
of the Histories, tracing their rise and conquests in part through successful sieges. 
After the Greek victory at Salamis, however, the Persians lost the initiative in 
Greece and Herodotos represents this change through teichea. Once infallible in 
siege warfare, the Persians experienced unprecedented difficulties. As their own 
siege-craft faded, they turned to teichea for protection, constructing fortifications 
at Plataea and Mycale. In the Histories, defeat accompanies the teichos and with it 
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the ruin of Persian imperial ambitions in Europe. Herodotos synchronizes the 
ascent of Athenian imperial fortunes with Xerxes' reversals and signifies this rise 
through a newfound Athenian siege-craft. Formerly unskilled at siege warfare, 
the Athenians developed both the patience to conduct a prolonged siege and the 
technical skill to capture a teichos by storm. They practiced these formerly Persian 
skills against the Persians themselves, overcoming fortifications at Plataea, 
Mycale, and Sestos. Imitating the old Persian relationship to teichea, the 
Athenians emerged as the new imperial power in the Aegean.  
 Thus, although a thematic object possesses only one meaning, it has many 
potential applications. Creating such objects through initial emphatic 
presentations and subsequent consistent association of the object with a core 
meaning, Herodotos creates a powerful tool to advance an argument throughout 
his narrative. Although the current study has limited itself to the examination of 






In the present study, then, I have examined the manner in which 
Herodotos enhances the meaning of his text through objects. They are, I suggest, 
alterable yet fixed loci of a Herodotean sub-text. Evoking particular connotations 
through their contexts, the historian replaces and reshapes the objects, creating 
wellsprings of implicit meaning for the audience to examine and understand. 
 Herodotos uses these objects for a variety of purposes. In addition to 
adding layers of meaning to his narrative, the historian enlists these charged 
objects to display and compare character traits. He uses royal monuments to 
foreshadow the fates of monarchs and their kingdoms. Through a heroic corpse, 
he casts the Athenians in the role of an epic hero. Finally, presenting teichea in the 
context of failure, he contrasts strategies and traces the rise and fall of empires. In 
addition to these individual readings, however, this study suggests that 
Herodotos based his use of objects on broader cultural connotations. The 
additional meanings he derives for common objects, such as clothes and bows, 
are based largely upon existing connotations. Whether he invented or borrowed 
them, however, the historian reveals a clear understanding of the manipulation 
and arrangement of objects and their connotations.  
Defining the methods that Herodotos uses to create these meanings, 
however, is somewhat problematic. The complexity of his work discourages 
rigid categorization. Even so, I suggest that there are patterns in the historian’s 
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approach to objects and his manner of manipulating and imbuing them with 
additional meaning. Similar to most authors, Herodotos uses the context of a 
passage to evoke a particular connotation from an object. But a study of an 
object’s meaning within its context must look beyond the immediate passage. 
The historian uses objects as a means to coordinate the meanings of various logoi 
in the paratactic structure of his text. Cambyses’ shooting of Prexaspes’ son with 
his bow indicates his madness, but when read within a broader context it is 
revealed to be a tool by which he evaluates and compares the Persian king to his 
royal contemporaries Amasis and the Ethiopian king. In addition, the individual 
failures of the myriad of teichea in the Histories take on a new meaning when 
viewed within the scope of the entire work. The historian’s patterning argues in 
favor of the unity and cohesion of his work. 
Although scholars have studied objects with additional meaning in other 
ancient authors, none have analyzed the manner in which an author manipulates 
or shapes these objects and their meanings. In the case of the Histories, Herodotos 
creates a cinematic effect. Presenting the audience with an image of an object, he 
alters or replaces it with a related image and provides the audience with a new 
perspective on the same (or similar event). Together these images create a text of 
meaning or connotations centered on the object(s). While scholars have studied 
the historian’s use of repetition, they have never focused their examination upon 
objects. Yet objects, even more than the historian’s language, provide a superb 
focal point for repetition and substitution. When the historian replaces one term 
with another, he often indicates a subtle change in meaning. But when he 
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replaces one object with another, he not only alters the object’s meaning, but also 
changes its role in the narrative. When he replaces the Lydian Queen’s chiton 
with a himation, he alters both the object and its significance within the logos; for 
the removal of a veil signifies something different than the removal of a negligee. 
Moreover, this coordinated reading of repeated and replaced objects suggests 
that other types of repetition, such as Herodotos’ use of variant versions, should 
be examined in a similar way.  
Finally, the historian displays an intriguing conception of time. Although 
other authors, such as Homer, present objects diachronically, revealing their 
pasts or futures in a brief analepsis or prolepsis, little study has been given to this 
manipulation. Through his diachronic presentation of objects, Herodotos, for 
one, concedes the ultimate fragility of objects in the face of time. Although the 
majority of his objects suffer no ill effect, the historian acknowledges the danger 
in his proem and correlates the passage of time and its effects upon objects to the 
legacy of individuals. His treatment of these objects reinforces one of the avowed 
purposes of his narrative – the preservation of erga. Moreover, similar to his use 
of repetition and substitution of an object, the historian uses time to give the 
audience additional perspectives. Through his diachronic presentation of objects, 
he suggests that some things cannot be understood unless viewed both at their 
beginnings and their ends (or at least current states).  
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Appendix A: Teichea in the Histories 
 Type of 
Fortification 
Location of Teichos and Context Result 
i.26.2 city-wall Walls of Ephesus – Lydian 'siege' defensive – siege (successful) 
i.80.6 city wall Walls of Sardis – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
i.81 city wall Walls of Sardis – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
i.83 walled city Walls of Sardis – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
i.84.1, 3  
bis (3) 
city wall Walls of Sardis – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
i.85.3 walled city Walls of Sardis – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
i.98.3-5 (3) palace The city and walls of Ecbatana defensive 
i.99.1 palace The city and walls of Ecbatana defensive 
i.141.4 city wall Walls of Ionian Cities – Persian sieges defensive– siege (successful) 
i.149.1 walled city List of Aeolic towns includes "New 
Wall" city 
non-defensive 
i.150.1 city wall Walls of Smyrna.  defensive– siege 
(successful)1 
i.162.2 city wall Walls of Ionian Cities – Persian sieges defensive– siege (successful) 
i.163.3, 4; 
i.164.1 bis, 
2, 3 (6) 
city wall Walls of Phocaea – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
i.168 walled city Walls of Teos – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
i.178.3 city wall Walls of Babylon – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
i.179.1-4 
(5) 




city wall Walls of Babylon – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
i.184 city wall Walls of Babylon – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
ii.118.3, 4 city wall, 
walled city 
The Greek siege of Troy defensive– siege (successful) 
ii.121g1 city wall Rhampsinitus hangs the headless body 
outside the wall (of the city) 
defensive 
ii.148.2 wall across 
passage 
The wall around the labyrinth. It 




city wall Memphis – during the Persian siege. defensive– siege (successful) 
iii.14.1 city wall Memphis – review of Egyptian 
prisoners after fall of the teichos. 
defensive– siege (successful) 
iii.39.4 city wall Walls of Samos - Polykrates forces 
Lesbian prisoners dig a moat around 
the walls. 
defensive 
iii.54.1 city wall Walls of Samos – Spartan siege. defensive– siege (failed) 
iii.55.1 city wall Walls of Samos – Spartan siege. defensive– siege (failed) 
iii.74.3 palace wall Prexaspes story – Magi propose he meet 
them at the palace wall. 
non -defensive 
iii.91.3 fort The White Castle at Memphis. defensive 
iii.151.1 city wall Walls of Babylon – Persian siege. defensive– siege (successful) 
                                                
1 Although the men of Colophon did not march as an armed body and took Smyrna through a 
traditional siege, they seized the town through one recognized method of a siege (treachery) and 
used force of arms to hold their prize. 
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iii.153.2 walled city Walls of Babylon – Persian siege. defensive– siege (successful) 
iii.155.4-6 
(3) 
city wall Walls of Babylon – Persian siege. defensive– siege (successful) 
iii.158.1 ter 
(3) 
city wall Walls of Babylon – Persian siege. defensive– siege (successful) 
iii.159.1 city wall Darius pulls down the walls of Babylon defensive– siege (successful) 
iv.12.1 fort The ruins of a Cimmerian fortress 
described immediately after the 
Scythian conquest of the Cimmerians. 
defensive (implicit failure)2 
iv.46.3 walled city The Scythians are a people without 
fortified town. 
non-defensive 
iv.78.4 city wall The Scythian king Scylas would visit 
the settlement of the Borysthenites 
(enter the walls) and live a Greek life. 
defensive 
iv.108.1 city wall The walls of Gelonus. defensive– siege (successful) 
iv.123.1 (2) city wall, 
walled city 
The walls of Gelonus – Darius burns the 





fort Persian forts in Scythia. defensive (failed)4 
iv.200.2 
bis (2) 
city wall The walls of Barca – initial Persian 
difficulties. 
defensive– siege (successful) 
iv.201.3 
bis (2) 
city wall The walls of Barca – Persian capture of 
the town. 
defensive– siege (successful) 
iv.202 bis 
(2) 
city wall The walls of Barca – The Persians 
punish the Barcans 
defensive– siege (successful) 
v.34.1 bis 
(2) 
city wall The walls of Naxos – The Naxians 
prepare for the siege. 
defensive– siege (failed) 
v.34.3 fort The fort of Naxos – The Persians build 
forts for the Naxian exiles 
defensive 
v.64.2 city wall Athenian Acropolis – Cleomenes 
besieges and removes Hippias from 
Athens. 
defensive– siege (successful) 
v.77.3 city wall Athenian Acropolis – Reference to the 
Persian siege of 480 BC. 
defensive– siege (successful) 
v.115.2 city wall The wall of Soli – Persian siege. defensive– siege (successful) 
v.125 fort Hecataeus suggests to Aristagoras that 
he build a fort on the island of Leros, 
but Aristagoras does not follow this 
advice. 
defensive 
vi.7 city wall The walls of Miletos – Persian siege 
(impending) 
defensive– siege (successful) 
vi.18 city wall The walls of Miletos – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
vi.33.1 walled city Greek towns in the Hellespont – Persian 
sieges. 
defensive– siege (successful) 
                                                
2 The Scythians did not besiege the Cimmerian fortress, but since Herodotos places the teichos in 
the context of the Scythian conquest of Cimmeria he implies the failure of the fort to resist the 
Scythian aggression. 
3 The Persian capture of the abandoned fortifications at Gelonus did not constitute a traditional 
siege, but since it fits the general pattern of Persian success against fortifications it is counted as 
such for this study. 
4 The Scythians never besieged the Persian forts, but since the Scythians succeeded in driving the 






city wall The walls of Thasos – Histiaeus' siege. defensive– siege (failed) 
vi.48.1  city wall The walls of Thasos – The Thasians tear 
down their walls in response to the 




city wall The walls of Eretria – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
vi.133.2, 3 
(2) 
city wall The walls of Paros – Miltiades' siege. defensive– siege (failed) 
vi.137.2 city wall Athenian Acropolis – construction defensive 
vii.59.1 fort Fortress at Doriscus – construction defensive 
vii.107.2 
bis (2) 
city wall The walls of Eion – Athenian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
vii.108.2 walled city The Samothracian walls (forts) defensive (failed)5 
vii.112 bis 
(2) 





The Isthmian wall built by the Spartans. defensive 
vii.141.3 city wall The wooden wall (Athenian fleet) defensive 
vii.142.2 
bis, 3 (3) 
city wall The wooden wall (Athenian fleet) defensive 
vii.143.2 city wall The wooden wall (Athenian fleet) defensive 
vii.176.3, 
4, 5 (3) 
wall across 
passage 






Old Phocian wall at Thermopylae defensive– siege (successful) 
vii.215 wall across 
passage 
Old Phocian wall at Thermopylae defensive– siege (successful) 
vii.223.2 wall across 
passage 





Old Phocian wall at Thermopylae defensive– siege (successful) 
viii.51.2 city wall Athenian Acropolis – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
viii.53.2 city wall Athenian Acropolis – Persian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
viii.71.2 wall across 
passage 
The Isthmian wall – construction defensive  
viii.97.1 wall across 
passage 
Persian breakwater at Salamis. defensive 
ix.7.1 wall across 
passage 
The Isthmian wall – additional 
construction. 
defensive 
ix.7b1 wall across 
passage 
The Isthmian wall – additional 
construction. 
defensive 
ix.9.2 wall across 
passage 
The Isthmian wall – additional 
construction. 
defensive 
ix.10.2 wall across 
passage 
The Isthmian wall – additional 
construction. 
defensive 
ix.13.2 city wall The walls of Athens – Persian sack (2nd) defensive– siege (successful) 
                                                
5 Although the Persians had previously conquered Thrace, the appearance of the forts in the path 
of the Persian march emphasizes the failure of the Thracians to ward off the expansion of Persian 
power. 
6 see n. 5. 
7 The Spartans did not strictly use the Old Phocian wall to resist a Persian siege, but the teichos 
played an integral role in their defense of the pass and was the position they held. 
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ix.15.3 fort The Persian fort in Boeotia – 
construction 
defensive 
ix.41.2 walled city The walls of Thebes – Artabazus urges 
Mardonius to retreat to Thebes. 
defensive 
ix.65.1 fort The Persian fort in Boeotia – Greek 
siege 
defensive– siege (successful) 
ix.66.3 fort The Persian fort in Boeotia – Greek 
siege 
defensive– siege (successful) 
ix.66.3 walled city The Persian fort in Boeotia – Greek 
siege 
defensive– siege (successful) 
ix.70.1 bis, 
4 (3) 
fort The Persian fort in Boeotia – Greek 
siege 
defensive– siege (successful) 
ix.86.2 city wall The walls of Thebes – Greek siege defensive– siege (successful) 
ix.98.2 wall across 
passage 
The Persian fort at Mycale – Greek siege defensive– siege (successful) 
ix.102.3 
ter, 4 (4) 
fort The Persian fort at Mycale – Greek siege defensive– siege (successful) 
ix.106.1 bis 
(2) 
fort The Persian fort at Mycale – Greek siege defensive– siege (successful) 
ix.115 walled city The walls of Sestos – Athenian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
ix.117 walled city The walls of Sestos – Athenian siege defensive– siege (successful) 
ix.118.1 (2) walled city, 
city wall 




Appendix B: Sieges in the Histories 
 
 Place and 
Defender 
Attacker Method Success/ 
Failure 
i.15 Colophon Lydians – Gyges military force success 
i.16 Smyrna Lydians – 
Alyattes 
military force success 
i.17-i.25.1 Miletus Lydians – 
Alyattes 
prolonged siege failure 




military force success 
i.80.6-84 Sardis – Croesus Persians – Cyrus military force success 
i.103 Nineveh Medes – 
Phraortes 
military force failure 
i.106 Nineveh Medes – 
Phraortes 
military force success 





i.154 Sardis – Persian 
governor 
Tabalus 
Lydian rebels – 
Pactyes 
military force failure 
i.160.1 Cyme (no siege) Persians(no 
siege) 
threat of siege no siege; people 
of Cyme feared a 
siege. 












i.169 (x9) Asiatic Greek 











threat of military 
force 
success 




prolonged siege success 




military force success 
i.178-186 Babylon – 
Babylonians 
Persians – Cyrus prolonged siege success 
ii.118 Troy – Trojans Achaeans prolonged siege success 









military force success 
iii.54-56 Samos – 
Polycrates 
Spartans military force failure 




military force success 
iii.151-159 Babylon – 
Babylonians 
Persians - Darius prolonged siege success 
                                                
1 According to Herodotos, Harpagus captured the poleis of all of the other Ionians (oiJ dæ a[lloi 
[Iwne"), except the Milesians, in a manner similar to his capture of Phocaea (i.169.1). 
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iv.123 Gelanus – 
abandoned 
Persians – Darius military force success 
iv.200-201 Barca – Barcaean Persians prolonged siege success 
v.34 Naxos – Naxians Persians – 
Aristagoras 
military force failure 
v.62.2 Leipsydrium – 
Athenian exiles 
Peisistratids (?) military force? success 













Athenians military force, 
prolonged, siege 
success 
v.100-102 Sardis – Persians Athenians and 
Asiatic Greeks 
military force failure 




military force failure 
v.115 (x4) Towns of Cyprus 
– Cypriots2 
Persians military force success 
v.115 Soli – Cypriots Perisans military force 
(tech) 
success 
vi.18 Miletus – 
Milesians 
Persians military force 
(tech)  
success 
vi.22, 25 Samos – Samians Persians threat of military 
force 
success 
vi.25 Zancale Samians military force success 
vi.26, 27 Chios – Chians Histiaeus military force success 
vi.28 Thasos – 
Thasians 
Histiaeus military force failure 
vi.31 (x12) Chios, Lesbos, 
Tenedos, and 
Ionians of the 
mainland.3 
Persians military force success 
vi.33.1 (x2) Towns in the 
Hellespont on 
the Asiatic coast.4 
Persians 
(Phoenicians) 
military force success 




military force success 
                                                
2 Although Herodotos does not list them by name, he claims at v.104.1 that all of Cyprus (except 
Amathus) rebelled from the Persians. Later, after the defeat of the Ionians and Cypriots the 
Perisans besieged all of the towns of Cyprus except Salamis (kai; ta;" povli" tw'n Kuprivwn 
poliorkeumevna" ta;" a[lla" plh;n Salami'no") and captured them all (v.1115). If the Persians did 
not besiege Salamis and Amathus remained loyal, then the Persians conducted at least four other 
sieges: Marium, Citium, Idalium, and Paphos.  
3 Since Herodotos deals with the siege of Miletus elsewhere, the remaining Ionians would have 
been – Myrus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebebus, Teos, Clazomenae, Phocaea, and Erythrae. 
4 Although Herodotos does not name the poleis on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, his use of 
the plural (ta; ga;r ejpi; dexia;) suggests that the Persians took by assault (uJpoceivria h\n gegonovta 









military force success 
vi.35, 37, 40 Chersonese – 
Miltiades 
Persians threat of military 
force 
success 
vi.46-48 Thasos – 
Thasians 
Persians – Darius threat of military 
force 
success 
vi.99 Carystus – 
Carystians 
Persians military force, 
burned crops 
success 
vi.101 Eretria – 
Eretrians 
Persians betrayal success 
vi.133-136 Paros – Parians Athenians – 
Miltiades 
military force failure 
vi.140 Myrina Athenians military force success 
vii.105-106 Doriscus – 
Mascamus the 
Persian 
Greeks (post 479 
BC) 
military force failure 
vii.107 Eion – the 
Persian Boges 
Athenians prolonged siege success 




Gela – Gelon and 
Hippocrates 
military force success in all 
save Syracuse. 
vii.170.1 Camicus (a town 
in Sicily) 
All the Cretans 
except the people 
of Polichna and 
Praesus 
prolonged siege failure 
vii.200, 208-225 Thermopylae - 
Spartans7 
Persians – Xerxes military force success 
viii.28 Phocians Thessalians military force not a siege? 





Persians – Xerxes military force success 











threatened siege not a siege 




military force success 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Herodotos mentions the Chersonnese, which contains many communities (ejn th/' povlie" sucnai; 
e[neisi), Perinthus, the strongholds on the Thracian coast (ta; teivcea), Selymbria, and Byzantium. 
Again, since Herodotos uses the plural in two cases, the Persians (Phoenicians) took and burned 
(katakauvsante") at least six communities. Although it is not clear that all these communities 
were walled, it is likely the majority were. 
6 It is not clear that the Phoenicians besieged these cities, but they did capture (ejxairhvsonte") 
further unnamed communities in the Chersonnese. 
7 Strictly speaking the action at Thermopylae was not a siege. Since the Spartans rekued so 
greatly upon the old Phocian wall (teichos) for the defense of the pass, however, the Persian attack 
is treated as an assault upon a fortified position. 
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military force success 
ix.58.3 Thebes – 
Persians 
Greeks military force proposed siege – 




Greeks military force success 
ix.86-88 Thebes – 
Thebans 
Greeks Threat of 
military force 
success 
ix.96-97, 102 Persian 
fortifications at 
Mycale 
Greeks military force success 
ix.114-118 Sestos – Persians Athenians – 
Xanthippus 
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